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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem and Hypotheses of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to determine if there is 
any significant difference between the way students of high and of 
low religiosity view themselves. 
The basic hypotheses of this study are as follows: (1) there 
is no significant difference in the self evaluation of students of 
high and of low religiosity; (2) there is no significant difference 
in the stability of the self-reports of students of high and of 101'1 
religiosity; and (3) there is no significant difference in certain 
personality factors of students of high and of low religiosity. 
B. Rationale of Study 
This study developed out of an interest in the problems, needs, 
and aspirations of college students, as they face a world of cata-
clysmic changes and startling scientific developments. A few of the 
underlying reasons for this study are: (1) rapid increase of student 
population, (2) changing purposes and values of college life, (3) grow-
ing administrative and academic responsibilities of faculty and staff, 
(4) dynamic influence and importance of poUtical, economic, and social 
issues and ideologies, and (5) an increasing national interest in 
religion. 
1 
1lan;y recent studies have highlighted and analyzed the mood, 
behavior, and thinking of contemporar,y college students.l These 
studies indicate that there has been a shift in the students ' atti-
tudes and value references. As a result, a revolution in values 
2 
emerged emphasi zing a trend that reflects the student perceiving from 
an externalized frame of reference where his self image has become 
influenced primari~ by other students. For example, the hypothesis 
of Riesma.n•s book, The LoneJ.y Crowd, is that there has been a change 
in the disposition of the American people, whose character was formerly 
"inner-directed." Although The LoneJ.y Crowd asserts that the tendency 
is now toward the 11 other-directed" character, it fully acknovrledges 
and discusses the confluence and consequences of these two types of 
character in contemporar.y American Society.2 
Phillip E. Jacobs' study reveals uniformity and conformity of 
student values and amazing~ little change during their four years in 
college. According to this study, students, irrespective of the 
college attended or the major subjects pursued, appear to be essen-
tial~ self;_centered, bent on material security and comfort. They 
1. Recent value studies of college students indicate that major 
shifts in value orientation are under way. See the cross-national 
study attempted by James W. Gillespie and Gordon W. Allport of Harvard 
University. Students were asked to write concerning their future plans. 
This study was entitled, "Autobiography: From Now to 2000 A.D." Ira D. 
Reid made a similar study of Haverford College, 1952. See Gillespie and 
Allport's Youth's Outlook on the Future (New York: Random House, 1955). 
2. David Riesman, et al., The Lonel.z Crowd (New York: Doubleday 
Anchor, 1956). As explained In this book, the "Inner-directed" persons 
are those--like pioneers and individualists--who internalize adult 
authority; the "other-directed" persons are those whose character is 
formed chief~ by the example of their peers and contemporaries. 
3 
tend to conform to the general mores of American Society although 
being som~hat more conservative, more tolerant, and less prejudiced 
than the general public or certain classes of students. They want to 
see a world of peace and justice but are not as a whole participating 
in crusades in order to transform their ideals into realities.l 
out of this concern with student attitudes and values, the 
present study was conceived. It therefore proposes to deal with the 
factors of personality, religion, and values experienced by a judi-
ciously selected cross section of 124 male and female members of the 
freshmen class at Clark College, a church-related college for Negroes 
in the deep south. To the knowledge of the writer, this is the first 
time a study of this nature has been made of a group of Negro students 
in a church-related college. 
C. Definitions 
This study is based upon a phenomenological approach. Therefore, 
important phenomenological terms must be defined and certain postulates 
made clear. 
(1) 
(2) 
The postulates are: 
All behavior is lawful. This is a necessar,y assumption of 
aqy system, since chance behavior would be unpredictable. 
Behavior is completely determined by and pertinent to the 
phenomenological field of the behaving organism. 
1. Phillip E. Jacobs, Ch~ing Values in Colle~e (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. ~ The ifm of this s uqy is to see 
whether college training "makes or does not make a difference in a 
person's life." Jacobs• inquiry is made by performing certain com-
parisons; one between college graduates and the general public; one 
between first year students and upper classmen; and certain so-called 
"longitudinal comparisons" aimed at showing changes in the outlook of 
the same student at different stages of growth. 
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(3) There is some relationship between the phenomenological 
fields of different individuals. This is a necessary 
assumption since control is impossible if one individual 
is unable to affect another's field. The locus of rela-
tionship, usually presumed to be an underlying reality, 
is not open to observation. 
(4) The characteristics of the parts of the phenomenological 
field are determined by the character of the field itself. 
More specifical~, the direction and the degree of differ-
entiation are determined by the phenomenological needs of 
the be haver. 
(.5) Differentiation takes time. It follows from this prin-
ciple that the way to accelerate learning is to arrange 
the situation so that the required differentiations are 
either more obvious or are unnecessary.l 
Important phenomenological terms are defined as follows: 
1. Self-concept. "The self-concept includes those parts of 
the phenomenal field which the individual has differentiated as 
definite and fairly stable characteristics of himself.n2 
2. Self-Report. The term, "self-report," used in this study 
in preference to self-concept, designates the way an individual may 
view himself. "Self-reporttt is a function. 11Self-concept11 is a 
perceptual organization. Since this study is based upon the actual 
reports of the subjects, the term, "self-report," is more accurate 
than the term, ttself-concept."3 Hence, the author uses the term 
"self-report." 
1. Donald Snygg, "The Phenomenological Field," Psychological 
Theory, ad: Melvin H. 1larx (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), 
PP• 326-327. 
2. .Arthur Combs and Donald Snygg, Individual Behavior (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 194!:>), P• ID. 
3. Or.-lo Strunk, Jr., 11Notes on Self-Reports and Religiosity," 
Psychological Reports, XXIX (March, 19.58), 29. 
s 
3. Phenomenal Self. The "phenomenal self" when applied to the 
total theoretical and empirical content of this study "includes all 
those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual experiences, 
as part or characteristic of himse1f.nl 
4. Phenomenal Field. Combs and Snygg offer an explanation of 
the term: 
Unlike the "objective" physical field, the phenomenal field 
is not an abstraction or an artificial construction. It is 
simply the universe or naive experience in which each 
individual lives, the eve~ situation of self and sur-
roundings which person takes to be reality.2 
5. Ideal Self. The "ideal self," is the self an individual 
would like to be.n3 It is not to be confused with the self an 
individual feels he should be. Further clarification of this term 
has been made by contemporary research psychologists, Taylor and 
Combs. It is their contention that the ideal self is not equated 
fUlly with either the ego-ideal or the super-ego, as usually defined. 
They further assert that the ideal self may include elements of ego, 
super-ego, and is in most cases, in varying combinations, perhaps, 
with the ego-ideal and super-ego dominant.4 
6. Generalized other Concept. The "generalized other concept," 
as both Rogers and Sullivan use the term is that concept which denotes 
1. Combs and Seygg, Individual Behavior, p. 58. 
2. Ibid., P• 15. 
-
3. c. Congdon, "Self Theory and Chlorpromazine Treatment," 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1958). 
4. c. Taylor and A. Combs, "Self-Acceptance and Adjustment," 
Journal of Consulting Psychology, XVI (April, 1952), 89-91. 
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that every person tends to perceive other persons in terms of his own 
experience. Proposition XVIII of Rogers• theoretical system states: 
When the individual perceives and accepts into one consistent 
and integrated system all his sensory and visceral experiences, 
then he is necessari~ more understanding of others and is more 
accepting of others as separate individuals.! 
Sullivan discusses "the generalized other" as follows: 
If there is a valid and real attitude toward the self, that 
attitude will manifest as valid and real toward others. It is 
not that ye judge so shall ye be judged, but as ye judge your-
self, so shall ye judge others;: strange but true so far as: I 
lmow, and with no exceptions .2 
Hence, the "generalized other concept" is a facet of self-theory 
denoting the nature of perception. 
7. Religiosi;ty. Ot"lo Strunk defines religiosity in the follow-
ing way: 
The Religiosity Index was constructed with religiosity being 
operational~ defined as fair~ frequent attendance at church, 
regular contributions of money and time to the church, the 
reading of some type of religious literature, regular prayer 
activity, a belief that the person's awn religious beliefs and 
needs were stronger than the average when compared with those 
of peers, and the admittance of a feeling that some sort of 
religious belief is necessary for a mature outlook on life.3 
D. Scope and Limitations 
1. Scope. The scope of this dissertation includes two basic 
sections. The first section consists of a historical survey of the 
1. c. Rogers, Client-centered Therapy (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1951), P• 520. 
2. H. Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Pmhiatry (Washington: 
William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, ~), p. 7. 
3. o. Strunk, "Relationship Between Self-Reports and Adoles-
cent Religiosity," Psychological Reports, IV (March, 1958), 685. 
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Self-concept and the development of phenomenological psychologies 
(Chapters I, II, and III). The New Phenomenology of Combs and Snygg 
is ini tial.ly projected in this phase of the dissertation. The second 
section consists of the experimental aspect which contains the basic 
presupposi tiona, problem, hypotheses, methods, instruments, findings, 
and conc.lusions of the stu.d1' (Chapters IV, V, VI, am VII). 
2. The new phenomenological approach as a delimiting factor, 
This study does not emphasize the metaphysical implies tiona of its 
phenomenological theory. Because the New Phenomenological approach 
is based on the subjects' own experiences as ths.Y perceived them, 
these experiences are considered more significant than the events 
which are the direct result of them. Hence, this study is limited by 
a pqchological rather than philosophical perspective. 
3. The problem and other delimiting factors. The problem of 
this dissertation is to determine if there is any significant differ-
ence between the way students of low and of high religi.osi ty view 
themselves, In structuring the problem of the dissertation, the scope 
which it envelops is further limited. The problem necessitates a 
theoretical and experimental analYsis of a population of subjects who 
are classified as having high or low religiosi 'GY traits, The problem 
does not include the subjects whose self-reports indicate an average 
index of religiosity. Furthermore, the problem is 1imi. ted because of 
its reliance upon statistical computations and not mere speculations. 
Thus, the signifiQ4nce of difference factors included in the problem 
emerges out of statistical theory and method. Finally, the problem 
of this stuqy stresses the subjects• religiosity from a behavioral or 
8 
functional viewpoint. Religiosity, observed within this context of 
the problem~ is operationally defined. By assigning to religiosity 
a definite meaning, the investigator excludes maQy interpretations 
and definitions which normal~ would be treated when religious atti-
tudes and behavior are considered from a philosophical point of view. 
The methods used in this study also delimit its scope. The 
choice of the title of the dissertation~ the formulation of its 
problem~ the development of its rationale, the formation of its defi-
nitions, and the application of its empirical research, further 
illustrate the delimitation of its methods. 
Another limiting factor of this research design is the type of 
subjects used in its experimental phase. These subjects were classi-
fied according to number, age, sex, intelligence quotient, denomin~ 
tion, race, college setting, religiosity, and self-reports. The 
maximum number of subjects participating in the study was 124. The 
subjects' mean age was 18.57. Female and male students were subjects. 
The mean intelligence quotient of the average subject did not exceed 
90.63 nor fall below 89.26. ~ Methodist and Baptist subjects took 
part in the experiment. ~ Negro subjects were active subjects. 
White students were not used as active subjects. A large variety of 
colleges was not made the setting for this study; instead, the small, 
southern, church-related Negro college community was its setting. 
Diversified religious beliefs were not the central concern of this 
study. On the contrary, the subjects' religiosity was the major focus 
of the investigation. 
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4. The self-reports as basic delimiti?g factors. Finally, 
the scope of this study is delimited by the investigator's assessment 
of the self-report. Because the self-report is the product of the 
individual's total perception and behavior, perceptive or otherwise, 
it is determined both by what the individual senses and the situation 
in which he is involved. The accuracy of the self-reports included 
in this study was both determined and conditioned by the following 
factors: 
a. Clarity of the subjects • awareness. Since the phenomenal 
self varies in degrees of clarity, some concepts of self at aqy moment 
may emerge as figure while at other times the self-concept may be 
viewed as ground. The degree to which an individual is clearly aware 
of himself will in part determine the degree to which his self-report 
will be considered precise. 
b. Lack of adequate symbols for expression. Unless adequate 
symbols are used, communication tends to be short circuited. Ideally, 
the self-report should be congruent with the phenomenal self; however, 
the self-report is open to error because of its involvement in 
conmrunication. 
c. Social expectancy. The social milieu tends to influence 
and to predetermine how one may express his perception. The self-
report is likewise limited. 
d. Cooperation of the subject. This research project is 
naturally dependent upon the subjects ' willingness to cooperate. In 
so far as he wishes to reveal various levels of himself, the experi-
ment will tend to be more fruitful. It is also understandable that a 
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subject may agree to cooperate in an exploration of his self-concept 
with the best of intentions, but be unable to give the desired infor-
mation accurately for reasons of which he, hilllself, may not clearly 
understand. 
e. Freedom from threat. llan:y maladjustment factors constantly 
impinge upon the subjects' perception. For example, intense fear, 
anxiety, and conflict when experienced by the subjects are considered 
threatening to the accuracy of their self-reports. The optimum con-
dition for the self-report is at the level where the subjects see 
themselves free of such threatening factors. 
f. The degree of personal adequacy. The self-report is also 
determined by the degree of personal adequacy. The assumption that 
persons possess a fundamental need for adequacy is essential in the 
attempt to understand the subjects ' behavior in this study. In 
general, the more adequately the individual perceives, the more likely 
his self-report approaches an accurate description of the phenomenal 
self. 
g. Changes in field organization. Self-reports constantly 
undergo change, because they are largely the products of the dynamic, 
changing phenomenal field. This indigenous condition of change makes 
for error. Although this factor of error is ever present, it never-
theless provides a b asic channel through which the self reports what 
it perceives.l 
1. 
New York: 
A. Combs and D. Snygg, Individual Behavior {2nd ed. rev.; 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1959), PP• 439-442. 
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E. Previous Research in the Field 
Extensive studies have been done in various psychological 
fields. Within recent years, t he phenomenological and self-psycholog-
ical approaches in the investigation of human behavior have undergone 
a resurgence. Indeed, Combs and Seygg stress the importance and 
study of the phenomenological self.l Rogers unites both physiological 
and psychological aspects of the drive and the need for self argani-
zation.2 Allport suggests that the self-concept is necessar,y as a 
special aspect of personality. Self-function, which he calls the 
proprium1 is a dynamic interlocking of relevant problems, processes, 
and activities of the self.3 ~ makes use of the personal or 
phenomenological field in counseling.4 Johnson, an interpersonalist., 
points out t he importance of self-perception and self-integration 
within the framework of responsive interaction of persons.5 
In 19501 Michael published an article indicating the growing 
trend of empirical religious studies. It follows from such a study 
that the correlational values obtained by analyzing religious and 
ps.ycho1ogical phenomena under controlled situations are quite signifi-
1. Ibid. 
2. Rogers, Client-centered Therapy, pp. 483-532. 
3'· G. w. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1955), PP• 41-56. 
4. V. c. Ra.intv, "The Self-concept as a Factor in Counseling 
and Personality <k'ganization," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio 
State University, 1953). 
5. P. E. Johnson, ~chology of Pastoral Care (New York: 
Abingdon Cokesbury, 1953) 1 PP• 25=32. 
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cant in understanding the adolescent's attitude toward religion.l 
other important studies dealing with the relationship between religion 
and the adolescent point out both the need for more empirical evidence 
in this area and the phalanx of researchers already in the field. 
Dominic, for instance, studies juvenile delinquents with respect to 
their degree of religiosity.2 Goodnow and Tagiuri have made an 
intensive study of ethnocentricism of the adolescent • .3 In 1950, Gordon 
W. Allport, in his book, The Individual and His Relig!on, challenged 
psychologists to further study of the individual's attitude toward 
religion and his attitude toward himself and others.4 Several impor-
tant studies in this area followed the significant challenge of 
Allport's book.5 
Strang indicates that self-realization in the psychological 
realm is connected with religious faith. An adolescent who believes 
1. J. L. Michael, "Empirical Psychological Studies of Religion: 
A Survey," American P~chologist, V (September, 1950), 468. 
2. s. M. Dominic, "Religion and the Juvenile Delinquent," 
American C~tholic Sociological Revi~w, V (1954), 254-264 • 
.3. R. E. Goodnow and R. Tagiuri, "Religious Ethnocentrist and 
Its Recognition Among Adolescent Boys,n Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, XLVII (April, 1952), .316-.320. 
4. G. w. Allport, The Individual and His Religion (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1950) • 
5. See the following works for such studies: s. B. Axell, 
"The Relationship Between Some Aspects of Personality and Certain 
Dimensions and Patterns of Religious Beliefs," (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, 195.3); D. G. Brown am W. L. 
Lowe, "Religious Beliefs and Personality Characteristics of College 
Students," Journal of Social ~hologz, XXXIII (195.3), 10.3-129; and 
H. L. Silverman, "The Relationship of Personality Factors and Religious 
Background .Among College Students," Dissertation Abstract, XIV (1954), 
55.3-554. 
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in God as a "very present help, 11 not only in time of trouble but also 
as a fairly good source of guidance for his best development, has a 
certain source of strength and courage. He is not alone. His concept 
of himself extends into infinity •1 
Strunk, working 1d th 136 high school Jl.U'liors, male and female, 
and using the Brown!ain Self-Rating Inventor,r, along with the Wesleyan 
Religiosity Index, finds a significant tendency among adolescents in 
the way they view themselves. He observes: 
Taken as a whole, these results seem to demonstrate a definite 
tendency for religiously oriented adolescents to have a rela-
tively affirmative self-concept, as compared with less religious 
oriented adolescents. This finding is contrary to some of the 
classical research and discussion on adolescent religion where 
guilt and negative feelings toward self have been emphasized.2 
Cowen found that subjects who made high negative self-concept 
scores tended to hold less intense religious beliefs than those who 
made low negative self-concept scores.3 Gerkin and Weber have 
designed and administered two scales: one scale measures the religious 
development of the individual and the other scale measures the projec-
tive factors of the individual in relation to his religious experiences 
(Religious Stor,r Test). 4 Bergman, examining the nature of religious 
1. Ruth Strang, The Adolescent Views Himself: A Psychology of 
Adolescents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 123. 
2. Orlo Strunk, "Relationship Between Sell-Reports and Adoles-
cent Religiosity," 685. 
3. E. L. Cowen, "The Negative Self-Concept as a Personality 
Measure," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XVIII (April, 1954) 1 138-142. 
4. c. V. Gerkin and G. H. Weber, •A Religious Story Test: Same 
Findings With Delinquent Boys," Journal of Pastoral care, II (1953), 
11-90. 
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conversion during the course of psychotherapy, applied the case 
descriptive method.l Lichtenberg analyzed the relationship between 
religious ideology and authoritarian personality.2 Giedt's study of 
parental images and the relation of the individual's participation 
in religious acts, provides important data relative to the adolescent 
and his interpersonal relation to religious authoritarian figures • .3 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that research on 
the self-concept has recentlY attracted the serious attention of ~ 
psychologists. It would be well at this point, therefore, to review 
brieflY some of the types of research that have been done in the field 
and to set forth some of the conclusions drawn. 
In general, the research literature of the self-concept may be 
set into three major categories: (1) the self-concept related to 
clinical judgement or psychometric data, (2) the self-concept compared 
to the ideal-self concept, and (.3) the self-concept related to the 
generalized other concept. The discussion that follows will be treated 
in this order. 
(1) The self-concept related to c~ical judgement or psl?ho-
metric data. Bills, using interviews, the Rorschach Test, and the 
1. P. Berman, "A Religious Conversion in the Course of Psycho-
therapy," American Journal of Pszchotherapy, VII (19.5.3), 41-.58. 
2. P. Lichtenberg, "Authoritarian Personality and Religious 
Ideology: An Analysis of Standardized Personal Documents of High and 
Low Scores on the Religious Conventionalism Scale," (unpublished 
Master's thesis, Western Reserve University, 1950) • 
.3. F. H. Giedt, "Relationship Between Religious Participation 
and Rejection of Parental Figures," American Psychologist, V 
(September, 19.50), 468. 
15 
Index of Adjustment and Values, measures acceptance of self and con-
cludes that the self-concept as measured by his test and projective 
techniques is positively correlated.l R~'s study of fourteen 
counseling cases, already mentioned in this study, investigated 
positive and negative self attitudes during trerapy. Qualified judges 
rated self referent statements as positive, ambivalent, or negative in 
tone. Raimy finds that from such cases, positive statements increase 
during the course of therapy.2 In his research, Elias used the Maslow 
Security-Insecurity Inventory,3 while Benjamins used several objective 
tests to measure the self-concept.4 Brownfain used a number of meas-
ures of personality,$ and Porter and Stacey used the Guilford-
Zimmerman Temperament Surve.y.6 Cohen and Holt used the Rorschach Test 
and a group of diagnosticians. Generally, it was found that clinical 
judgement and psychometric data correlated positively with various 
1. R. E. Bills, "Self-concepts and Rorschach Signs of Depres-
sion," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XVIII (April, 1954), 135-137. 
2. Raimy, "The Self~Concept as a Factor in Counseling and 
Personality Organization." 
3. G. Elias, "Self-Evaluative Questionnaires as Projective 
Measures of Personality," Journal of ConsultinE P~chologr, XV (April, 
1951), 496-500. 
4. J. Benjamins, "Changes in Performance in Relation to 
Influence Upon Self-Conceptualization, 11 Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, XLV (July, 1950), 473-480. 
5. J. J. Brownfain, "Stability of the Self-Concept as a 
Dimension of Personality ,n Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
XLVIII (July, 1952), 597-606. 
6. L. G. Porter and c. L. Stacey, 11Study of the Relationships 
Between Self-Ratings and Parents Ratings for a Group of College 
Students, 11 Journal of Clinical Psychology, XII (July, 1956), 243-248. 
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measures of the self-concept.l 
(2) The self-concept copeared to the ideal self-concept• The 
Bills, Vance, McLean, Index of Adjustment and Values, exemplifies 
comparatively the self-concept with the ideal self-concept and is one 
of the first measures to be used extensively. One hundred and twenty 
four words were selected and arranged in vertical listing. Parallel 
with this word list were three blank columns. The subjects were asked 
to use each of the words to complete the sentence, "I am a (an) 
person," and to indicate on a five point 
------------------------
scale how much of the time the answer to this statement truly repre-
sented them. This rating placed in the blank in colunm I, indicates 
the subjects• concept of themselves. The subjects were also instructed 
to indicate in the second blank a rating which would tell how they felt 
about themselves in the sentence: "I --------------- being 
as I am in this respect." The ratings were: (i) very much dislike, 
(ii) dislike, (iii) neither like nor dislike, (iv) like, (v) very much 
like. The sum of column II measured acceptance of self. The subjects 
also used the appropriate words to complete the sentence, "I would like 
to be a (an) 
----------------------------
person" and to indicate 
in the third blank how much of the time they would like this trait to 
characterize them. Column III thus sampled the concept of the ideal 
self. 
1. R. R. Holt, "The Accuracy of Self-Evaluation: Its Measure-
ment and Some of Its Personological Correlates," Journal of Consulti!lg 
Psychology, XV (April, 1951), 95-101. 
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Butler and Haigh at the University of Chicago, using the Q 
technique,l obtained sorts on the perceived self ani the ideal self. 
This technique is a method whereby an individual is given one hundred 
cards containing statements about the self. The subject is then 
asked to sort these cards into several categories, depending upon haw 
well that statement describes him. A certain number of cards is to 
be placed in each category and in this way a normal distribution of 
responses is obtained. The primary advantage of this technique is 
the fact that parametric statistics may be used to obtain accurate 
tabulation and correlations of results. ~ 
Twenty-five subjects applying for therapy, together with 
fifteen subjects used as a control group were employed in this study. 
Self and ideal sorts were administered before and after therapy, 
followed by an additional test after a waiting period of six months. 
At the conclusion of therapy each case was rated "improved11 or 
"unimproved." The authors interpret the difference between self and 
ideal as a measure of self esteem and conclude that those clients 
entering therapy with low esteem experience a rise in the level of 
adjustment as the self becomes more like the ideal.2 
1. J. M. Butler and C. V. Haigh, "Changes in the Relation 
Between Self-Concepts and Ideal Concepts Consequent Upon Client-
Centered Counseling," Pstdhotherapy and PersonalitfrloChanges, ed. C. R. 
Rogers and R. F. Dymond hicago: University of C cago Press, 1954), 
PP• 55-75. . 
2. ~., PP• 55-75. 
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Studies by Hanlonl et al., and by Levy,2 concerned with the 
relationship of the self-concept to the ideal, tend to agree with 
the previously mentioned investigations, that discrepancy between 
the ideal and the self-concept is a measure of maladjustment. 
Block and Thomas hypothesized that the relationship between 
adjustment and self satisfaction (operationally defined as the dif-
ference between self sort and ideal sort) was graphicallY portrayed 
in the form of curved lines. Their findings confirm their hypothesis: 
individuals with extremely high or low discrepancy scores are poorly 
adjusted,; those with scores near the center of the curve tend to be 
well adjusted.3 
Although Butler and Haigh find a linear relationship between 
discrepancy scores and adjustment, they state that extremely high 
self-ideal correlations are likely to be products of defensive 
sortings.4 Their findings seem to support Block and Thomas in their 
curvilinear relationship theory. 
(3) The self-concept related to the generalized other concept. 
One of the earliest (1949) studies of the self-other relationships and 
1. T. E. Hanlon, P. R. Hofstaetter and J. P. 0 1Conner, "Con-
gruence of Self and Ideal Self in Relation to Personality Adjustment~" 
Journal of Consulting Psychology, XVIII (June, 1954), 215-218. 
2. L. H. Levy, 11The Meaning and Generality of .Perceived Actual-
Ideal Discrepancies," stournal of Consulting Psychology, XX (October, · 
1956), 396-398. 
3• J. Block and H. Thomas, "Is Satisfaction with Self a Measure 
of Adjustment?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI 
(September, 1955), PP• 254-~59. 
4. Butler and Haigh, Psychotherapy and Personality Change, 
PP• 55-75. 
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one which has great influence on the theoretical formulations of 
Rogers was that of Sheerer. ':UW'o scales were developed: one which 
measured the attitude of the self and one which measured attitudes of 
others. These rating scales were applied to six judges and to fifty-
nine recorded interviews of ten separate counseling cases. Analysis 
of the data shows that acceptance of and respect for self rises 
continually from the beginning to the conclusion of therapy. The 
rise in the acceptance of others is not so regular, as that in respect 
for self, but it also increases as therapy progresses. Sheerer's con-
elusion is: "There is a definite and substantial correlation between 
attitudes of acceptance and respect for others."l 
Phillips developed a scale of acceptance-rejection toward self 
and others. In a class of seventy-seven college freshmen, he found 
a positive correlation · (.54) among those measured.2 Berger3 and Fey4 
both studied correlations between self and others and concluded that 
there is a significant positive correlation between them. In the 
1. E. T. Sheerer, "An Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Acceptance of and Respect for Self and Acceptance of and Respect For 
others in Ten Counseling Cases, II Journal of Consulting Psychology, 
XIII (June, 1949), 169-175. 
2. E. L. Phillips, "Attitudes Toward Self and others: A 
Brief Questionnaire Report," Journal of Consulting PSychology, XIII 
(June, 1949), 169-175. 
3. E. M. Berger, "The Relation Between Expressed Acceptance 
of Seir and Expressed Acceptance of others," Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, XLVII (April, 1952), 778-782. 
4. W. F. Fey, "Acceptance of Self and others and Its Relation-
ship to Therapy Readiness, 11 Journal of Clinical Psychology, X (July, 
1954), 269-271. 
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Berger study, five groups totaling more than three hundred in all were 
given his instrument. He found correlations between self and other 
attitudes ranged .from +.36 to -t. 10. ()DW'akel made a comparative study 
of the findings of Bills et a1.,2 Phillips,3 and Berger.4 In her 
study, she not only found close agreement among them but also sup-
ported them in the belief that high positive correlation exists between 
the way an individual perceives himself and others. 
Gordon and Cartwright, however, reported a study in which 
contradictory evidence on this point was obtained. Using a self-other 
scale which was administered in a time other than the therapy hour, 
two groups of twenty-six each were tested. In the initial test no 
significant difference was found between these groups. One of the 
test groups then had therapy (non-directive) and both were then tested. 
This retest also showed no significant difference between the two 
groups. As a consequence, Gordon and Cartwright reject the hypothesis 
that therapy produces a more positive attitude toward others.5 
1. K. Onwake, "The Relation Between Acceptance of Self and 
Acceptance of others Shown by Three Personality Inventories," Journal 
of Consulting Psychology, XVIII (June, 1954), 443-446. 
2. R. E. Bills, "Acceptance of Self as Measured by Interviews 
and the Index of Adjustment and Values," Journal of Consulting Psycho-
~' XVIII, (February, 1954), 22. 
3· Phillips, Journal of Consulting Psychology, XIII (June, 
1949), 169-175. 
4. E. M. Berger, "Relationships Among Acceptance of Self, 
Acceptance of others, and MMPI Scores, tt Journal of Counseling Psycho-
~, II (1955), 279-284. 
5. T. Gordon and D. Cartwright, "The Effect of Psychotherapy 
Upon Certain Attitudes Toward others," Psychotherapy and Personality 
Changes." ed. Rogers and Dymond, 167-195. 
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In a recent study, Rosenmann analyzes the concept of acceptance 
of others and makes clear the distinction between evaluation of others 
and action toward them. He concludes that during counseling patients 
may become more positive in their behavior toward others without 
necessari~ forming more positive concepts of others.l In a study of 
the effect of chlorpromazine on psychotic patients, Congdon also con-
eludes that while behavior may change in a more positive direction, the 
underlying personality structure is unchanged by the drug.2 
Gener~ speaking, it has been found that people who accept 
themselves tend to accept others, while those who reject themselves 
tend to reject others. There seems to be a great degree of individual 
variability operative in self-other attitudes. Measures of the genera-
lized other do seem to indicate a positive direction in therapy, but 
the,y should o~ be used in conjunction with other measures of 
adjustment. 
The foregoing discussion reflects basic similarities which 
exists between other studies and the present study. However, this 
dissertation differs from the previously cited studies in the follow-
ing ways: (1) it treats the self-reports of Negro Freshmen of a 
southern, church-related college; (2) it denotes the relationship 
which exists between Negro Methodist and Negro Baptist subjects; (3) it 
discloses the use of normative and idiographic instruments in measuring 
1. S. Rosenmann, "Changes in the Representations of Self, others 
and Interrelationship in Client-centered Therapy, 11 Journal of Counseling 
P!ychology, II (1955), 271-278. 
2. Congdon, 11Self Theory and Chlorpromazine." 
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its findings; (4) it is the first combined application of the following 
testa: Allport-Vernon-Lindzey's Study of Values, Cattell's Neurotic 
Personality Factor Test, Funk's Experimental Scales, Strunk's Wesleyan 
Religiosity Index. Bill 1 s Index of Ad.1usment and Values, and Gilmore's 
Sentence Completion Test; (S) it is more recent than the other studies 
mentioned; (6) and it contains a preliminary section which traces the 
history of the self-concept and types of phenomenologies. 
F. The Relation of Psychotherapy and Self Studies 
The relation between psychotherapy, a science concerned with 
the behavioral adjustment of persons, and self studies is growing 
closer and closer. Therapists are now finding that experimental studies 
designed to measure the self-image and other personality factors serve 
to define their methods and techniques in counseling and psychotherapy. 
In the past, controlled studies of psychotherapy were considered diffi-
cult because of the fact that they tended to invade the privacy of the 
therapeutic session. In fact, according to Carl Rogers, there was a 
time when the therapist rejected the efficacy of self studie:!: 
The self has for many years been an unpopular concept in 
psychology, and those doing therapeutic work from a client-
centered orientation certainly had no initial leanings 
toward using the self as an explanatory construct.! 
Rogers' research has done much to cement the relation of psycho-
therapy and self theories. In his system, therapy and self 
1. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 136. 
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research, becoming inseparably and importantly related, created a new 
science of personality based on self inference. other investigators 
such as Stephenson,l Snyder,2 Lipkin,3 and Seeman,4 in substantial 
argument with Rogers, have done effective work to make known the 
value of self theory and self studies in psychology and psychotherapy. 
Content analysis, Q technique, and phenomenological research have been 
accelerated into existence and acceptance largely because of the 
therapist's recognition that psychotherapy and self theory are 
mutually inclusive and interdependent. Consequently, experimental 
studies in the area of self-concept are essential for effective 
therapy. Thus a short resume of the data revealing (1) types of 
psychotherapy and their relation to the self-concept and (2) technique 
particularly used in connection with these data is pertinent and appro-
priate at this point. 
(1) 1]Pes . of pqchotherapy. Rogers has stated that certain 
changes take place during non-directive therapy, that is, the self-
concept becomes more like the ideal and generalized other concept.5 
1. w. Stephenson, The Study of Behavior (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953). 
2. w. u. Snyder at al., Casebook of Non-Directive Counsel,ing 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947). 
3. s. Lipkin, "The Client Evaluates Non-Directive Psychother-
apy," Journal of Consulting Psycholoq, XII (May-June, 1945), 137-146. 
4. J. Seaman and N. J. Raskin, "Research Perspectives in 
Client-Centered Therapy," PsychotheraPY:, ed. o. H. MolYrer (New York: 
Ronald Press, 1953), pp. 205-234. 
5. c. Rogers, "Perceptual Reorganization in Client-Centered 
Therapy," Percettion: An Afroach to Personalit~, ed. R. Blake and 
G. Ramsey (NeW orlt: Rona:L Press, T9';'1), pp. T7-327. 
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Several researches have investigated the hypothesis that these changes 
also occur in other types of psychotherapy; for example, directive 
counseling, ps.ychoana~is, and medical treatment. 
Ewing has investigated the changes in attitudes of the client 
toward self, ideal and others,l while Heine2 and Fiedler3 have made 
comparisons of these changes in terms of psychoanalytic, non-directive 
and Adlerian therapy. In general, these studies tend to support the 
Roger ian position that the self does change to be in greater agreement 
with the ideal and generalized other concepts. Congdon4 has shown 
that the effect of chlorapromazine on psychotic patients does not 
fundamentally change the self-concept and its variations. Chlorapro-
mazine is therefore not a substitute for psychotherapy. It affects 
the mere superficial or behavioral levels and leaves the underlying 
personality structure unaffected. 
(2) Techniques used. Maey . techniques and instruments are used 
to evaluate self theory and the changes which occur in the self-concept 
or its variants. Some of these techniques and instruments will now be 
mentioned. 
1. T. N. Ewing, "Changes in Attitude During Counseling," 
Journal of Counseling Psyehologr, I (1954), 232-239. 
2. R. Heine, "A Comparison of Patient's Reports on Psychothera-
peutic Experience With Psychoanalytic, Non-Directive, and Adlerian 
Therapist," American Journal of Psychotherapy, VI (1953), 16-23. 
3. F. Fiedler, "Factor Analyses of Psychoanalytic, Non-Directive, 
and Adlerian Therapeutic Relationships," ~ournal of Consulting pgycho-
~' XV (April, 1951), 32-38. 
4. Congdon, "Self Theory and Chlorpromazine Treatment." 
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The Index of Adjustment and Values by Bills, Vance, and McLean 
provides measures of the perceived self and the ideal self.l The 
"Q technique," originated by Stephenson2 in 1951, has been used 
extensive~ and successfully at the University of Chicago by Rogers 
and his associates. Butler and Haigh used this technique in 
evaluating the relation between self-concepts and the ideal concept 
during client-centered counseling.3 The "Scale of Acceptance and 
Respect for others" has been reported and endorsed by Sheerer.4 An 
acceptance-rejection questionnaire has been used by Phillips,5 while 
Berger has correlated MMPI scores with self-deal-other concepts.6 
Fey7 and Omwake8 have correlated results obtained on a number of self-
concepts. 
Ra~, using the tape recordings and a rating scale, studied 
1. Bills, "Acceptance of Self as Measured by Interviews and 
the Index of Adjustment and Values," Journal of Consulting Ps;rchology-, 
XVIII (February, 1954), 22. 
2. Stephenson, The Study of Behavior. 
3· Butler and Haigh, PsychotherapY and Personality Changes. 
4. Sheerer, Journal of Consulting ?sychology, XIII (June, 1949), 
169-175. 
5. Phillips, Journal of Consulting Psychology, nrr (June, 
1949), 169-175. 
6. Berger, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII 
(April, 1952), 778-782. 
7. Fey, Journal of Clinical Pszc:hology;, X (July, 1954), 
269-271. 
8. Omwake, Journal of Consulting Psychology, XVIII (June, 1954), 
443-446. 
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positive and negative statements during therapy,l while Chordorkof'.:f 
used the "Q technique," and compared sorts by a subject and a judge 
who used evidence from projective test material.2 The Rorschach test 
was empla,yed b,y Janietz in evaluating self-concepts.3 Hanlon, 
Hofstaetter and J. P. O'Conner related self sort, ideal sort and the 
California Personalitz Test,4 while Norman analyzed sociometric and 
rating scale data on seventy-two graduate students .5 
other instruments, of course, have been used to rate the self-
concept. Generally, however, these instruments have been based on 
some variations of Bills, et al., Index of Adjustment and Values, or 
a similar type of questionnaire. 
G. The Method of Research 
The problem that this study seeks ~o resolve is related (1) to 
the matter of low and high religiosity among a group of selected 
college students and (2) to show how these subjects view and report 
1. Rainzy", "The Self-concept as a Factor in Counseling and 
Personality Organization." 
2. B. Chordorkoff, 11Self Perception, Perceptual Defense and 
Adjustment, n Journal of Abnormal and Social Pszcholog;r, XLIX (October, 
1954), 508-5~. 
3. A. Janietz, 11A Study in Changes in Perception in Relation 
to Psyehotherapy,n (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1956). 
4. Hanlon, Hofstaetter and O'Conner, Journal of Consult~ 
~cholo~, XVIII (June, 1954), 215-218. 
5. R. Norman, "The Interrelationships Among Acceptance-
Rejection, Self-other Identity, Insight into Self, and Realistic 
Perception of others, n J"ournal of Social Psychologz, XXXVII (May, 1953), 
205-235. 
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themselves. Therefore, in order to determine the religious attitudes 
of these students and to define them in terms of low and high religi-
osity, Strunk's WesleY!? Religiosity Index was administered to the 
one hundred and twenty-four subjects. Some factors discussed in the 
study besides religiosity are age, intelligence quotient, sex, and 
religious denomination •. 
To determine the nature of the self-reports and personality 
characteristics of the students involved, five other tests were 
administered. They are the Gilmore Sentence Completion Test, 
Cattell's Neurotic Personality Factor Test, Bill's Index of Adjustment 
and Values, Allport, Vernon, Lindzey•s Study of Values, and Funk's 
Experimental Scales. On the basis of the findings from this battery 
of religiosity and personality tests administered, correlations 
between the factor of religiosity and that of self were made. 
H. Summary 
The present chapter is primarily expository in nature. It 
attempts to make clear not only certain terms pertinent to the study, 
together with the hypotheses, the problem, and the underlying 
rationale, but the significance of the current investigations devoted 
to the study of self and its relation to human behavior and attitudes. 
In its purpose, then, this chapter lays a foundation for a phenomenol-
ogical and idiographic approach to the problem of the dissertation. 
But before this problem can be effectively studied and met, the chief 
features of the longevity and growth of self theories, as well as the 
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development of phenomenological psychologies, must be traced. To do 
this is the task of the next two chapters. 
CHAPl'ER. II 
HISTCRICAL SURVEY OF THE SEtF-cONCEPr 
This chapter presents a historical approach to the study of the 
self-concept. Starting from the early theories of the self' and 
redefining the self-concept consonant with contemporar,y theories, the 
chapter reveals ma.n•s long preoccupation with self' and his maturing 
understanding of that self tlu-ough the serious reflections and investi-
gations of certain scholars. 
A. Early Theories of the Self' 
1. The development of a self-concept. Historical evidence 
indicates that primitive man was motivated. Furthermore, he was 
regulated by an internal self as the center o:r desire and intention. 
Though many ascriptions have been given to this inner agent, the terms 
"soul," "spirit," and 11 self11 are prominent in usage.l The perceptive 
capacity of man seems to guide his understanding and conscious 
behavior. Some present day anthropologists find reason to believe 
that primitive man could think abstractly and that his thought was 
basically no different from the thought of modern man. Radin insists 
that the same distribution of temperament and ability existed among 
1. Allport, Becoming, pp. 41-56. 
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primitive peoples as among ourselves.l If this is true, then it is 
also reasonable to assume that cognitive processes existing in 
primitive manwere precipitated by a conscious unifying force. It is 
to this aspect of man•s being that one facet of the term "self" may 
be ascribed. 
Indeed, basic assumptions in philosop~, sociology, religion, 
and psychology have included theories of the self. These theories 
have played an important role in establishing the authenticity of 
selfhood--especially in psychology. The importance of the self in 
psychology is suggested in the fallowing: 
And yet the whole history of lnunan effort, the major philos-
ophies of living, and a marked trend in ps.rchological research; 
clearly ·!haw. that selfhood and personality, describing or 
denoting as they do a characteristic feature of the complete 
flow of adjustment of a person, constitute a quite natural 
point of departure for any psychologizing at a11.2 
In Greek philosophy, significant discussions of the soul are 
found. Aristotle, for example, gave speci~ concern to the theory 
of a soul. Distinguishing the transition of inorganic bodies from 
organic bodies, he indicated the central position of the soul and 
described the soul as a ps.ychic principle, known as the entelechy, 
1. Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Phil~her (New York: 
Appleton, 1927), p. 5; c!. Franz Boas, The of Primitive Man (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1911), p. 113. 
2. Coleman R. Griffith, Principles of Systematic Psychology 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1943), p. 606. See G. W. 
Allport's .Personalit : A Ps halo ical Inter retation (New York:-
Henr.y Holt an Co., 93 , pp. 2 - so see W. Stern's Psychology 
from the Personalistic Standpoint, trans. H. D. Spoerl (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1938). These books include interpretations concerning 
the predominant role that the self has played in psychology. 
the actuality of a natural body furnished with organs .1 Plato 
conceived the soul to be an indissoluble entity. It reflected 
the unbroken continuity of a changeless and eternal thought.2 
Though Plato 1 s metaphysical interpretation shows a sharp contrast 
with Aristotle 1 s scientific treatment of the soul, their philo-
sophical systems set the stage for a transition of later ideology 
in which Hume,3 Kant,4 and Schopenhaur? wrote concerning the 
problem of the self, not realizing that they were contributing to 
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a foundation for twentieth century psychology. Among the ear~ 
psychologists who recognized the importance of the self were Freud,6 
1. Aristotlel De Anima ani Parva Naturaliaf trans. 19i th an 
intro. and note by Wl.lliam Alexander H.aiiiiiiorid (New ork: The 
Macmillan Co., 1902), P• 412b. 
2. B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophv (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1938), P• 151. More discussion on the soul may be 
found in Plato's Phaedo, Gorgias, and the Republic. 
3. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Everyman's Library 
Series, No. 548; New York: E. P. Sutton and Co., 1911) • . Hume was 
among the first philosophers to make the break with the traditional 
concept of the soul as a distinct entity. 
4. Emmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Ever,yman 1 s Librar,r 
Series, .No. 909; New York: E. P. Sutton and Co., 1787). Kant early 
recognizes a contrast between a subjective self and "Ding-an-sich", 
a discrimination that forms the basis of the treatment in some 
contemporary writings of the self. 
5. Arthur Schopenhaur, The Four-Fold Part of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (Paris: Baillere, 1882. Schopenhaur believed that we 
are able to perceive the self that wills, but not the self that knows. 
6. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (International Psycho-
analytical Library, No. 2; London: The Hogarth Press, 1927). This 
book, first published in Germany in 1923, presents Freud's theories 
with regard to the structure of personality. Serving as a stimulus to 
considerable theorizing and speculation, it lays the groundwork for 
much of the present day theory with regard to ego development. 
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Ribot,l McDouga11,2 and Jung.3 
In sociology, Cooley4 presented the view that an individual •s 
image is obtained primarily through social interaction. Cooley 
originated the phrase, "looking glass self," which is composed of 
three psychic elements which may be stated as questions: (1) "Haw 
do I look to other people?"; (2) WWhat do I think about haw I look 
to them?", and (3) "Haw do I feel about what they think of me?" 
Cooley tries to show that an individual's self perceptions are gained 
by viewing one's self as someone else would. 
Concentrating his efforts in cultural anazysis, Mead has 
written monumental works on the relationship of the self and society.5 
1. T. Ribot, Diseases of Jl:lmo : An Essa: in POsitive 
chology (New York: D. App e on an Co., 
Freud~is aware of the part that self plays in mental disease 
attempts to define mental disturbance in terms of conflicts. 
efore 
and 
2. William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psycholo~ 
(Boston: John W. Luce and Co., 19t5B) • According to McDouga!I,he 
self occupies an important place in his psychology. He refers to self-
regarding sentiments and self-esteem as important factors in person-
ality adjustment. 
3. Carl G. Jung, Psychological !ypes (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
and Co., 1923). Jung defines the ego as tne subjective consciousness 
whereas the self, which includes the ego, is the subject of one 1s total 
personality. 
4. c. H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922). Social determinants of the self are 
emphasized here. 
,5. George Mead, Mind, Sell and Society (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1934). This book, written by one of America's leading 
philosophers and social psychologists, has attracted the attention of 
many scholars. Section 2 deals with the origin of the self. Mead 
elaborates in considerable detail a person's awareness of himself in 
relation to his reactions to other persons. For Mead, the self is 
determined in large measure by the individual's social relations. 
Mead•s analYsis of modern man•s psycho-sociological behavior has 
sharpened the focus of other social psychologists toward a view of 
the self and interpersonal relationships. 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, a number of studies were 
made by psychologists of religion, searching for the meaning of 
religious experience. For the first time in America, empirical 
designs emerged within religious circles to test the validity of such 
phenomena as "conversion," "prayer," and "mysticism.nl It was out of 
this dynamic interaction of non-religious empirical research and reli-
gious empirical research that psychologists such as Hall,2 James,3 
and Leuba,4 sought to open frontiers beyond the limited boundaries of 
behaviorism and structuralism. Because secular psychologies of this 
1. E. D. Starbuck, The Psycholo~ of Reli9ion (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903). This ook contaJ.nS a careful study 
of conversion and other relational factors. Also see E. T. Clark•s 
The rrahologlrof Religious Awakening (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1929 or con asting analYsis. 
2. G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence (New York: Appleton, 1904)~ 
A classic book in psychology, this work advances sol!E of the earliest 
empirical studies in American psychology. Hall• s theoretical pro-
nouncements, validated by his scientific findings, give emphasis to 
the study of adolescent behavior. A chapter deals with religious 
experiences of the adolescent. 
3. William James, The Varieties of Reli ious rience (New 
York: Random House, 1902 • In this book James lives up to one of 
his many complimentary titles--"Father of American Psychology of 
Religion." Although at times his verbose style tends to obscure the 
logic of his thought, he nevertheless makes a signal contribution in 
interdisciplinary thought. 
4. James H. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion (New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1912). This book is an agnostic's approach to 
the study of religious experience within the limits of natural 
science. 
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period tended to be steepeid in rigid and limited scientific systems, 
religious research was temporarily blocked. The study of dynamic 
models such as "religious motivation," "personality," and the "self" 
were also in disfavor.l 
To crystallize the basic thought and nethods of the antecedents 
to contemporary psychologists interested in the self-concept, it 
might be well at this point in the survey to consider briefly the 
wcrk of Jean Piaget, William James, and Mary Whiton Calkins, whose 
impact on contemporary psychologists still seems to be felt. 
2. Jean Piaget:- self as an undifferentiated whole. Up to 
the close of the nineteenth century, maey attempts to study the 
development of the personality and the self of the child had been 
made. Such attempts offered fruitful hypotheses; but finding these 
conclusions subject to philosophical biases, men like Hall, Binet, 
and Stern began to undertake new studies of the child from a genetic 
approach. This approach influenced Plaget, who wrote The Language 
and Thought of the Child, Judgement and Reasoning of the Child, ~ 
Child•s Conception of the World, and The Child•s Conception of 
Physical Causality. 
In the child's development of self-consciousness, Piaget 
distinguishes three stages. In the first stage, which terminates at 
the second or third year, the child experiences no clear conscious-
ness of self. His mentality in this stage is depicted by pure autism 
1. Griffith, Principles of Systematic Psychology, P• 606. 
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in which the truth is confused with desire, the sel.:f fused wi. th the 
war ld. The child makes no distinction between thought and the 
material of thought. An egocentric, he identifies the world with 
himself. In fact, he is a microcosm, as Piaget suggests in the 
following: 
Reality is impregnated with self, and thought is conceived 
of as belonging to the category of physical order. From 
the point of view of causality, all the universe is felt to 
be in communion and obedient to one•s self. There is partic-
ipation and magic. The desires and the commands of the self 
are felt to be absolute, since the subject's awn point of 
view is felt to be the only one possible. There is an inte-
gral egocentricity through lack of consciousness of seJ..:r.l 
The second stage of the child's mental development, according 
to Piaget, is Characterized b.1 a feeling of reciprocity, a mutual 
relationship existing between the child and his environment, in which 
he perceives the external world by means of schemas of internal 
origin, as illustrated in the form of categories and forms. It would 
follow that if the child interprets the internal world in terms of 
himself, then the self is in turn explained in terms of external 
experience. Hence, to Piaget, we have no more direct cognizance of 
the sel.:f than we have of the external world. Experience molds the 
mind and the mind molds experience. 
In the third stage, the child replaces his awn individual point 
of view with that of others. Therefore the child•s growing awareness 
of his thoughts is merged with his growing awareness of social factors. 
His egocentricity disappears; he advances from dynamiSin to mechanism. 
1. Jean Piaget, The Child•s Concept of the World (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., l929), p. 288. 
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From a study of Piagetrs system, one finds strong evidence of 
a view of the self. In his constant use of the terms "mind," "ego," 
and "egocentricity," Piaget stresses his basic concept of ttundiffer-
entiated whole." For him, the concept of the "undifferentiated 
whole" means a dynamic frame of reference for the self's developmental 
stages. The self confronts the world, converging with it and yet 
still retaining its independent qualities. He writes describing this 
process: 
This phenomenon is vwy general. During the early stages, the 
world and the self are one; neither term is distinguished from 
the other. But when they become distinct, these two terms 
begin by remaining very close to each other; the world is still 
conscious and full of intentions, the self is still material, 
so to speak, and ·only slightly interiorised. At each step in 
the process of dissociation these two terms evolve in the sense 
of the greatest divergence, but they are never in the child 
(nor in the adult for that matter} entirely separate.l 
Even though Piaget presents a logical interpretation of the 
child's mental development, one might question the scientific validity 
of the method used. It is extremely difficult to separate children's 
opinions that are due to social conditions and those that are due to 
their so-called original natures. When Piaget separates the child's 
development into three distinct stages, one observes the emergence of 
a pseudo-typological method. For, indeed, the mental development of 
the child is continuous, not broken. Failing to show positive evidence 
that the consciousness of a child is without developed structural 
organization, without a boundar,y between the subjective and the objec-
1. Piaget, The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, p. 244. 
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tives, between the ego and the objective world, Piaget bases his con-
clusions on a priori inference. 
With respect to Piaget's theories dealing with the self-concept, 
the following observations may be made: (1) The self, tacitly but 
very definitely emerges in his system as a cognitive, limited concept. 
It is conscious, perceptive, and purposive. (2) It is an indispen-
sable model for his system. Without it, his significant schemata 
constructed for the purpose of explaining child behavior would be 
incoherent. (3) His reliance upon relationship indicates a feature 
which harmonizes with other contemporary psychologies, that is, inter-
personal psychology and other social psychologies. (4) His relation-
ship w.l th the philosophical movement and his avid interest in 
rational psychology have molded his logical approach. (5) His 
big~ s.ystematic method of research includes convincing evidence of 
a rationale based upon ingenious experiment designs. (6) Although 
at times his style of writing tends to lapse into a type of genetic 
epistemology, nevertheless his major thesis is not completely lost. 
(7) His prolific writings emphasi~e the values of the self, an 
important entity in modern psychology. 
3. William James: self as pure ego. William James, who gave 
to early ps.ychology some fundamental precepts of the self, combined 
originality of psychological insight with religious empiricism. 
After maey years of teaching peysiology and psychology at Harvard 
University, James moved into the larger perspective of philosopey. 
In this field he made contributions to the stature of radical 
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empiricism.l But what contributions did he make to the development 
and the methodology of the self-concept? Let us brief~ discuss this 
matter. 
The following discussion will be confined mainly to original 
state~nts .found in James 1 s Principles of Psychologv, which explains 
his dynamic ideas, and sets forth a constructive argument for an 
empirical self, its constituents, and its teleological character. His 
self-psychology may be divided into two phases: the "self as lmown," 
and the "self as lmower." The discussion will .follow this order: 
(a) a discussion of the two t,ypes of selves, considering their 
relational significance to subsidiary .facets of James's psychological 
system; and (b) a general resume of his self psychology. 
(a) The 11 sel.f as known" and "knower". What does James mean by 
the term "self as lmown 11? This concept is defined by the author in 
the foll01Ving way: 
In its widest possible sense, however, a man's self is the sum 
total of all that he can call his, not on~ his body and his 
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his ldfe and 
1. See Willian James 1s The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897). This 
volume consists of articles and addresses which had been written at 
intervals from 1879 to -.1896. Throughout its pages, one can detect the 
influence of Renouvier. The articles fall into three groups: 
(1) fideism, (2) pluralism, (3) individualism. James's Pragmatism 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909) was given an additional sub-
title: "A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking." In this book 
James's propositions, which are restated within the fresh context of 
J. S. Mill arrl Lotze provide channels of new insight. Doctrines of 
evolution and histo;lcal relativism and the probability of hypothesis 
in the scientif~c method are discussed. James 1 s Pluralistic Universe 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909), contains his Hibbert 
Lectures which were given at Manchester College, Oxford, 1908. His 
major idea in the book is that of presenting an alternative to monistic 
idealism. 
39 
children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, 
his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account.l 
The self, possessing certain constituents, is analy2ed under the 
following categories: 1) the material self; 2) the social self; 
and 3) the spiritual self. Definitive statements concerning each of 
these are given. 
1) The material self: it consists of one's physical qualities; 
it is mainly one 's body, his clothes, his immediate family. 
2) The social self: this is a relational concept which applies 
to recognition that one receives from others, his peer group, his 
society. 
3) The spiritual self: this refers to "a man's inner, or 
subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions taken con-
cretely; not the bare principle of personal unity, or •pure• Ego. "2 
Furthermore, the spiritual self, abstract in quality, is the 11 seatn 
of conscience and mere sensibility.3 
In the concept of pure ego, we see the radical mind of James at 
work. Pure ego became the revolutionary concept reflecting a self 
as "I". This is the "self as knower." It is that self which claims 
consciousness at any moment; it may therefore be described as the 
unity of consciousness. Here James advances his concept of the sense 
of personal identity. It is, as he says, personal sameness which may 
1. James, Principles of Psychology, I, p. 291. 
2. ~., P• 296. 
3• ~., P• 296. 
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be subjective or objective. A process called subjective synthesis 
tends to bring things into an objective focus. Comparing perceptions 
with personal identity, James sums up such rela_tion in the following 
statement: 
The sense of our personal identity, then, is exactly like any 
one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It 
is a conclusion, grounded either on the resemblance in a 
fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of 
the phenomena compared)-
In the foregoing statement, James emphasizes that such grounds 
are not conceived in terms of absolute Unity or metaphysical Unity. 
The concern of nature is psychic feeling or sameness or oneness as 
in the case of bodily existence, warmth, generic unity, oneness in 
kind.2 
(b) Resume of James's self-psychology• A summary of William 
James's ideas regarding the self follows: 
(i) James simply defines "consciousness of self" as that 
which involves a stream of thought.3 
(ii) The nucleus of me is bodily existence, yet it is 
experienced in time. When remembered, past feelings resemble present 
feeling for the same "me" is experienced. Hence, the constituents of 
nme,n such as material possessions, friends, honor, esteem, are 
constituents of "me" in a broader sense. 
1. Ibid., P• 334. 
-
2. ~., p. 335. 
3. ~., P• 400. 
41 
(iii) James furthermore concludes concerning the nature of 
This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. 
The.! which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither 
for ps.ychological purposes need it be considered to be an 
unchanging metaphysical enti'Gr like the Soul, or a principle 
like the pure Ego, viewed as 1out of time.• It is a Thought, 
at each moment different from that of the last moment, but 
appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter 
called its own.l 
He insists that such description of the self involves an experiential 
realm consisting of thoughts or states of mind. However, he hastens 
to add, he cannot explain how brain functions manifest changes of 
conscious selves. Such meaning he ad.mi. ts must lie in the very cosmic 
meaning of the universe. 
(iv) James infers that naturalistic psychology and natural 
science cannot go beyond the functional in attempting to gain knowl-
edge of the total meaning of the world. Thus James stops short of 
theistic description or assumption. He does, however, affirm that 
the moment we admit as human beings we do not have direct knowledge, 
we have logical need for referral to a 'transcendental thinker' who 
does have direct knowledge comprehensive of world meanings. Neverthe-
less, when this is done we leave psychology and Ellter the sphere of 
philosophy or the naturalistic point of view; and James candidly admits 
that a discussion of the pure ego ends at this point. 
(v) However, we may note that while James's psychology tends 
to end in the concept of the ego, it continues in his vital concept of 
1. Ibid., PP• 400-401. 
42 
the individual. James insists that the ego can be a "world-humanizing 
power," an instrumental farce for the resolution of man's crises and 
the salvation of the world. Arnold Metzger, writing about James •s 
interpretation of the ego, says: 
This ego is not the self of German thought. It is certa~ 
not the transcendental ego of German idealism which retreats 
from facts into the fateless inwardness. In the ego which 
James presents rises the appeal of the unconditional: •the 
world is to be saved by our action.' This ego has the faith: 
The world can be saved. In the fact that James puts into the 
center of his philosophy the individual which seeks his own 
salvation through the salvation of the world--! see one of the 
most important accomplishments of his philosophy .1 
4. Mary Calkins: self as a personalistic concept. Mary 
Calkins developed a personalistic self-concept which represented a 
minority point of view in the philosophical and ps,ychological 
thought of her day. In fact, her defense of the "science of the 
selves"2 set forth her basic viewpoints regarding the fundamental 
nature of psychology. 
Sensitive to the psychological controversies of her age, 
Calkins reflected the theories of other scholars in the field. In 
the main, James's position concerning the nature of consciousness 
was possib~ a model for her view of the person and his world. 
(1) Relation of structurali~m and functionalism to Ca1~' 
self. 
-
1. Arnold Metzger, ''William 'James and the Crisis of Philosophy," 
In Commemoration of William James, ed. Brand Blanchard and Herbert 
Schneider (New York:: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 222. 
2. Mary Calkins, A First Book in Psychology (4th ed. rev.; New 
York: The Macmillan Co., L924), p. 1. 
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(a) Toward a definition of the self. Calldns• analysis of 
structuralism and functionalism prepared her for the formulation of 
a positive theory of the self. In her attempt to present her 
position, she evaluated three possible views of the self as follows: 
(i) the self may be conceived as a psychophysical organism with the 
body constituting a part of the self; (ii) the self may be identified 
as mind without body; and (iii) the self may be considered an entity 
distinct from the body but related to it. Her analysis led her to 
reject the first two concepts and accept the third. She refused to 
accept the validity of (i) and (ii) because (i) reflected the 
positions of behaviorists and functionalists who repudiated the thesis 
that psychology should be divided into mentalistic and physiological 
categories. Approach (ii) was declined because, to her, it was 
unrealistic. The authenticity of the body repudiated it. However, 
approach (iii) was accepted because it tended to embody a more 
realistic interpretation where the relation between body and self 
actually existed.1 Hence, approach (iii) provided a definition of 
the self consonant with the personalistic framework. In this respect, 
her definition of psychology is significant: 
There is never perception without somebody who perceives, and 
there is never thinking, unless some one thinks. Bearing this 
fact in mind, we . may define psychology more exactly by naming 
it science of the self as conscious.2 
' 
1. J. S. Moore and H. Gurnee, The Foundation of Psychology 
(2d ed. rev.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. B1-ff2. 
2. Calkins, A First Book in Psycholo~, P• 1. 
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(b) Calkins' reaction to structuralism and functionalism. In 
her ~~alysis of structuralism and functionalism Calkins was able 
partially to accept structuralism. On the other hand, she totally 
rejected the basic doctrines of functionalism because she felt it was 
artificial to study .:function as activity without at the same time 
studying the functioning self. She argued this point in the following 
manner: 
For just as the study of ideas raises the unavoidable question, 
•whose idea?• so the consideration of mental functions involves 
the question, •function of whom?' To define psychology as 
science of mental functions without referring the functions to 
the functioning self, is therefore, an entirely artificial 
proceeding.l 
Calkins criticized structuralism as a sort of "idea psychology," 
because it arbitrarily neglected a part of our immediate consciousness 
and offered an inadequate description of consciousness.2 The follow-
ing continues her argument against structuralism: 
••• I cannot be conscious of an idea i.e., of any mental 
content except as idea of self •••• If therefore, I define 
psychology as science of idea, I raise the inevitable 
question ••• The •idea• is immediately experienced as idea 
of self, or subject mind, ego--call it as one will. To 
refuse to deal ~th this self, or subject is indeed theoret-
ically possible, but it is ne~dlessly abstract or artificial , 
an incomplete procedure.3 
(2) The self-theory:· an object of criticism. Three possible 
points of criticism were directed to Calkins' self-theory: (i) it is 
1. ~., P• 274. 
2. ~., P• 273. 
3. Calkins, "Psychology: What Is It About?" Journal of Philos-
22Sl' IV (December, 1907), 678. 
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a metapnysical theory instead of a scientific theor,yJ (ii) its claim 
of universal consciousness is false; and (iii) its concept of self 
is indefinable. To all these, she replied but perhaps futilely.l 
In summary, Calkins• concept of the self is personalistic be-
cause she holds that persons are indispensable to the understanding 
of ps,rchology.2 Hence, every psychological activity or function is 
the act of a person or is embedded in a personal life.3 The nature 
of the precursive effect of the work of Calkins, James, and Piaget on 
contemporary self theories will be seen in the following section. 
B. Redefining the Self-Concept in the Light of 
Contemporary Theories 
1. cause and effect in modern pszchologr. Historica~, a 
succession of important experimental discoveries and techniques 
played a major part in ps,ychology becoming a true science. For 
example, Weber discovered under laboratory controls that events in the 
brain must be generally correlated with the contents of the mind.4 
Utilizing the basic hypothesis of Weber, Fechner formulated psycho-
1. See Calkins, "A Reconciliation Between Structural and 
Functional Psychology,'' Psychological Review, XIII (March, 1906), 
61. Also see Margaret Washburn, Review of 11Der Doppelte Standpunkt 
in der Psychologie," b,r M.W. Calkins, American Journal of Philosopgy 
and Scientific Methods, II (December, !905), 715. 
2. Calkins, A First Book in PsY£hology, p. 1. 
3· Horace B. English and Ava Champney English, A Comprehensive 
Dictionary of Ps chological and Ps hoanalytical Terms (New York: 
ngmans, Gl:'een an • 
4. E. H. Weber, De Tactu: Annotationes Anatomical et Physio-
logical (Leipzig: c. F. Koehlen, 1834). 
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physical laws designed to establish a mathematical correlation between 
physical and psychic facts.l Wundt, attempting to structure data of 
psychology within the scope of experimental laws, established the 
first recognized laboratory in 1879 at Leipzig, Germany.2 Indeed, 
these events, among others, marked the beginning of a new scientifi c 
era in the history of psychology. 
As psychology developed to the point of scientific maturity, it 
faced traditional problems. Among them, there was the problem of the 
self, with its proponents and opponents. James was a proponent for 
the self in psychology. As was previously indicated in an earlier 
section of this paper, James formulated his definition of the self in 
terms of the "Empirical Me 11 , defining it as the sum total of all that 
a man can call his own: his body, characteristics, abilities, his 
material possessions, his social relations, and his spiritual 
proclivities. 
Following some of the basic precepts of James, Mary Whiton 
Calkins defended, as has been pointed out, the personalistic concept 
of the self. Contending that the self-concept was a natural outgrowth 
of what in actuality was a systematic psychology, she suggested PB.r-
chology in reality was the "science of selves," the science that gives 
centrality to the person. 
Also in Piaget •s concept of the "undifferentiated whole," one 
1. H. M. Johnson, "Did Fechner Measure 'Introspectional• 
Sensations?" Psychological Review, XXXVI (July, 1929), 257-284. 
2. Boring, A Historz of Experimental Pszc:hology, pp. 133-150. 
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sees the pivotal role that the self occupies. Although Piaget 
reflects a seeming over~ zealous interest in epistemological designs 
and logical patterns, he perceives the self, whether it is the self 
as mind or the self as regulator, at the center of his psychological 
system. But these proponents of self-theory had stalwart opponents-
Titchener, for example. To be sure, Titchener•s frontal denunciati on 
of the self-concept not only tended to set a pattern of non-acceptance 
in the ranks of scientific psychologists but to kill the movement.l 
0nJ.y in recent years has there been a revival of mounting interest in 
the self-concept, illustrated in the research of Rogers2 and Allport,3 
along with other contemporary adherents. 
2. Modern psychologists confront the self. Forty-five years 
have passed since the Titchenerian criticism, which, though consider-
ab~ modulated, is still manifest in the conservative schools of 
modern experimental psychology. Renewed efforts, however, to define 
the essential nature of the self have emerged in scientific psychology 
and have caused a distinct resurgence of interest among psychologists 
in the concept of the self. These psychologists are faced with the 
question: Is the concept of the self necessary? Allport suggests 
that it is: 
1. See E. B. Titchener, A Beginner's Psycholo~ (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1915), p. 6. A passage taken from th~s book shows 
Titchener•s reaction to the self-concept highly uncompromisir~. 
2. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy• 
3. Allport, Personalitz: A Psychological Interyretatiol_!• 
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They (modern psychologists) have introduced sell and ego 
unashamedly and, as if to make up for lost time, having 
employed ancillary concepts such as self-image, self-
actualization, self-affirmation, phenomenal e~o, T-involve-
ment, ego-strivings, and many other hyphenate el& orations 
WEICh to experimental positivism still have a slight flavor 
of scientific obscenity.l 
The foregoing comment is suggestive of the prolific attempts of 
contemporary psychologists to rethink the place of the self in modern 
psychological theory. This specific challenge reflects a new orien-
tation for such definitions. In direct contradistinction to earlier 
theorists, modern psychologists no longer hold to the concept of a 
"mannikin" which controls behavior. Instead, they refer to either 
the object of psychological processes or to the processes themselves. 
Furthermore, the self is no longer applicable to the ambiguous 
description appearing in the theories of James2 and Calkins.3 It is 
not a metaphysical concept nor a religious concept. Rather, it 
unequivocally falls within the boundary of scientific psychology. The 
following is a recent statement, indicating modern usage: 
The self as used in modern psychology has come to have two 
distinct meanings. On the one hand it is defined as the 
person's attitude and feelings about himself, and on the 
other hand it is regarded as a group of ps.ychological pro-
cesses which govern behavior and adjustment. The first mean-
ing may be called the self-as-ob~ect definition since it 
denotes the person's aititudes,eelings, perceptions, and 
evaluations of himself as object. In this sense, the sell is 
what a person thinks of himself. The second meaning may be 
called the self-as-£rocess definition. The self is a doer, 
1. Allport, Beco~, p. 37. 
2. James, Principles of ~chologr, I, pp. 291-400. 
3• Calkins, A First Book in ~hologr, PP• 1-10; pp. 273-284. 
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in the sense that it consists of an active group of processes 
such as1:hink:Lng, remembering, am perceiving.l 
In their Dictionary, 2 Horace English and Ava English adapt 
multiple definitions and find approximately 1000 forms of the self-
concept within seven categories. Their effort indicates haw two 
present day psychologists have attempted to meet the challenge far 
more valid definitions of the self. 
In order to obtain a closer view of the contemporary psycholo-
gists • position regarding theories of the self, let us briefly discuss 
five comparatively recent books on the subject with the understanding 
that they are merely a sampling of many other books done in this area. 
Following this brief discussion, a more specific analysis of four 
outstanding present day personality theories will be given. These 
psychologists were chosen both for their concern for the significance 
of self-theory in psychology and for their uniqueness of treatment and 
validity of research. 
a. Lec~•s Self-Consistengr is indicative of a unique approach 
to the study of the self. This small book has attracted the interest 
of psychologists because of its emphasis on integration of personality. 
Leck:y believes in an inevitable striving toward self consistency. This 
belief can be considered a constructive influence in any process of 
1. Calvin s. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19.57), p. 468. 
2. Ehgllsh and English, A Dictionary of Ps_zc:hological and 
Psychoanalytical Terms, pp. 484~485. 
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psychotherapy.l 
b. References to the ego and the self are floequently made 
throughout Symond•s The DJrna;mics of Human Adjustment:• For example, 
in the chapter entitled "Introspection and the Superego," and in the 
one captioned "Love and Self Love," Symond discusses the relation 
between the ego and the superego and narcissism both in its normal 
and pathological forms.2 
c. Gardner :am.rpby•s Personality is an important study with 
regard to the psychology of the self. In section three, Murphy dis-
cusses the origin of the self, modes of enhancement, and self-defense. 
In a later section, he presents in considerable detail the concept of 
integration. In a concluding section he points out hem the self is 
related to the social group in which it develops.3 
d. Cantril's book, The Psychology of Ego-Involvement, is 
regarded by some as perhaps the most important discussion of ego 
development available today. The first chapters are elaborations of 
Sherif's treatise in which the social basis of ego formulation is 
stressed. other chapters are devoted to the development of the ego 
at different stages. The chapter dealing with adolescence shows 
1. Prescott Lecky, Self-Consistency (New York: Island Press, 
1945). 
2. P. M. Symonds, The ?i94&cs of Human Adjustment (New York: 
Appleton-Century-crofts, Inc., 19 ) • 
3. Gardner Murphy, Personalitz. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1947). 
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insight and understanding of a difficult period in human life. The 
last chapter in the book is very critical of psychoanalytical theory 
of the ego.l 
e. Arthur Combs am Donald Snygg' s second edition of Individual 
Behavior is considered one of the most important books of its kind, 
and hinges on what the authors call the "phenomenological view." The 
book discusses the "phenomenal self," and the "self-concept." It is 
from this major v.Qrk as well as from those of Koffka, Hilgard, A.llport, 
and Rogers (who will be presently discussed in some detail) that this 
dissertation assumes the basis for its fundamental presuppositions.2 
3. Recent self assessments of four psvcho1ogists. 
a. Koffka 1 s book dealing with his approach to the self-concept 
is consonant with his psychological position. He is known as a 
Gestalt psychologist, though some authorities conceive of Gestalt 
Ps.1Chology as a movement rather than a ps,ychology.3 This movement of 
psychology came into being chiefly to refute behavioristic psychology 
and other atomistic psychologies. Some basic principles of the Gestalt 
school are (1) direct experience is fundamental; (2) perception is a 
movement, not a series of sensations; (3) the Gestalt is conceived · 
in terms of configuration, pattern or form; it is stressed in contrast 
1. Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Ego-Involvement (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1947). 
2. Combs and Snyggs, Individual Beh8vior, 1959. 
3. K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psycholoq (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935), PP• 319-366. 
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to the parts of experience; (4) all behavior, conscious or uncon-
scious, takes place within a field relationship. 
Koffka 1 s self-system consists of the ego, phenomenal ego, 
executive, and the self. High:cy influenced by Lewin, Koffka 
structures his concept within the context of a field where energy sub-
systems perform work. In relation to other ancillary self-movement s, 
Koffka assigns to the ego the predominant role. The phenomenal ego, 
a minor system, is equivalent to the self-as-object. Koffka sees t he 
ego as a field phenomenon in which various fQ[' ces play a part and i n 
which various figures take shape. A closer analysis of Koffka 1 s self-
system will reveal plausible appraisal of the ego in relation to ot her 
sub-self systems which Koffka has found indispensable in explaining 
his theory of personality. 
The ego, according to Koffka, is seen as a complex field object, 
not as a fixed physical or non-physical being, unchanging and limited. 
To this point, Koffka says: 
We have advisedly used the term 1Ego 1 without a proper 
definition, for no such definition could at the start of 
our discussion be adequate; the Ego cannot even be said to 
be constant, to be confined within unchanging limits. 
This, however, is not to say that the Ego does not have a 
boundary. Its boundary, says Koffka, is inconstant because various 
tensions such as "great sorrow," or "disappointment" impinge upon it. 
The ego comes about through a person• s perception of his spatial 
relationships: 
1. ~., P• 320. 
••• here, between the •infront• and the •behind•, is that 
part of the behavioral world which I call Icy Ego. It has a 
very definite place in that world, and well-defined, if 
variable boundaries. 
This perception is caused by inhomogeneity of the ego. 
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And thus we have gained a first clue in our search; for the 
object which we call Ego is in one decisive respect different 
from all other objects, just as the term Ego implies a 
difference between the object so designated and all other 
objects.2 
Koffka further suggests that certain experiences naturally are 
ego-related. These experiences are pleasure and pain, emotions, needs, 
wishes and desires, and thoughts. Yet, these ego-related experiences 
are parts of the environmental field as well as the Ego. 
Koffka advances the belief that in order for processes or 
tensions to be incorporated into the Ego, certain conditions must 
exist. At this point, a reference is made to the major hypothesis of 
his total thesis: (1) we must assure the Ego to be a particular field 
part in constant interaction with the rest of the field; (2) no Ego 
would exist as a spatial s.ystem unless it segregated itself from other 
systems.3 
Besides the "ego," another term in Koffka•s self-~stem is "the 
executive," upon which he places great importance. A general but 
clear statement illustrates the significance of the executive in 
Koffka•s thought: 
1. Ibid., pp. 321-322. 
-
2. ~., P• 322. 
3· ~., p. 324. 
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The executive comprises, then, all the ways in which action can 
relieve stresses or contribute to such relief .1 
The executive is furthermore a controller of behavior. Koff'ka. 
suggests that not all relief of stresses is action. Yet, in most 
cases, stresses are relieved by producing movements of the body. In 
a final statement concerning the nature of the sub-systems, Koffka 
does not actually answer the question which force controls the Ego. 
Therefore, he concludes within a general principle of action: 
All action is a process b,r which stresses existing in the total 
field are decreased or removed. Because of the multiplicity of 
such tensions and their mutual interdependence the possibilities 
of action may have enormous effects. An action may relieve a 
stress in an Ego system which at the moment was isolated from 
the rest o:f the Ego and in :full conunand of the executive. The 
result o:f this action may revolutionize the whole life of the 
agent.2 
The concepts of the Ego, the phenomenal ego, the Self, and the 
executive constitute Koffka's complex self-system. Each has its 
peculiar contribution to make toward the organization of a dynamic 
psychological construct. 
b. Speaking before the Eastern Division of the American 
Psychological Association, E. R. Hilgard, Professor of Psychology at 
Stanford University (1949), presented a paper entitled, "Human Motives 
and the Concept of the Self." It was the thesis of his paper that 
(1) adult motives are best understood through an interaction between 
biology and culture; (2) all mechanisms imply a self-inference and such 
mechanisms are not understandable unless they adopt a concept of the 
1. ~., P• 322. 
2. ~., P• 367. 
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self; (3) essential~, there are two approaches to defining and making 
use of the self-concept: first, through self awareness, and, second, 
self-inference. Disproving the first approach, Rilgard accepts the 
second, maintaining that the inferred self is basic to the proper 
understanding of personality in modern psychology. 
Hilgard argues that his views are substantiated by the findings 
and beliefs of distinguished predecessors and contemporaries. He 
points out t~t Freud, Adler, and Jung included mechanisms within 
their motivational theories. This contention is especial~ supported 
in the writings of .A.nna Freud/ E. R. Guthrie, and A. L. Edwards.2 
Referring to recent studies indicating the relation between mechanisms 
and their direct influence on the process of self-conception, Hilgard 
suggests two main areas of consideration: (1) mechanisms as defenses 
against anxiety and ( 2) mechanisms as self-deception. He cites Mowrer 
and Miller, who in working with white rats under laboratory conditions, 
point out fear as an acquirable drive: 
A new drive is acquired by the rats escaping electrical shock 
in the box by leaping over a barrier or by depressing a level 
to shut off the current. This new drive is sometimes called 
1. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanism of Defense (Inter-
national Psychoanalytical Library, No. 30; London: The Hogarth Press, 
1946). One of the most important contributions in the literature of 
the ego, this work sets forth in considerable detail the concept that 
the individual is responsible for his method of defense against 
anxiety. 
2. E. R. Guthrie am A. L. Edwards, Psychology (New York: 
Harper, 1949), P• 37. 
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fear and sometimes anxie::!zy'; anything reducing anxiety or fear 
will reinforce behavior.! _ 
Hi~ard agrees with these conclusions but asserts that this 
experiment should be carried a step further into mants anxiety, which 
is intermingled with guilt-feelings. He makes this statement: 
To feel guilty is to feel the self as an agent capable of 
good or bad choices. Therefore, at the point where anxiety 
is infused with guilt-feelings, self-inference enters. It 
follows if one is to lmow something about why a person's 
defenses are against guilt-feelings, he must lmow something 
about the image of himself. Therefore, if we are to under-
stand mechanisms, we must also understand the concept of the 
self.2 
Discussing mechanisms as self-deceptive factors, Hilgard 
suggests two ways in which we deceive ourselves: (1) by the denial 
of impulses, or traits or by memories; (2) through disguise whereQy 
the impulses, traits, or memories are disturbed, displaced, or 
converted. Hence, we do not recognize them as they are. 
Hilgard utilizes the findings of a recent study which illustrates 
important ways in which persons deceive themselves. An amnesia 
patient through hypnotic treatment revealed loss of ~ memory, in 
connection with the act of buying a ticket in a railroad station. 
During hypnosis, the patient remembered everything except certain 
1. N. E. Miller, "Studies of Fear as an Acquirable Drive: I. 
Fear as Motivation and Fear Reduction as Reinforcement in the Learning 
of New Responses," Journal of ~rimental Psychology, XXXVIII (1940), 
89-101; see o. H. Mowrer's artiCe, "Anxiety..oReduction and Learning," 
Journal of Experimental PsycholoeQ':, XXVII (1940), 497-516. 
2. E. R. Hilgard, "Human Motives and the Concept of the Self," 
American Psychologist, IV (1949), 374. 
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periods of his life where he was asha.ned of himself. Here is a case, 
Hilgard says, which represents deception through denial.l 
Hilgard further cites a series of studies which corroborates 
the hypothesis that a person having undesirable traits which he 
prefers to keep from his awareness will project such traits upon 
others. Germane to all this is the following summary statement of 
Hilgard: 
In this discussion of mechani sms, I h~e tried to point out 
that they may be integrated with ot~r aspects of motivation 
and learning provided their self-inference is accepted. Then, 
it can be understood how they provide defenses against anxiety 
and why they are deceptive through denial and disguise.2 
Expanding his the sis further, Hilgard asserts that mechanisms 
are only comprehensible if one accepts the concept of the self. If 
the hypothesis of the self is accepted, one must then define the self. 
Hilgard offers two possibilities: 
(1) to look for the self in awareness, to see if we can find 
by direct observation the self that is anxious, that feels 
guilty, that tries various dodges in order to maintain self-
respect; and (2) to infer a self from data open to an 
external observer, to construct a self which will give a 
coherent account of motivated behavior.3 
Hilgard sharply denounces the first method, indicating again 
that the discovery of the self through awareness is illusionary. 
Fundamentally, Hilgard respects the apologetical spirit and contri-
1. L. F. Beck, "Hypnotic Identification of an Amnesia Victim, 11 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, XVI (1936), 36-42. 
2. E. R. Hilgard, American Psychologist, IV, 377. 
3· Ibid. 
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butions of ).{. w. Calkins relative to the self-concept; nevertheless , 
he rejects her "pure introspection" method because it is based on a 
false premise.l He believes that "defense mechanisms and self-
deception so contaminate observation that unaided introspection is 
bound to yield a distorted view of the self. n2 
From Hilgard 1 s point of view there are three hypotheses funda-
mental to the inferred self. They are: 
(1) the organization of motives and attitudes that are central 
to the self is one which persists and remains recognizable as 
the person grows older; (2) motives unlike in their overt ar 
phenotypical expression may be representative of an underlying 
similarit.y; and (3) the human motives are interpersonal both 
in origin and in expression. The self is then a product of 
interpersonal influences.3 
Attempting to appraise the use of the self-concept, Hilgard 
argues: 
The uncertainties about tm truth of the hypotheses regarding 
the inferred self need not be regarded as signs of weakness 
in the concept. On the contrary, the concept has greater 
potential richness of meaning precisely because it goes beyond 
the self-evidept and requires empirical study and 
justif'ication.4 
In summary, the self-concept as held by Hilgard is inextricably 
related to the dynamic ef fect of motives on human personality. He 
pleads emphatically that we not be mesmerized into thinking that the 
early introspective methods and subjective concepts of M. W. Calkins 
1. Calkins, American Journal of Psychology, XXVI (January, 
1915), 495-524. 
2. Hilgard, American Psychologst, IV (1949), 371. 
3· ~., 391. 
4. Ibid. 
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and her followers are sufficient standards for today•s understanding 
of the self. On the other hand, he underlines the valuEf of viewing 
the self phenomenologically provided proper limitations accompany such 
usage. Hilgard does not lose sight of his basic psychological 
prejudices. These prejudices are clearly evident as (1) a Freudian 
psychoanalytical interpretation and use of unconscious and conscious 
motivational theory; and (2) a thoroughgoing consent to the important 
part that experimental research plays in charting new discoveries con-
cerning human behavior. Under these fixed assumptions, Hilgard 
reminds the critic of psychology that the self is not to be es timated 
as a simple matter of logical deduction from behavior. Unconscious 
motivation and intense internal conflicts are at the basis of human 
experience. Therefore, he recommends the inferred self as a solution 
to tm present day confusion, created by those who define ambiguously 
the nature of the self. 
c. From the writing of Personality: A Psychological Interpre-
tation (1937) to that of Becoming: Basic Considerations for A 
Psychology of Personality (1955), Gordon W. Allport's point of view 
concerning the psychology of personality has weathered severe criticism. 
But even under such attack, Allport has emerged as one of America's 
undisputed leaders in theory of personality. Hence, his prolific writ-
ings have provided fertile resources to deal with the controversial 
issues in the study of personality .1 Indeed, Allport represents a 
synthesis of systematic psychology and personality theory. 
1. Hall and Lindze,r, Theories of Personality, p. 257. 
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Against the background of broad scholar~ experiences, Allport's 
writings reflect the personalistic writings of Stern, the radical 
empiricism of James and the motivational emphasis of McDougall. His 
basic assumptions take the following farm: (1) motivational variables 
are important; (2) generic constitutional factors are basic; (3) the 
uniqueness of the individual is foremost; (4) empirical research is an 
absolute prerequisite for the psychologist; (5) the use of the concept 
of Functional Autonomy is a deliberate attempt to free the organism 
from bondage to the past; (6) psychoana~is cannot account for the 
normal individual; (7) psychological research ought to be problem-
centered; (8) personality structure is primarily representative of 
traits; behavior is motivated by traits; (9) structure and dynamics of 
psychology are conceived as the same .fundamental construct; (10) "Per-
sonality, is something and ~ sonething • • • • It is what lies 
behind specific acts and within the individual; ttl (11) personality is 
11the dynamic organization within the iniividual of those psychophysical 
systems that determine his unique adjustment to his environment. n2 
Allport sharp~ rejects the notion of a homunculus or little man 
within the body. Instead, he offers the term, proprium, which he 
defines as those aspects of personality recovering inward unity.3 
Allport discusses the proprium under eight classifications: (1) the 
1. Ibid., P• 262. 
-
2. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, 
p. 48. 
3. Allport, Becoming, pp. 41-56. 
61 
bodily sense; (2) self-identity; (3) ego-enhancement; (4) ego-
extension; (5) rational agent; (6) self-image; (7) propria.te strivings; 
and (8) the knower.l 
Allport suggests that there is an advantage in adhering to the 
proprium concept. It facilitates research, enabling the researcher 
to draw important distinctions between focal experience and external 
behavior. He says: 
The first thing an adequate psychology of growth should do is 
to draw a distinction between what are matters of importance 
to the individual and what are, as Whitehead would sa:y, merely 
matters of fact to him; that is, between what he feels to be 
vital and c'9ii'f.'ral in becoming and what belongs to the periphery 
of his being.2' 
In contrast to other approaches to the self-concept, Allport 
suggests several new features: (1) the proprium concept with other 
ancillary concepts exists within the total sphere of personality; 
(2) as a developmental agent, propriate functions do not begin at 
birth but come into being about the age of two or three; (3) 11the 
proprium is not a thing; it is not separable from the person as a 
whole. Above all it is not a homunculus; 113 (4) the proprium is a 
temporal fact. It "develops in time; 114 arrl (5) the proprium has the 
instrwnental value of being a concept to which only psychological 
meanings of the self can be implied; and yet, simultaneously, it 
1. ~., P• 39· 
2. ~., p. 39. 
). ~., P• 61. 
4. Ibid. 
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implies value and ontological interpretations.l 
Through the course of his career as a psychologist, Allport's 
main ideas have been expressed in terms of a dual pattern. His 
thought has oscillated from a relentless interest in the uniqueness 
of the individual to an unwavering belief in the wholeness of reality. 
In the midst of his study and writings, he has held tenaciously to 
his original theses. Innovations have come into existence as a result 
of his insistent search for understanding and clarification of concepts. 
The self-concept has emerged among them as no minor concept. It is at 
the center of his thought even though he may prefer the term proprium 
to characterize the unifying tendencies in personality. 
d. In a recent statement,2 Carl Rogers, whose works represent 
a culmination of modern personality theories, acknowledges the 
clinical observations and theoretical hypotheses which bear a close 
affinity to his personality system. He ~ntions G. H. Mead3 as one 
who has made certain observations concerning the self that have a 
strild.ng similarity to his position. This is particularly true of 
Mead's descriptions of the 11 I 11 and the 11me 11 • Furthermore, Mead's 
interpretation of therapeutic goals substantiates Rogers' own thinking. 
Rogers indicates that Allportts4 concept of the self as organizer of 
1. ~., P• 62. 
2. Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 476. 
3· Mead, Mind, Self and Societ;r. 
4. Allport, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology," Psychological 
Review, L (1943). 
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experience and his insistence that the ego be given an integrative 
function are ideas which resemble his own. Rogers adopts Lewin's 
field theory! and he also accepts Angylts hypothesis2 that the self 
is an integral representation of the biological organism. Lecky• s 
emphasis3 upon the principle of self-consistency is an important 
factor in Rogers• treatment of the self. Finally, Rogers admits that 
Combs and Snyggts4 recent innovations dealing with a phenomenological 
approach to the self agree with his observations. Therefore Rogers 
considers these parallel streams of clinical observations and general 
personality hypotheses to have constituted the foundation of his 
psychological system. 
The fundanental assumptions of Rogers' personality theory tend 
to cluster around the self. This may account for the fact that his 
system is thought to be a thoroughgoing self-system. Here are the 
main hypotheses of this system: (1) organism and the total individual 
are ~quivalent concepts; (2) the phenomenal field is the totality of 
experience, and (3) the self is the differentiated aspect of the 
phenomenal field; it consists of patterns reflecting conscious percep-
tion and values of the "I" and the nme.tt 
1. K. A. Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 193.5). 
2. A. Angyl, Foundations for a Science of Personality (New 
York: Commonwealth Fund, !94!). 
3. Lecky, Self-Consistency. 
4. Coni>s and Snygg, Individual Behavior, 19.59. 
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According to Rogers, the self is the core concept in his total 
psychological system. He indicates the properties of the self as 
being these: 
(a) it develops out of the organism's interaction with the 
environment, (b) it m~ introject the values of other people 
and perceive them in a distorted fashion, (c) the self 
strives far consistency, (d) the organism behaves in ways 
that are consistent with the self, (e) experiences that are 
not consistent 1'li.th the self-structure are perceived as 
threats, and (f) the self may change as a result of matura-
tion and learning.l 
In his book, Client-Centered Ther!EY (1951), Rogers avers that 
the varied conceptualizations reflected in the principles already 
listed may be seen as nineteen propositions. As a matter of showing 
how the self is interrelated in Rogers' propositions, Hall and 
Li.ndzey make this summary statenent: 
This theory is basically phenomenological in character and 
relies heavi~ upon the concept of self as an explanatory 
concept. It pictures the endpoint of personality develoP-
ment as being a basic congruence between the phenomenal 
field of experience and the conceptual structure of the 
self--a situation which, if achieved, would represent freedom 
from internal strain and anxiety, and freedom from potential 
strain; which would represent the maximum in realistically 
oriented adaptation; which would mean the establishment of an 
individualized value system having considerable identity with 
the value syste~ of any other equal~ well-adjusted member of 
the human race. 
Writing recently in an unpublished manuscript entitled, 11A 
Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships," 
Rogers extends his personality theory b,y introducing three new 
unifying concepts: "(1) the need for positive regard, (2) the need 
1. Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 478. 
2. ~., P• 488. 
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for self-regard, and (3) conditions of worth.nl Rogers indicates 
that the need for positive regard is generally assumed to be universal 
although not essential~ innate; it emerges in the developmental 
process as a portion of the emergent self. This particular need tends 
to compete with the organismic valuing process to such an extent t hat 
the individual may seek the appraisal of others. With respect to the 
second concept, Rogers asserts that the person acquires the need far 
self-regard as a result of his experiences with satisfaction or 
frustration. This kind of experience may be individual or interpersonal. 
As the individual moves f'rom the need for positive regard to the need 
for sell-regard, he concomitant~ undergoes a process of selective 
functioning. Hence, the individual undergoes "conditions of worth, 11 
the last phase in the three unifying concepts. However, Rogers makes 
the point clear that the person my or may not find worth in this sell-
experience. He concludes qy assigning great value to these three 
concepts; they can assist the therapist in explaining "discrepancies 
between the sel:f and experience, discrepancies in behavior, threatening 
experiences and defensive processes and reintegration. tt2 
Certain~, a historical survey of modern self psychologies or 
aqy serious study of self based on a phenomenological approach would 
be incomplete without considering the self-theory of Rogers. In fact, 
Rogers' achievements in psychology--personality theory, clinical work, 
1. Ibid. 
2. ~., P• 489. 
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empirical research, and self-theory--have awakened wide interest among 
authorities and critics in the field. An appraisal of his total 
accomplishments by two leading psychologists indicate the role that 
Rogers' self-theor.y has played in his entire psychological system: 
Whatever the future of Rogers' self-theory may be--whether its 
originator chooses to modify it to the extent that it is no 
longer primarily a self-theory--it has served well the purpose 
of making the self an object of empirical investigation. Many 
psychologists have given theoretical status to the self but it 
is to Rogers credit that his formulations regarding the phenom-
enal self have led directly to the making of predictions and to 
investigative activities. In this sense, his theory has been 
extremely useful.l 
3. Summary 
In this chapter we have presented a cursory discussion of the 
development of the self-concept. Our underlying assumption is that 
such a survey serves not only as a foundation but as a rationale for 
this dissertation. In making this survey, we presented (1) sone early 
theories of the self and (2) some contemporary theories pertaining to 
the self-concept. We will now briefly sunnnarize the main features and 
contributions of these two divisions of our survey. 
The formation of the self-concept has its origin in the primitive 
mind and culture. Although controversy exists concerning the proba.-
bility of primitive man's self-consciousness, there is sufficient 
evidence to postulate self-awareness in the primitive mind. 
The broad fields of scientific investigation have revealed 
attempts to structure a more adequate concept of the self. Plato . 
1. Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personali5f, p. 499. 
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thought of the soul or self as pure form; Aristotle as the entelechy 
or an end-realization of the body. Cooley's "Looking-Glass Self" and 
G. H. Mead•s "Reflective Self" are representations of the sociological 
approach to the self's meaning. Psycho-religious self-interpretations 
are found in Hall, Starbuck, and Clark's empirical studies of adoles-
cent and adult religion. 
Piaget, James, and Calkins were treated as forerunners to the 
main compendium of self-theory. Piaget stressed a self having two 
dominant features: (1) a rationalistic self, the end-product of the 
child (ar adult) mind and (2) the social ego, the result of the inter-
action of the environment and the individual creating a state of 
"undifferentiated whole. 11 James •s classical distinction of' the self 
as object and subject provided a tenable, definitive foundation for 
contemporary psychologists who found James's defL~tion advantageous 
for further quests toward a redefinition of the self-concept. 
Calkin's personalistic self-concept, though scientifica~ naive, 
provided an impetus for psychological explorations in personality 
theory. 
The essential features of' the evolutionary self-theories, 
commencing with primitive man and ending with the early theorists, 
developed from theo-centric and anthropomorphic traits to empirical 
studies based on introspective and mentalistic methods. 
The first fifty years of the twentieth century were years of 
revolution for American psychology. In the midst of dissimilar 
emphases, American psychology became the subject of extensive empir-
ical research. Concurrent with an empirical development, a new 
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emphasis, the psychology of personality came into existence. In the 
light of the rapidly growing interest in personality theory, the 
self-concept reappeared as a main object of investigation. Conse-
quently, a group of theorists attempted to meet the needs of redefining 
the self-concept in the light of contemporary psychological research. 
Koffka proposed a self-concept in terms of the ego, phenomenal 
ego, executive and self. The ego and ancillary self-systems existed 
in a dynamic relation with each emerging as a result of field 
phenomena. Hilgard pictured the self-concept in terms of the "inferred 
self;" and Allport defined the self-concept as proprium, an integrative 
concept. 
Finally, Rogers' self-concept developed from a mere explanatory 
concept to a self-system. Underlying his psychological thought was a 
fundamental self-theory, emerging from a phenomenalistic viewpoint, 
empirical research, and clinical experience. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENI' AND STRUCTURE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGIES 
In this section of our study, we shall direct our attention to 
three specific tasks: (1) to trace the origin and development of the 
new phenomenological psychology as a distinctive element from pure 
phenomenology to its present form; (2) to analyze four basic types of 
phenomenologies existing in current thought;l and (.3) to present the 
contentions of the new phenomenology. The fulfillment of these tl'n-ee 
purposes will further confirm the rationale and basis of this 
investigation. It will also serve as a threshold to the discussions 
and findings of Chapter V. 
A. Pure Phenomenology 
Originating in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
phenomenology was advocated by Edmund Husserl, Who promulgated its 
essential doctrines. Husserl has been called the "father" of the 
phenomenological movement,2 despite the fact that Bretano3 preceded 
1. See Ted Landsman, "Four Phenomenologies," Journal of Indi-
vidual Psychology, XIV (May, 1958), 29-37. 
2. Muller-Freienfels, The Evolution of Modern Psychology, 
P• 311. 
3. Even though Husserl expressed sincere appreciation to 
Bretano for aiding him in making the transition from a mathematic-
centered interest to a philosophical career, he later sharply disagreed 
with Bretano 's major premises. 
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Husserl in this movement. Other associates of this era were Dilthey,l 
Lipps, 2 and Natorp.3 
At the turn of the t wentieth centur,r, Husserl published his 
vigorous Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations),4 a volume 
in which he sets forth early phenomenological doctrines within the 
framework of a logical design. This volume attracted gathering of 
proponents and opponents. 
But it is in his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenome-
nologr,5 that Husserl makes definitive contributions to an explanation 
of pure phenomenology. In this direct account, Husserl first of all 
makes a plea that his reader not confuse "transcendental phenomenal-
ogy' and "descriptive psychology" with its more verhacular form, 
"phenomenological psychology." He further insists that the distinc-
tiom between the two approaches is found in their methodological 
emphases. 
1. Ibid., pp~ 98-104. It is interesting to note that both 
Muller-Freienfeis and Murphy describe Dilthey as a vigorous critic 
of scientific psychology. Kluver, writing in the supplementary section 
of Murphy's book, classifies Dilthey in the cultural section of German 
psychology. 
2. Ibid., PP• 3lh-320. Lipps had a talent very similar to 
that of Husserl: both were logicians who probed in structural psycho-
logy. 
3. Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, p. 
421. Kluver suggests Natorp was an associative member of the Neo-
Kantian school, which adhered to the Neo-Kantian emphases of 11 acts, 11 
"phenomena," "funct ions," and "experience." 
4. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (2d ed. rev.; Halle: 
Niemeyer, 1921) • . 
5. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology (2d ed.: London:-ITnwin, 1952). 
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"Transcendental phenomenology" rests upon a philosophical method 
which is in the background of all science. "Descriptive phenomenology" 
rests upon a p~chological method. Husserl defines ps.ychology as the 
"science of real fact.nl He continues to describe the actual function 
of his phenomenological approach by asserting that in contrast to the 
"science of real facts," the 
science of pure possibilities must everywhere precede the 
science of real facts, and give it the guidance of its 
concrete logic. So is it also in the case of transcendental 
philosophy, even though the dignity of the service rerrlered 
by a system of the transcendental a priori is far more 
exalted.2 
Husserl further suggests that philosophical and psychological 
distinctions are basically predetermined by one •s point of view. For 
example, a philosopher employing the method of transcendental 
reduction expresses this "from the natural standpoint as a basis, an::l 
I experience mwself here in the first instance as 'I' in the ordinar,y 
sense of the term, as this human person living among others in the 
world.3 In a parallel process, Husserl contends that a psychological 
vantage point makes a difference in the focus of one's being. Here, 
Husserl states the precise differentiation assumed in a psychological 
approach. He writes: 
As a psychologist, I take as my theme this I-type of being 
and life, in its general aspects, the human being as 
tpayebicaJ.•• Turning inwards in pure reflexion, following 
1. ~., P• 13. 
2. ~., P• 13. 
3. ~., P• 13. 
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exclusively 'inner experience' (•sel£-experience' and 'empathy,' 
to be more precise), and setting aside all the psychophysical 
questions which relate to man as a corporeal being, I obtain 
an original and pure descriptive knowledge of the psychical 
life as it is in itsel£, the most original information being 
obtained from ~el£, because there alone is perception the 
medium. If, as is often done, description of all sorts, which 
attach themselves purely and truly to the data of intuition, 
are referred to as phenomenological, there here grows up, on 
the pure basis of inner intuition of the soul's own essence, a 
phenomenological p~chology.l 
In essence Husserl, as a pure phenomenologist, is fundamenta~ 
concerned with the sphere of consciousness or experience. His aim is 
to contrast such a sphere with the natural or physical world. In 
this sense he may be classified as a structural psychologist. Yet, 
on the other hand, this distinction is of lesser significance in the 
sense that Husserl does not exclude from his approach the actuality 
of the physical world. This inclusion is brought about as one 
11brackets11 the world phenomena from the realm of consciousness, ena-
bling a momentary exploration of essences and ideal objects.2 
Within recent years a great deal of controversy has tended to 
focus on the method of pure phenomenology. This controversy has 
apparently stemmed from tre misconceptions of what is meant by th9 
term epoche or phenomenological reduction. It has been previously 
indicated that such a method, as conceived b,y Husserl, reflects rigorous 
logic in the form of pure reflection. Hence, it is accompanied by the 
logical method. Furthermore, it does not omit the use of experimenta-
1. ~., PP• 13-14. 
2. Landsman, Journal of Individual Psychology:, XIV (May, 1958), 
P• 34• 
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tion as a corollary method. Its type of experimentation, however, is 
manipulative. It has been considered as an aid to pure reflection in 
the sense that thinking is a manipulation of symbols. So far as 
Husserl is concerned, it seems fair to say that phenomenology is sui 
generis, the basis of all science. 
A prominent disciple of Husserl has kept pure phenomenology 
before the mind of America. Marvin Farber, a philosopher at the 
University of Buffalo and editor of Philosopqy and Phenomenological 
Research, tends to support basically pure phenomenology. He suggests 
its main ideas in the following statements: 
There are a number of things Which phenomenology conspicuously 
does not do or mean. (a) It does not •tear the meaning loose 
from the act.• (b) It does not deny or reject the external 
wcrld. (c) It does not try to answer all questions,; and is 
not intended to be all-inclusive as a method far all purposes. 
(d) It is also not intended to be a substitute for other 
methods, and above all, for those involving factual and 
hypothetical elements. (e) It does not deny inductive truth, 
nor does it fail to distinguish between different types of 
•truth'. (f) It is not a trap for metaphysical purposes. 
In contrast to these misunderstandings, there are a 
number of things that phenomenology does do or mean. (a) It 
is the first method of lmowledge because it begins with "the 
things themselves" which are the final court of appeal for 
all knowledge •••• (b) It views everything factual as an 
exemplification of essential structm-es and is not concerned 
with matters of fact as such. (c) It deals with not only 
11real essences" but also with "possible essences." (d) Direct, 
insight, evidence in the sense of the self-giveness of the 
objectivity is the ultimate test for it. (e) Despite the "re-
duction" the phenomenologist still has a brain (an "evolutionary" 
brain) in the same sense that he breathes. That statement is as 
true as it is irrelevant to the method.l 
To recapitulate, pure phenomenology had its expression in the 
work of Bretano, a forefunner of the phenomenological movement. 
1. M. Farber, "The Function of Phenomenological Analysis," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, I (1941), pp. 440-441. 
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Husserl, a student of Bretano, performed the task of disseminating 
some of Bretano•s basic ideas and vigorously proposed and argued 
distinct phenomenological hypotheses ~ich revealed him as a thorough-
going phenomenologist. The following main ideas tend to represent the 
central nature of pure phenom:mology:: {1) It is the basis of all 
science; (2) its methodological emphasis is demonstrated in the epoche 
or bracketing of the natural world by a researcher; (3) its scope 
embraces the totality of all consciousness and experience; and (4) it 
is more accurate to classify it as a philosophy than as a psychology, 
although it has a close affinity to ps.ychological doctrines. 
B. Classical Phenomenological Ps.ychology 
In 1947, R. B. Macleod, a strong advocate of phenomenological 
principles, presented a comprehensive statement suggestive of Husserl•s 
original teachings and fundamental to the principles of classical 
phenomenological ps.ychology which Landsman defines as follows: 
It /Classical Phenomenological Psychology7 may be defined as a 
method for the preliminary exploration of the world of 
perceptual phenomena, involving principally an attitude of 
•disciplined naivete• Qy the researcher to differentiate per-
ceptual phenomena more clear~.l 
Considered among the outstanding exponents of the classical 
school o.f peychological phenomenologists are David Katz and R .. B. 
Macleod. Let us review briefly their main tenets in the field. Katz, 
a con.firmed empiricist, asserts that the psychologist should commence 
his experimentation by "bracketing" psycho-physical and philosophical 
1. Landsman, Journal of Individual Psychology, XIV (May, 1958), 
P• ,30. 
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prejudices. If the psychologist does this, then he is ready to observe 
varied phenomena as they are actually experienced. This approach 
presupposes not only a scientific facility but a specific training 
which the observer must have. For example, Katz did not merely study 
"hue, 11 "brightness," and 11saturation" of colors but various "modes of 
appearance," "pronouncedness, 11 llinsistence," "transparency," and 
11 stability. 11 
Furthermore Katz distrusts the new trend of placing the 11seeing-
the-world-as-the-other-fellow-approach" at the center of the movement 
at the expense of original phenomenological theses. In direct contra-
distinction to this emphasis, Katz insists that phenomenology must be 
systematic. However, he is careful to make the point clear that 
phenomenology must be applied to the everyday problems of life. 
Katz does not claim preference for any particular school of 
psychology. Yet he is deeply interested in the Gestalt movement. His 
developmental approach enables him to denounce extreme forms of 
conventionalism and scientism. He eagerly uses psychological constructs, 
clearing the way for significant research. Advancing the achievements 
of David Katz, Macleod has this to say of his colleague and peer: 
It is perhaps best to think of Katz as pioneer, catholic 
rather than eclectic. He had a single purpose in his 
scientific life--to put in old fashioned l~guage, to 
understand the phenomena of the human mind. 
As already mentioned, R. B. Macleod is one of the foremost 
exponents of classical phenomenological psychology. Mainly interested 
1. J. R. Macleod, "David Katz," Psychological Review, I.JIT 
(January, 1950), 3. 
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in freeing phenomenological psychology from stereotypes, he is also 
interested in keeping the sophisticated mind alert to phenomenological 
research and its application to the common good of society. Macleod's 
additional efforts have included a two-fold concern: (1) to point out 
the dangers confronting the neophyte student of phenonenology and 
(2) to clarify the fundamental meaning of psychological phenomenology. 
TWo quotations indicate the manner in which he is attempting to meet 
these basic needs. Macleod urges that the student be aware of t~ee 
biases which tend to undermine the value of phenomenological 
psychology: 
(1) the belief that something small is more .fundamental than 
something large--the atomistic-reductive bias; (2) the belief 
that a differentiable variable in the phYsical world or a 
differentiable receptor in the organism implies the existence 
of a correspondingly differentiated unit of experience--the 
stimulus receptor bias; and (3) the belief that that whicn-is 
genetically earlY is more fundamental than that which is 
genetically late--the genetic bias.l 
Macleod also insists upon a concrete distinction between 
philosophical phenomenology and psychological phenom:mology. This is 
the way that he contrasts the two: 
Whereas philosophical phenomenology began with an attempt at 
an unbiased description of psychological data and proceeded 
there:fore toward an account o£ ultimate reality in terms of 
essences, the psychological phenomenologists have endeavored 
mere~ to liberate their science from some of its theoretical 
biases, and to :focus attention on problems which might other-
wise be neglected.2 
1. R. B. Macleod, "The Phenomenological Approach to Social 
Psychology, 11 Psychological Review, LIV (July, 1947), p. 19.5. 
2. ~., PP• 193-194. 
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On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we offer the following 
basic features concerning the nature of classical phenomenological 
psychology: (1) it is a modified version of phenomenological 
ps,ychology based on Husserl•s fundamental doctrines and includes 
R. B. Macleod's and David Katz•s scientific contributions; (2) it 
underlines a method which is based on the disciplined naivete of the 
researcher ani (3) it has proven itself highly applicable to the 
studies of perception and social ps.ychology.l 
C. Existential Psychology 
Probably one of the most discussed philosophical movements to 
reach American shores is existentialism. A derivation of the term, 
"existence," literally indicates the root term ex-sistere, meaning ttto 
stand out," or "to emerge." This translation suggests that the 
individual is no longer viewed as a "collection of static substances 
or mechanisms or patterns but rather as emerging and becoming, that is 
to say as existing.n2 Existential psychology is defined as follows: 
Existential psychology: 1. view that the task of 
ps.ychology is limited to observation and description of 
the existent data or contents of experience, of mental 
1. See two recent studies by Macleod which illustrate this 
point: "The Phenomenological Approach to Social Psychology, tt Psycho-
logical Review, LIV (July, 1947), 193-210; also see Macleod 1s 11The 
Place of Phenomenological Analysis in Social Psychological Theory," 
in J. H. Rowrer and M. Sherif (eds.), Social P~chology at the Cross-
roads (New York: Harper, 1951), pp. 215-241. 
2. Rollo May, Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger ( eds.) , 
Existence: A New Dimension in P chiatry and P cholo (New York: 
contents. It may be regarded as the logical outcome of 
structural psychology ( 1) with definite emphasis upon 
complete introspective description shorn of all interpre-
tation, followed by analysis and classification of 
experiences as facts in and for themselves. The term was 
coined for the viewpoint of E. B. Titchener. 2. The 
psychological doctrines associated with existentialism, 
which hold that man must oppose his free will to a hostile, 
purposeless universe.l 
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In substance, the method of existential psychology is interre-
lated closely with its theory. Although it reveals on the one hand 
a bias for an ontological frame of reference as against an epistemo-
logical perspective, yet at the same time it gives new emphasis to 
"modes of being." 
Connected w1 th existential psychology are the names of several 
psychologists and philosophers--Heidegger,2 Kierkegaard,3 Jasper,4 
and Sartre,5 for example. Husserl, thoroughgoing apologists of pure 
phenomenology, as we have seen, was the teacher of Heidegger. 
Heidegger, a major philosophical adherent of existentialism, was the 
teacher of Sartre. or the names mentioned, Sartre and Kierkegaard 
have had more of a predominant academic influence in America. And 
1. English and English, A Dictionazy of Psychological and 
Psychoanalvtical Terms, p. 192. 
2. M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago: 
Regnery, 1949). 
3. Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, ed. Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).-
4. Karl Jasper, Reason and Existenz, trans. William Earle (New 
York: Noonday Press, 1955). 
5. Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1947). 
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yet it has been from all of the previously mentioned thinkers that 
existentialism has found rootage in western culture. Rollo May, 
writing concerning 11The Origins and Significance of the Existential 
Movemmt in Psychology,'' shows the extraordinary historical circum-
stances which caused the western mind to develop an interest in 
existentialism. He writes: 
The third and contemporary phase of existentialism came after 
the shock to the Western world caused by World War I. 
Kierkegaard and the early Marx were rediscovered, and the 
serious challenges to the spiritual and psychological bases 
of Western society given by Nietzche could no longer be 
covered over by Victorian self-satisfied placidity. The 
specific form of this third phase owes much to the phenome-
nology of Edmund Husserl, which has given to Heidegger, 
Jaspers, and the others the tool they needed to undercut the 
subject-object cleavage which had been such a stumbling 
block in science as well as in philosophy. There is an 
obvious similarity between existentialism, in its emphasis 
on truth as produced in action, with the process philosophies, 
such as Whitehead •s and .Anerican pragmatism, particularly as 
in William James.l 
For this historical background as seen in the foregoing, leaders 
in existential ps.ychology gradually made their debut on the intellec-
tual stage. Two other outstanding thinkers in this area are 
u. Sonneman2 and L. Binswanger.3 Their roles as proponents of the 
existential position have provided much needed channels of communica-
1. M~, Angel and Ellenberger ( eds.), Existence: A New 
Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, p. 1.5. 
3. L. Binswanger, "On the Relationship Between Husserl's 
Phenomenology and Psychological Insight," Philosopgy and Phenomenolo-
gical Research, II (1941), 199-210. 
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tion for a sensitive mind. A recent manuscript by Binswanger, chief 
representative of existential analysis in psychiatry, sets the tone 
of existential research in the following sentences: 
• • • existential research orientation in ps.ychiatry arose 
i'rom dissatisfaction with the prevailing efforts to gain 
understanding in psychiatry. • • • The new understanding 
of man, which we owe to Heidegger•s ana~sis of existence, 
has its basis in the new conception that man is no longer 
understood in terms of some theory--be it a mechanistic, a 
biological or a ps.vchological one. • •• 1 
Indeed, the above passage reflects the direction of Binswanger 1s 
critical efforts to place before therapeutic theorists a much needed 
innovation in psychological research. Yet Binswanger•s efforts have 
been combined with those of Sonneman,2 who is also noted for his 
dynamic interests in the relationship of existential hypotheses to 
therapy. Through the analyses and empirical research of these men, 
modern psychology is becoming aware of new existential concern. 
From a general analysis of the diversified references pertaining 
to existentialism and existential psychology, we may make the follow-
ing observations: (1) that existential psychology evolved out of 
existential philosophy, having its timely impact during the third phase 
of modern existentialism in western civilization; (2) that Husserl, 
Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Jasper, and Sartre were major theorists in the 
1. L. Binswanger, "Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy," 
Progress in Psychotherap:r, ed. f. Fromm-Reichmann and J. L. Moreno 
(New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954), p. 144. 
2. Sonneman, Eristence and Theraty: An Introduction to 
Phenomenolog!cal P~chology and EXisten ia! Analysis. 
7 
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existential move100nt; and (3) that existential psychology has emerged 
to the foreground of contemporary psychology with Binswanger and 
Sonneman as its two major adherents; and (4) that existential psy-
chology, generally described, is 11the endeavor to understand man by 
cutting below the cleavage between subject and object which has 
bedeviled Western thought and science since short~ after the 
Renaissance.nl 
In the final analysis, existential pS,rchology consists of the 
following basic features: (1) it is a psychology of being as opposed 
to a functionalism; (2) there is no one method attributed to it; 
instead, there are many methods utilized in accordance with an 
emphasis upon the subject's spontaneity, eidetic knowledge, and the 
freedom to be; and (3) its main area of application is psychotherapy. 
D. New Phenomenological Psychology2 
Arthur Combs, of the University of Florida, and Donald Snygg, 
of State University of New York, Teachers College, have collaborated 
in introducing a new approach to the study of psychology. In their 
revolution~ book, Individual Behavior: A New Frame of Reference 
for Psychology (1949), they proposed their "novel," or "perceptual," 
l. May, Angel, and Ellenberger ( eds.), Existence: A New 
Dimension in Psychiat;ry and Psychology, p. 11. 
2. The adjective "new" has been adopted for the following 
reasons: (1) Combs and Snygg contend that it was "novel" in their 
1949 edition; (2) Landsman in "Four Phenomenologies, 11 Journal of 
Tndividual Psychology, XIV (May, 1958), 30-31, cites its "newness" 
because it has been relatively influenced b.1 Husserl and Macleod's 
thought." 
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or "phenomenological" approach. A recent second edition of the book 
further extends and corrects earlier theories. Both authors have 
interesting backgrounds which have influenced their respective points 
of view. As a clinical psychologist, Combs has worked closely with 
Carl Rogers' .fundamental therapeutic techniques a.rrl theories. As a 
consequence, the similarity between Rogers• and Combs• theories is 
marked.l Snyggts major work has been done in the area of experimental 
psychology, and his empirical findings in rat learning have been 
noteworthy.2 
As a point of departure, Combs and Snygg defined their 
phenomenological approach in terms of a perceptual phenomenological 
perspective. A preliminary description revealing in detail the nature 
of t ·heir fundamental focus follows: 
In this book, however, the word 'perception' is used to 
refer to aQy differentiations the individual is capable 
of making in his perceptual field whether an objectively 
observable stinrulus is present or not. There seems little 
need for more than one process to explain these events. 
Differentiations in the phenomenal field resulting in 
perceptions of seeing, hearing, smelling, or feeling are 
precisely the same as those made in conceiving, knowing, 
or understanding. Although the subject matter varies, the 
process is the same. The differentiation of an idea or a 
concept is not basically different from the differentiation 
of a scent, a sound or the printed words of a page.3 
1. See Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Person-
ality," The American Psychologist, II (1947), 358-368; also see A. w. 
Combs, 11A Phenom3nological Approach to Adjustment Theory," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIV (1949), 29-35. 
2. See Snygg, "Mazes in Which Rats Take the Longer Path to Food," 
Journal of P~cholo~, I (1935-36), 153-166; also see Snygg, "Maze 
Learning as Percept~on," Journal of Genetic Psychology (XLIX 1936), 
231-239. 
3· Combs and Snygg, Individual Behavior (2d ed. rev., 1959), 
p. 30. 
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The new phenomenological ps.ychology includes several basic 
concepts: (1) the phenomenal field; (2) the phenomenal self; (3) the 
self-concept; and (4) the self-report. An examination of these 
concepts follows: 
(1) Combs and Snygg contend that ttbehavior, without exception, 
is complete~ determined by and pertinent to the phenomenal field 
of the behaving organism. ttl In the second edition of Individual 
Behavior (1959), they further aver that the perceptual field or 
phenomenal field of the individual is not completely private, but 
"changes in my own field are often accompanied by behavior on the part 
of others which indicates that a change has also taken place in their 
phenomenal fields.u2 In other words, coD!Ilunication is the main 
avenue through which persons are able to differentiate the nature of 
one another 's awareness. Combs and Snygg clari.:f'y this point by 
indicating that communication is possible through that part of the 
phenomenal. field common to two persons. The phenomenal field, then, 
is the totality of a person's awareness. This awareness maybe high 
intensity or low intensity. Combs and Snygg firmly contend that aware-
ness is never completely unconscious. At this point they conclude that 
a common sense criterion, asserting that awareness is the fundamental 
1. Snygg, "The Phenomenological Field,tt Psychological Theory, 
ed. Melvin H. Marx, p. 326. 
2. Combs and Snygg, Individual Behavior (2d ed. rev., 1959), 
P• 31. 
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cause of behavior, is sufficient rationale for interpreting human 
behavior. 
(2) The pheno~nal self is a product of the phenomenal field. 
It "includes all those parts of the phenomenal field which the 
individual experiences as parts or characteristics of himself.nl 
The phenomenal self is doer and object. Because it is an aspect of 
the phenomenal field it is considered a doer. Because it consists of 
self-experiences it is also an object. However, Combs and Snygg 
carefully guard against a false interpretation of the phenomenal self 
as abstract. They argue, however, that the phenomenal self is not a 
mere physical entity. In so far as an individual internally perceives 
himself, he is real. The phenomenal self is oneself. To the external 
observer, the phenomenal self appears in the form of pure abstraction 
or as an inference. This external observation is a partial perception 
of the self because of the locus of its observation. 
Originally Conibs and Snygg stressed that the indi vidual• s need 
was two-fold: the need for preservation and enhancement. In their 
second edition, they state that there is actually one basic need--
the need for personal adequac.y. They defend this change in the follow-
ing manner : 
We can define mants basic need, then as a need for adequacy. 
It represents in man the expression of a universal tendency 
of all things. • • • It is expressed in man • s every behavior 
at every instant of his existence. Asleep or awake, each of 
us is engaged in an insatiable quest for personal adequacy.2 
1. Combs and Snygg, Individual Behavior (1949), p. 58. 
2. Combs and Snygg, Individual Behavior (1959), p. 46. 
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(3) The self-concept and (4) the self-report are pivotal terms 
in Combs and Snygg • s system. They define the self-concept as follows: 
The self-concept includes those parts of the phenomenal 
field which the individual has differentiated as definite 
and fairly stable characteristics of himself.l 
However, it is important to note that Combs and Snygg have added 
a construct which is closely related to the self-concept. This is the 
concept of the self-report, and it is described in the following 
manner: 
The .self-report is the individual's self-description as he 
reports it to an outside observer. It represents what the 
individual says he is. Like any other act, the self-report 
is a behaviorrevealing in more or less degree what is , 
going on within the organism. It is an expressive behavior 
produced b,r the perceptual field including the phenomenal 
self. The self-report and the self-concept are by no means 
synonymous. One is behavior, the other a perceptual organi-
zation which can be more or less closely approximated by 
inference from behavior. Confusion of these two concepts 
can lead to similar confusion in our thinking. There are 
even a number of experiments in the psychological literature 
designed to stuey the self but which, in fact, are studies 
of the self-report.2 
In a concluding statement, Combs and Snygg insist that the self-
report in actuality is ~the subject•s perception of the self and 
of not self.3 
To indicate the distinctive position of Combs and Snygg•s 
psychology, we make the following observations: (1) the new 
1. Combs and Snygg, Individual Behavior (1949), p. 58. 
2. Snygg and Combs, Individual Behavior (19.59), p. 440. 
3. ~·, P• 440. 
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phenomenological psychology is consonant with the general character-
istics of the three phenomenologies previous~ discussed. However, it 
tends to be less related to pure phenomenology and more related to 
classical phenomenological ps,ychology and existential ps,ychology. 
(2) the theories of Combs and Snygg are close:cy related to psycho-
therapy; (3) the theoretical assumptions of the new phenomenological 
psychology have been substantiated by empirical research; and (4) i t s 
methodological emphasis reflects the importance of the subject's 
perceptual frame of reference and the basic need of adequacy. 
5. Summary 
A cross-sectional view of the four major types of phenomenologies 
will reveal heterogeneous and homogeneous patterns. What then may we 
conclude about their respective similarities and difference? The 
following descriptive statements will designate related patterns among 
these phenomenological systems: 
(1) All proponents of the four phenomenologies invite open 
criticisms of their respective theories. In connection with their 
present approaches, they admit that many problems evolving from their 
basic presuppositions remain to be solved. 
(2) None of the systems represent an absolute theory or a closed 
absolute s.ystem, but each ps.ychologist is seeking new evidence beyond 
the context of his respective theory. 
(3) Classical phenomenological ps.ychology, existential psy-
chology, and the new phenomenological ps,ychology show a natural and 
greater interest in applied ps,ychology. They are applied to psycho-
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therapy, learnL~g, perceptual and social behavior and to the transfor-
mation of their theories into applied areas of psychology. 
(4) Husserlts phenomenology is historically the most distinctive 
and influential. It is primari~ a philosophy described as the basis 
of all science. 
(5) To distinguish points of view indicated, we may note that 
Combs and Snygg support a perceptual frame of reference; Sonneman and 
Binswanger seek a reorientation of p~chotherapy; Macleod and Katz 
emphasize the importance of descriptive psychology; and Husserl and 
Farber accent the universal basis of their system for the work of 
science and philosophy. 
CHAPTER IV 
BA.SIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
In Chapter II of this dissertation, we found in the cursory 
account of the development of the self-concept theories that, during 
the early days 'of psychology- and philosophy 1 discussion of the self 
was not only considerable but subjective in treatment. Ear~ regarded 
as an intangible essence, an ultimate entity of experience--rather 
than as an hypothesis serving to uni£.y discordant aspects of observed 
behavior-the self-concept was treated from an inadequate and faulty 
application of the scientific method. In the later treatment of the 
self theories, however, more precision, more and more scientific 
instruments and approaches were used to make the self tangible, meas-
urable, knowable--a definite basis for the prediction of human 
behavior. 
In Chapter III--a discussion of the development of phenomenolo-
gical psychology--we found that postulated in order to permit 
operational investigation, the self, through a phenomenological 
approach, may furnish a frame of reference from which a sound theory 
of personality and behavior can be assessed. It is in this kind of 
assessment that the author has undertaken an empirical investigation 
of the self-concept in a soil heretofore untouched in this way. Three 
presuppositions, offered as reasons for an application of this type 
of assessment, are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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A. Self-Concept as an Empirical Construct 
The self-concept may be designed to indicate meaning for the 
individual's behavior. The self may be demonstrated as an inferential 
function, manifesting itself in the manifold categories of behavior. 
This property of the self-concept 110uld then serve as a basis from 
which to study the various psychological processes such as learning, 
memory, motivation, and thinking. 
As a consequence of marzy- contradictions, the self-concept may 
be resolved under more inclusive principles of interpretation. For 
example, this theory obviates the traditional mind-body hypothesis, 
reconciles the generality-specificity traits controversy and clarifies 
the meaning of same common terms of the English language: those that 
denote self-reference, such as "shame," "modesty" and "complacency.n1 
Experiments centered around the self may be designed with a 
minimum of artifieiali ty. The condi tiona of experiment may more 
ideally approach those of natural situations, notwithstanding the fact 
that they may be finely structured with regard to specific hypotheses. 
Such experiments would add to our understanding of the so-called 
mechanisms of self defense, thus acting to facilitate an approachment 
between psychoanalytical theory and the concept of academic psychology. 2 
A self-concept may serve as an impetus to a theory which would 
emcompass the whole range of emergent phenomena created by social inter-
1. A. Isenberg, !~Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy 
and Phenomeno1ogica1 Ref?earch ( Septemb sr, 1949), pp. 1-25. 
2. E. Hilgard, American Psychp1ogist, IV (1949), 374-382. 
90 
action: value, purpose, prejudice and religion. 
Finally, at this stage of the development of self theory, it 
would seem shortsighted to delimit arbitrarily the use of the self-
construct. Maximum utility has been implied in recent psychological 
theory • . It has been suggested that the construct representing such 
an hypothesis will tend to furnish the greatest stimulus to research 
and explain the greatest number of relations with a minimum of 
principles. For this author, Combs and Snygg, discussed in Chapter III 
as modern exponents of the new phenomenological approach, offer such a 
theory. 
B. The Self-Concept as a Phenomenological Construct 
In the light of these presuppositions, the purpose of this study 
is to test further the possible relationship between self-concepts or, 
more accurately, self-reports and religious attitudes and behavior, in 
the experience of a certain number of Negro College freshmen of a 
church-related college situated in the deep South. .A.s already 
mentioned and explained, the assumptions of Combs and Snygg were chosen 
to provide the basic theory to which the hypotheses of this study were 
to be applied. Therefore, in the following ways, the modem phenome-
nology of Combs and Snygg is used in the experimental phases of this 
dissertation: (1) by assuming the realit,y of certain concepts of 
personality theory, i.e., "phenomenal field,"' "phenomenal self," •self-
reports," and "traits;" (2) by focusing on the importance of self-
concept and self-reports as central objects of investigation; (3) by 
adhering to an operational definition of the items of personality, 
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i.e., "religiosity," 11sell'-concept, 11 and 11value;" and (4) by using 
self-rating and projective instruments, i.e., Strunk's Index of 
Religiosi~, Allport-Vernon-Lindzey•s Study of Values, Cattell's 
Neurotic Personality Factor Test, Bill's Index of Adjustment and 
Values, Funk•s Experimental Scales, and Gilmore's Sentence Completion 
Test. 
Thus, the sell'-reports of students in this study are necessary. 
Primary attention, therefore, is given to the individual's view of 
himself. The self-report "represents what the individual says it is.nl 
Hence, the data gathered from the subjects of this project were 
determined by how subjects viewed themselves. The validity of this 
experiment large~ depends upon the findings from these self-reports. 
Because the author of this study assumes that the meaning of 
the self is determined by the process of the individual's assigning 
himself features which are self perceived, this further categorizes 
the study as a phenomenological attempt to understand the individual. 
The subject's meanings of religiosity and other self attitudes are 
determined by this criterion. 
The life record, self-rating and objective tests are generally 
regarded as three major approaches to the measurement of personality. 
Of these three, self-rating is the method by which the personality 
traits, i.e., social, political, et al. of the subjects in this experi-
ment are assessed. The sell'-evaluations of these subjects are the 
results of a phenomenological viewing of themselves. 
1. ~., P• 440. 
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c. The Self-Concept and Conceptual Traits 
The conceptual traits should readily reflect changes in self-
perception, since within this formulation the trait is not considered 
a causal agency; rather it is regarded as a necessary inference to 
explain relative consistencies of behavior. Combs and Snygg have this 
to say about traits: 
Traits are the manifestations of the individual's techniques 
of achieving need satisfaction as the,y can be observed by 
the outsider in overt activity of one sort and another.l 
A trait becomes a characteristic mode of differentiating within 
the phenomenal field. The various common traits become conventional 
s,ymbols for characterizing the phenomenal field. The trait is not 
considered independently of the self, since with such identification, 
traits are incorporated as integral parts of the self-concept. For 
example, the chronic lawbreaker not only acts like a criminal but 
often feels that he is one. The general hypotheses of this study are 
in accordance with this view. Likewise, the student of strong 
religious attitudes not only acts religious but often feels that he 
is religious. 
D. Swmnary 
It is in the sense of the foregoing discussion that the self-
concept, as an empirical and phenomenological construct, reflecting 
conceptual traits, is applied in this research project. This experi-
ment is organized to discover any definite relationships of the 
1. ~·, P• lZl. • 
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student•s view of himself and his religious attitudes. Hence, it is 
the purpose of the writer to study the relationship of the self-
concept to measurable traits, religious, et al., described U,y the 
subjects in their self-reports. 
CHAPrER V 
GENERAL DESCRIPI'ION OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
A. Testing Features and Methods 
1. Setting of tests. After determining the purpose of this 
dissertation, the writer gave basie consideration to finding the best 
possible setting for collecting the data. A criterion of reliability 
was to determine the nature of the reports of the subjects. A plan 
was devised to designate the time, place and purpose for administering 
the tests to the subjects. 
Five tests were administered to 186 freshmen at intervals of the 
academic year, commencing November 10, 19.58, and terminating May 14, 
19.59. Prior to the period of testing; a letter was written to each 
subject announcing that a series of tests would be given as a part of 
the over-all freshman orientation program. The letter stated further 
that religious inventories and personality tests would be given. 
General~, most subjects were tested in class sections of 
Religion Al and A2, introductory courses in religion offered by Clark 
College. A few students who were unable to complete their tests 
finished them by appointment in the office of the Department of Religion 
and Philosophy. 
Printed instructions for each test were precise~ followed. 
During the testing sessions the subjects asked comparatively few 
questions. The content of such verbal statements was part~ limited 
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by the directions appearing in each test manual. Further detailed 
information concerning such directions may be found in the Appendix. 
2. Subiects of the tests. Subjects of this study, selected from 
the fall 1958 freshman class of Clark College, represented a diversified 
background of Negro students, who had residences primarily in Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida and other Southern states. Many of them were of rural 
background. Others, however, came from Northern metropolitan areas. 
The total number of students enrolled in Clark College was 773. 
At this time, the students lived on the campus under dormitory super-
vision, However, many studants attending the college generally 
resided in the city of Atlanta, Georgia. 
A majority of them either claimed Methodist or Baptist affiliation. 
Of the 773 students enrolled in the college, 35% were Methodists and 49% 
were Baptists. The next highest denomination was the Roman Catholic 
group of 3% enrollment. "Protestantnl and Presbyterian denominations 
were cited, each respectively numbering 1%. About 8% of the students 
did not state any religious affiliations. Remaining denominations in 
this population represented 3% of the total student body. 
Specifically, 299 freshmen out of the total 380 in the freshman 
class took the Otis Quick Scoring Mental Ability Test. The highest 
intelligence quotient score achieved was 125 with a percentile rank 
of 99. The lowest intelligence quotient score was 71 with a percen-
tile rank of 1. 
1. Apparently because of misunderstanding, the term "Protestant11 
was cited as a denomination. 
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Or-iginall:y, a sample of 186 students constituted the total 
number of subjects, male and female, enrolled in the author's classes 
of Philosophy and Religion Survey. or the 186 subjects, 17 subjects 
were not used either because (1) their testsl were not completed or 
(2) their tests were not answered properl:y. Hence, the final sample 
of 124 subjects represented the female and male freshmen who completed 
proper J.:y the six tests included in this study. 
The author of this study used freshmen subjects because (1) the 
data obtained from them would offer prognostic directions for studying 
.further the basic religious and personality needs of freshmen and 
upper classmen; (2) it seemed that the religious attitudes of freshmen 
were less artificial and more genuine than the religious attitudes of 
upper classmen; and (3) it was easy to obtain such data since these 
subjects were primaril:y members of the author 1 s classes. 
The sample of 124 subjects included the female and male freshmen 
who completed the six tests administered in this study. The 124 
subjects were divided into six sub-groups. These six sub-groups were 
divided according to sex and the degree of religiosit,y and denomina-
tional affiliation. The sub-groups were classified in the following 
manner: male high religiosity group, male low religiosity group, 
female high religiosity group, and female low religiosity group. The 
two remaining groups were Methodists and Baptists. These denomina.-
1. "Tests," refers primarily to the Wesleyan Index of Religio-
~and five other tests which were initiaflY aamtnis£ered to ali 
s-ubJects, female and male, in order to measure religiosity and seli'-
variables. 
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tional groups were formed by extracting subjects from the same popula-
tion that comprised the religiosity groups. A closer examination of 
the 124 subjects sub-divided into six separate groups showed pertinent 
information concerning sex, age, intelligence quotient and denomina-
tional factors. A brief discussion of these factors will follow. 
Of the 124 subjects involved in this study, 31% were male and 
69% were females. The ages of the subjects ranged from 16 to 33 years. 
About 50% of the subjects were 18 years. The Baptists ranked first, 
including 52% of the group. The Methodists ranked second, including 
40% of the group. Roman catholics ranked third, including 5% of the 
group. The Church of God ranked fourth, including 2% of the group. 
The Congregationalists and Presbyterians ranked last, including 1% of 
the group. 
The first sub-group of the 124 subjects consisted of 19 Negro 
male college freshmen of high religiosity. These subjects were so 
classified because they scored high on the Wesleyan Index of Religio-
~· The mean age of this group was 18.63. The mean score for the 
intelligence quotient achieved on the otis Quick Scoring Mental Ability 
Test was 90.63. The Baptists ranked first, including 47% of the group. 
-
The Methodists ranked second, including 37% of the group. The Roman 
catholics ranked third, including ll% of the group. The Church of God 
ranked last, including 5% of the group. 
The second sub-group · consisted of 19 Negro male college freshmen 
of law religiosity. They were so classified because they scored law 
on the Wesleyan Index of Religiosity:. The mean age of this group was 
18.26. The mean score for the intelligence quotient achieved on the 
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Otis Quick Scoring Mental Ability Test was 86. 84. The Baptists ranked 
first, including 63% of the group. The Methodists ranked second, 
including 37% of the group. 
The third sub-group consisted of 55 Negro female college freshmen 
of high religiosity. They were so classified because they scored high 
on the Wesleyan !ndex of Re1igiosity. The mean age of this group was 
18.76. The mean score for the intelligence quotient achieved on the 
Otis Quick Scoring Mental Ability Test was 89.96. The Baptists ranked 
first, including 51% of the group. The Methodists ranked second, 
including 40% of the group; the Catholics third including 5%; the 
Presbyterians and Congregationalists, ranked fourth, each including 2% 
of the group. 
The fourth sub-group consisted of 31 Negro female college 
freshmen of low religiosity. They were so classified because they 
scored low on the Weslevan Ind.ex of Religiosity. The mean age of this 
group was 18.35. The mean score for the intelligence quotient was 
89.26. The Baptists ranked first, including 52% of the group. The 
Methodists ranked second, including 42% of the group. The Church of 
God and the Roman Catholics respectively ranked in third place, each 
including 3% of the group. 
The fifth sub-group consisted of 49 Negro Methodist male and 
female college freshmen. There were 14 males and 35 females in this 
group. There were 29 subjects who scored high on religiosity items' 
1 were males and 22 females. There were 20 subjects who scored low on 
religiosity items: 1 males and 13 females. The mean age of this group 
was 18.84. The mean intelligence quotient of this group was 89.55. 
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The sixth sub-group consisted of 65 Negro Baptist college 
freshmen. There were 21 males and 44 females in this group. There 
were 37 subjects who scored high on religiosity items: 9 males and 
28 females. There were 28 subjects who scored low on religiosity 
items: 12 males am 16 females. The mean age of tlrl.s group was 18.26. 
The mean intelligence quotient of this group was 88.69. 
3. Tmes of tests. Instruments used in this study were the 
self-rating and projective type. Basical~, the rationale underlying 
this type of test was that the subject was asked to explore various 
items in terms of his personal meanings. Hence, the score obtained 
from such tests was not so important as observing the meaning which 
the individual assessed from his perceptions. In this sense, the 
following tests used may be classified as phenomenological instruments 
because they were directly dependent upon the subject's self-reports . 
The Wesleyan !ndex of Religiosity was devised by Orlo Strunk, 
' 
who used empirical studies in an attempt to treat religious attitudes 
in relation to the self. The range may include uppercl.ass high school 
students, college students, and also adults. Time designated for 
testing is approrlmately five minutes. Strunk, in a recent article, 
describes the contents of his test: 
The Religiosity Index was constructed with religiosity being 
operationally defined as fairly frequent attendance at church, 
regular contributions of money and time to the church, the 
reading of some type of religious 11 terature, regular prayer 
activity, a belief that the person's own religious beliefs and 
needs were stronger than average when compared with those of 
peers, and the admittance of a feeling that some sort of 
religious belief is necessar.y for a mature outlook on life. 
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The items measuring religiosit,y were drawn in part from .several 
similar inventories and attitude scales.l 
Administration and scoring of the Weslexan Index of Re1iciositv 
are relative:cy- elementary tasks. It is a simplified check list which 
in turn requires that the student place an "x" on the line adjacent to 
the trait which best describes himself. 
In their Study of Values, Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey, are heavily 
indebted to Spranger, who classifies man in six value catagories, 
define and describe the theoretical man, the economic man, the aesthe-
tic man, the social man, the political man, and the religious man as 
follows: 
The theoretical man: 
The dominant interest of the theoretical man is the discover.y 
of truth. In the pursuit of this goal he characteristically 
takes a cognitive attitude, one that looks for identities 
and differences; one that divests itself of judgements regard-
ing the beauty or utility of objects, and seeks only to observe 
and to reason. Since the interests of the theoretical man are 
empirica11 critical1 and rational1 he is necessarily an intel-lectualist., frequent.ly' a scientist. or philosopher. His chief 
aim in life is to order and systematize his knowledge.2: 
The economic man: 
The economic man is characteristically interested in what is 
useful. Based originally upon the satisfaction of bodily 
needs (self-preservation), the interest in utilities develops 
to embrace the practical affairs of the lbusiness world-the 
production, marketing, and consumption of goods, the elabora-
tion of credit, and the accumulation of tangible wealth. This 
1. Strunk, "Relationship Between Self Reports and Adolescent 
Religiosity," Psycho1ogical Reports, IV (19$8), 684. 
z. Allport, Vernon, Lindzey, Study of ~ues: Manua~, P• 13-14. 
For a detailed discussion, see E. Spranger's Tmes of Men ( th German 
ed.; Halle, Max Wiemeyer Verlag}. 
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type is thoroughly "practical" and conforms well to the ~re­
vailing stereot,ype of the average American business man. 
The aesthetic mal : 
The aesthetic man sees his highest value in form and harmony• 
Each single experience is judged from the stiiidPoint of grace, 
symmetry, or fitness. He regards life as a process of events;. 
each single impression is enjoyed for its own sake. He need 
not be a creative artist; nor need he be effete; he is aesthe-
tic but he finds his chief interest in the artistic episodes of 
life.2 
The social man: 
The highest value for this type is love of people. In the 
Study of Values it is the altruistic-or philanthropic aspect of 
love that is measured. The social man prizes other persons as 
ends, and is therefore himself kind. Sympathetic, and unselfish. 
He is likely to find the theoretical, economic, and aesthetic 
attitudes cold and inhuman. In contrast to the political type, 
the social man regards love as itself the only suitable form of 
human relationship. Spranger adds that in its purest form the 
social interest is selfles~ and tends to approach very closely 
to the religious attitude. 
The poll tical man: 
The poll tical man is interested primarily in Eower. His 
activities are not necessarily within the narrow field of 
politics; bu,t whatever his vocation, he betrays himself as a 
M.achtmensch.4 
The religious men : 
The highest value of the religious man may be called uni p-. He 
is ~stical, and seeks to comprehend the cosmos as a who e, to 
relate himself to its embracing totality. Spranger defines the 
religious man as one 'whose mental structure is permanently 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
-
4. ~· 
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directed to the creatioi of the highest and absolute:cy satis-
fying value experience. 
The Stud,y of values: A Scale Measuring tm Dominant Interests 
in Personality (Revised Edition) was the second test used. Originally 
published in 1931, and designed by Gordon W. Allport and Philip E. Vernon, 
the present form of the test uses new changes in content and method 
of scoring. The range of the test includes college students or adults 
of equivalent education. 
Time needed to take this test is indefinite. It varies w:l. th 
the individual. However, it has been generally found that twenty 
minutes is the average time needed by most subjects. The authors dis-
discuss the purpose of the test as follows: 
The Study of Values aims to measure the relative prominence 
of six basic interests or motives in personality: the 
theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and 
religious. The classification is based d1xectly upon Eduard 
Spranger• s Txoes of :Men, a brilliant work which defends the 
view that the personality of men is best lmown by a study of 
their values or evaluative attitudes.2 
The test appears in the form of a booklet, containing statements 
and box scores. The last two pages consist of a Score Sheet and a 
Profile of Values. Divided into two parts, Part I requests the 
subject to select an answer from two alternative answers; Part II 
directs the subject to select an answer from four alternative an~ers. 
As has been previously indicated, the test may be given individ-
ually or in a group. A variety of situations is amenable to the test• s 
1. Ibid. 
2. Allport, Vernon, Lindzey, Study of Values: Manual of Direc-
tions (1951), P• 3. 
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usage. Classroom Demonstrations, Counseling, Vocational Guidance are 
a few suggested areas for such application. 
Norms for this test were based on the scores of college students. 
Because of the wide and heterogeneous uses of the test, its norms are 
considered hig~ reliable. 
Regarding administration and scoring of the test, the authors 
give six items of explanation: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) (4) 
(5) 
(6) 
The Study of Values is self-administering. • • • 
There is no time limit. • • • 
The test may be taken in a group or individually. • • • 
There should be no explanation of the purpose or 
construction of the test before it is taken •••• 
Omissions are permissable but undesirable. • • • 
Certain groups not familiar with psychological tests, 
need assurance and encouragement. • • .1 
The third test is called the Neurotic Personality Factor Test,. 
Raymond B. Cattell, Research Professor in Psychology, University of 
Illinois; Joseph E. King, President, Industrial Psychology, Inc.; 
A. K. Schuettler, A. M., Test Construction Director, Institute for 
Personality and Ability Testing, all are responsible for the con-
struction of this test. The test has a range which includes senior 
high school students and general adults. On an average, it takes ten 
minutes for the individual to take the test. The purpose of the test 
is indicated as follows: 
This is intended as a quite brief (40 item) questionnaire 
device for screening out relatively neurotic individuals, 
in industrial situations, and also for obtaining an index 
of severity of neurosis in clinical work. More research 
has yet to be done on it before it can stand alone for the 
1. Ibid., p. 4. 
-
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latter purpose; but in conjunction with other tests it should 
contribute usefullY to objective diagnosis and prognosis. 
Because of its brevity, and aptness for scoring by clerical 
help, its greatest usefulness is as a screening device, in the 
interests of high group morale, etc.l 
The test takes the form of a four-page booklet consisting of forty 
items with three answer choices. 
Examiners working with this test have found it extremezy helpful 
in industrial plants, office centers and in general group work 
situations. It is also a helpful instrument in investigating the 
clinical relationship of patient and counselor. 
Norms are derived from the Sixteen Personalitz Factor Question-
naire, a multidimensional measure designed by R. B. Cattell. This is 
another measurement which treats sixteen distinct, primary personality 
factors. Groups of neurotics analyzed by Cattell provided the critical 
neuroticism levels of the test. Although approximatelY ten minutes are 
needed to score the test, the time designated for taking the test is 
indefinite. 
The fourth test is the Index of Adjustment and Values. Robert E. 
Bills, Professor in the Department of Ps.ychology, Alabama Polytechnic 
Institute, is primarily responsible for the construction of this test. 
The range of the test includes high school seniors and adults. There 
is no time limit for tald.ng the test. On an average, the individual 
needs about twenty minutes for taking the test. However, it is suggested 
that slaw subjects be allowed as much as an hour when the test is given 
1. R. B. Cattell, Institute for Personality am Ability Testing 
Manual (Champaign: University of Illinois, 1955), p. 16. 
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to groups. 
Writing in the introductory section of his test manual, Bills 
cites the purpose of the Index of Adjustment and Values. He says his 
test was devised in order to meet the need of objective instruments 
designed to measure variables of tests constructed with the phenome-
nological approach:l 
It is these variables which the Index has been designed to 
measure. They include self-concept, self-acceptance, con-
cept of the ideal self, and perceptions of how other people 
accept themselves. In addition, the Index yields measures 
of the importance of each 49 different traits in a person's 
value system. 2 
This test consists of four pages. Two pages give general 
directions for the two sections of the test. One section of the test 
is designed to measure self-traits .from the standpoint of the self; 
the second to measure self-traits from the standpoint of others. 
:Ma.ey applications have been made of the Index of Adjustment and 
Values. It has been successfully employed with specialized problems 
in personality theory, counseling and psychotherapy, and research in 
classroom analysis. 
Norms which have been used as standards of evaluations were 
obtained from high school seniors totaling 1599, representing eight 
states, and from 1728 college subjects of four outstanding universities. 
Because of the large number of participating subjects involved in 
Bills ' testing program, the Index of Adjustment and Values renects a 
1. R. E. Bills, Manual: Index of Adjustment and Values (Auburn: 
Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1954), P• 5. 
2. ~., P• 6. 
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high degree of validity. 
The average time for taking the test is about twenty minutes. 
The scoring of the test is based on an intricate scheme. The time 
needed for scoring the test is between twelve and fifteen minutes. 
The fifth test used in this experiment is a questionnaire 
appearing under the alternate title of Experimental Scales. This test 
represents the work of Anne Funk, Clinical PS,ychologist, Dewitt, New 
York. The scales are derived from an earlier study, 11A Study of 
Attitudes Toward Religion and Philosophy of Life, 11 which were 
administered to 255 students in an introductory course at a Mid-
western university. The scales as used in this study were modified; 
subjects were asked in Part I to answer the items by adhering to the 
TrUe and False answer system. T and F were placed in the left margin, 
adjacent to each item. The subjects were asked to encircle T far True 
and F for False. 
There is no special time set for the completion of the test. 
However, the average subject should take twenty minutes to finish it. 
JJine Funk describes the purpose of the test as follows: 
Observation of several such individuals, whose growing 
religious conflict was accompanied b.Y severe anxiety and 
depression, prompted the present investigation. The major 
purpose of the study was to explore the relationship between 
manifest anxiety, and three religious attitude variables: 
religious conflict, change of religious belief's and 
orthodo:xy.l 
1. Ruth Anne Funk, "Religious Attitudes and Manifest Anxiety in 
a College Population," American Psychological Association Paper, 1956. 
See also Funk's "A Normative Survey of Religious Attitudes and Manifest 
Anxiety in a College Population," (unpublished dissertation, Purdue 
University, 1955). 
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The test consists of Part I and Part II. The test includes six 
religious attitude scales. In addition, there are adapted versions 
of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the MYers Orthodoxy Scale. 
These scales cover three pages. Because the test was designed to 
measure the religious attitudes and manifest anxieties of college 
students, it is primarily limited to college subjects. 
Norms emerging from this study are limited. Since the test has 
been applied to small segments of the college population, the norms 
should be viewed as reflecting tentative significance. Interspersed 
throughout the test, each scale has to be scored separately. Scoring 
each scale means adding the weights of each scale. 
The final test used in this study is the Gilmore Sentence Co~ 
pletion Test, designed by John v. Gilmore, Professor of Psychology, 
Boston University. Developed within the setting of the college campus, 
this instrument is used to test the personality traits and behavioral 
patterns of college students. 
The range of the test is limited to college and graduate students. 
Directions of the test indicate that no special time is allotted far 
its completion. However, the author suggests that subjects should 
allow for seven minutes per page. 
The purpose of this test, basically in line with the theory of 
projection, reflects the influence of the phenomenological the~ of 
Combs and Snygg. Under this assumption, the personality characteris-
tics of the subjects were investigated. Combs and Sqygg cite the 
phenomenological purpose of the projective test as follows: 
Projective instruments are designed to confront the subject 
with some sort of ambiguous situations as an ink blot, a 
vague picture, an incomplete sentence, or an unfinished 
plot. In responding to such ambiguity the individual is 
necessarily thrown upon his own resources to interpret them, 
and the perceptions he reports in his responses give inter-
esting clues to the nature of the perceptions making up his 
unique perceptual field.l 
l OB 
This test consists of two pages. Forty-nine i terns are contained 
in the format. 
Counseling, research analysis and diagnosis are some of the 
special areas to Which the Gilmore Sentence Completion may be applied. 
Norms used in connection with the test are considered very reliable. 
In the light of its widespread and continuous experimental use in 
colleges, universities and seminaries, the Gilmore Sentence Co~letion 
~has demonstrated a high degree of reliability. 
The administration of this test is relatively simple. Two 
possible methods may be used to score the test. A score manual has 
been designed to evaluate the test items quantitatively. On the other 
hand, the test may be scored qualitatively by employing the item 
analysis technique. In this respect, the concern of this examiner was 
that of analyzing personality traits qualitatively in order that 
general behavioral and attitudinal hypotheses might be tested. 
4. Methods of gathering the data. After the hypotheses and 
methods of the dissertation were formulated, the author administered to 
the subjects the Wesleyan Index of Religiosity. The tests were then 
collected and scored. 
1. Combs and Seygg, Individual Behavior, pp. 4.58-459. 
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Tests were scored by adding the item weights of each of the 
seven items appearing in the test. There were two basic steps involved 
in this procedure. The item weights from one through five were added 
for a total score. After the item weights were added separate~, the 
sum of the item weights, ranging from one through five, was multiplied 
by the total item weights ranging from six through seven. This 
procedure made it possible for theoretical and functional factors 
appearing in the items to be more even~ distributed on the total score 
of the subject. It was also thought that such a procedure might 
counter-balance perfunctory responses of the subject. 
Test scores were statistical~ arranged in such a manner that the 
subjects were divided into high and low religiosity groups. Male high 
and low religiosity groups and female high and low religiosity groups 
resulted from such a division. This experiment did not assume the 
primary importance of the average subject•s responses of religiosit,r. 
On the contrary, deviant subjects• responses in terms of high and low 
were the major concern of this examiner. Hence, high and low categories 
basica~ differentiated the groups. 
An arbitrary limit was assigned from the range of raw scores made 
by the subjects. High scorers on the Religiosity Index were defined by 
assigning all scores falling one-half of a standard deviation above the 
mean as the "high" group. Low scorers were defined by assigning all 
scores falling one-half of a standard deviation below the mean as t he 
It low'' group. 
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Female self-rating scorers yielded a mean of 75.04 (N=l31)1 on 
the Religiosity Index with a standard deviation of 26.50. one-half of 
the standard deviation equaled 13.25. One-half of the standard was 
then added to and subtracted from the mean score. This procedure 
resulted in ascertaining the cut.,. off scores. The cut-off scare for 
the female high group was 88.29; that for the female lovr group was 
62.00. 
Male self-rating scorers obtained a mean of 68.02 (N=38) on the 
Religiosity Index with a standard deviation of 23.10. One-half of 
the standard deviation equaled ll.$5. One-half of the standard 
deviation was then added to arxi subtracted from the mean score. This 
procedure resulted in ascertaining the cut-of£ scores. The cut-off 
score for the male high group was 80.00; that for the male low group 
was 57 .oo. These scores differentiated high and low experimental 
groups. 
After administering the Weslela:! Index of Religiosity, the 
examiner tested the subjects with other instruments: the Allport, 
Vernon, Lindzey•s Study of Values, Cattell's Neurotic Personality 
1. Origina~, an error was made in designating the scores 
falling above the limit of 88.29. A score of 88 was included in the 
high set of scores. This caused an additional case to be added within 
the female group (N:l31). The correct number of cases should be 130. 
The mean and standard deviation when computed again using 130 cases 
equaled to 75.03 and 24.80 respectively. When adding to and subtract-
ing from the mean by one-half of the standard deviation two new re-
spective cut-off scores of 62.63 (below the mean) and 87.43 (above t he 
mean) were found. The differences between the original cut-off scores, 
62.00 and 88.29 when subtracted from 62.63 and 87.43 respectively, 
showed no appreciable significance. Remainders of .63 and .86 amounted 
to the respective differences. 
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Factor Test, Funk t s Experimental Seales and Gilmore's Sentence Compl e-
tion Test. The scores obtained from the first four instruments were 
studied and arranged in summar.y form for IBM statistical calculations. 
Several statistical measures were found in order to determine whether 
the following null hypotheses of the dissertation were to be accepted 
or rejected: (1) there is no significant difference in the self-
evaluation of students of high and of low religiosity. (2) There is 
no significant difference in the stability of the self-reports of 
students of high and of low religiosity; and (3) there is no signif-
icant difference in certain personality factors of students of high 
and of low religiosity. 
Using the summ.ary of scores for the four groups including female 
high, female low, male high, and male low uncorrelated groups, the 
examiner found statistical measures. The means, standard deviations, 
the standard errors of the two means, the standard error of the 
difference between the means and the t-score were computed and 
evaluated. Then, on the basis of the null hypotheses, the author 
attempted to determine whether the probability that a value of "t" as 
large as, or larger than, the obtained value (which was based on the 
obtained difference between means of the two samples} could have 
occurred on the basis of chance variation in the selection of the sam-
ples. This was done by comparing the value of t-scores of the test 
items obtained from the Study of Values, Neurotic Personality Fact~ 
Test, Index of Adjustment and Values and the Experimental Scales. 
Because of the nature of the Gilmore Sentence Completion Test and the 
rationale underlying its usage, it was not evaluated in this manner. 
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The above arbitrary rule means that a "t" at least as large as 
1.96 could occur from chance variations in sampling is 5 - 100 or 5%. 
This means further that if null hypotheses were continually rejected 
at the 5% level of confidence, they would be falsely rejected about 5% 
of the time. Similarly, the probability that a "t" at least as large 
as 2.58 could occur from sampling variations is only 1 in 100, or 1%, 
and null hypotheses continually rejected at this 1% level of confidence 
would be falsely rejected only about 1% of the time. Finally, the 
probability that a "t", larger than 1.96 (5%) and smaller than 2.58 
(1%) would be neither accepted or rejected. 
The fifth and sixth groups were also compared for significant 
differences. The same statistical measures, as previously cited, were 
used in determining the significant differences in the light of the 
hypotheses of the dissertation. Findings from such comparison may be 
found in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
A final group was formed for the purpose of correlating idio-
graphic findings of a small group of 4 subjects with the quantitative 
findings of the 124 subjects. This final sample was sub-divided into 
four religiosity subjects. The subjects were classified as follows: 
one male of highest religiosity, one male of lowest religiosity, one 
female of highest religiosity and one female of lowest religiosity. 
'l'firee judges were asked to evaluate the items of the Gilmore 
Sentence Completion Test. Qualified judges participating in this 
phase of the experiment were: Wiley Bolden, Chairman of the 
Department of Education and Psychology, Clark College; Thomas J. Pugh, 
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Chairman of the Department of Psychology and Religion, Interdenomi-
national Theological Center Seminary; and Marie Copher, Social Worker, 
Department of Public Welfare of the State of Gear gia. 
A rating farm was devised and given to each judge who was also 
given a comprehensive statement entitled, "A Guide far Rating the 
Reports of Subjects Obtained from the Gilmore Sentence Completion Test." 
A summation of this guide indicates the follOWing basic information. 
The following suggestions were formulated to aid the judges in 
rating some basic gttitudes of 4 male and female subjects. Attitudes 
shown were grouped under certain themes. The themes were formed by 
anal~ing the written responses of subjects. The theme comes to focus 
as a result of a principle governing the projective technique. It 
presumably suggests that if the person is supplied stimuli to which 
he is free to respond as he pleases, he will tend to invest the stimuli 
with his own private meanings. The stronger the need, the more con-
sistent will such needs appear in the context of the subject's 
ex:pression.l 
Some fundamental themes2 emerging from this study are the 
following: (1) religious, (2) family relations, (3) sex, (4) aspira-
tion, (5) self-views, and (6) prejudice. These six themes were defined 
in the following manner: 
(1) Religious Theme. Extreme interpretations of this theme are 
1. Combs and Snygg, Individual Behavior, p. 458. 
2. "Themes, n as used in this study, refer to the need expressed 
by the subject. 
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the stereotype view versus the progressive view. The stereotype view 
in religion refers to the fundamentalistic concept of God; the 
progressive view in religion, to the liberal concept of God. Examples 
of the extreme interpretations are: (i) stereotype view: "God is the 
Creator and Judge of the world;:" (ii) progressive view: "God needs 
man to convey His Will." 
(2) Fami~ Relations Theme. Extreme interpretations of this 
theme are the authoritarian view versus the democratic view. Authori-
tarian view of the fami:cy refers to the family dominated and controlled 
by parental wishes. The democratic view indicates that the family is 
controlled by the collective interests and needs of both parents and 
off-spring. Examples of the extreme interpretations are: (i) authori-
tarian view: 11Jzy Father doesn•t give anybody else a chance to make 
decisions;" (ii) democratic view: ttAt home, we work together for the 
common good of all." 
(3) Sex Theme. Extreme interpretations of this theme are 
abnormal versus normal. Abnormal denotes the subjectts tendency to 
avoid the opposite sex. Normal denotes the subject's tendency to 
preoccupy oneself with the opposite sex. Examples of the extreme inter-
pretations are as follows: (i) abnormal male: "I prefer spending my 
leisure time with fellows rather than with gll-ls;" (ii) normal male: 
"Let •s face it, girls are what make the world go around;" (iii) abnor-
mal female: "I find fellows repulsive; I am lost without my gll-1 
friends;" (iv) normal female: "I think every girl oughta have a 
steady bqy friend." 
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(4) Aspiration Theme. &rlreme interpretations of this theme 
are success versus failure. In general, the achievement motive makes 
success the end of making good grades, getting a job, joining a 
fraternity or sorority, becoming a doctor, teacher or minister. 
Success is synonymous with reward. Failure is synonymous with law 
grades or non-achievement or punishment. Examples of the extreme 
views are as follows: (i) success view: "I am going to school so I 
can make a lot of money,;." (ii) failure view: "If I don't make good 
grades so I can join the sorority, I' 11 be a failure to mysel£ and my 
folks." 
(5) Self Theme. Extreme interpretations of this theme are 
acceptance and rejection. Self-acceptance refers to the subject having 
a positive view of himsel£; in self-rejection, the subject has a 
negative view of himself. The degree to which a person accepts himself 
indicates the degree to which he values himsel£. It also follows that 
this principle maybe stated as an opposite corollary principle. 
Examples of extreme interpretations maybe stated in the following 
order:- (i) self-acceptance: "I am beginning to see my faults;" 
(ii) self-rejection: "I wish I were dead." 
(6) Prejudice Theme. Extreme interpretations of this theme are 
racial prejudice versus democratic at~itudes. Racial prejudice means 
the resentment, the denial, and the discriminatar.y practices perpetuated 
by one racial group against another. Democratic attitude denotes the 
attitude and practice of Democratic-Judea-Christian Ideals. Examples 
of the extreme views are as follows: (i) racial prejudice: "I am held 
back because of my color;" (ii) democratic attitude: "For the first 
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time in my lif'e, I felt that I was accepted as a person in the group 
and not as a Negro." 
Suggested steps for rating each test form were also included in 
the guide. Each judge was asked to read the tests to obtain a general 
idea of the themes that may appear in them. Another step was that of 
reading through each test form for the purpose of rating the subject 
according to the six themes prevalent in the form. Judges then were 
asked to construct a summary of ratings on the basis of the total 
number of times that each of the six themes appear in the individual 
test. These ratings were to be qualified from the standpoint of three 
attitudes: negative, ambivalent and positive.l 
Definitions of the attitudes used in this study were taken from 
a standard dictionary of psychology. They read as follows: 
negative (response or reaction): a response which is directed 
away f'rom the source of stimulation. 2 
ambivalence: simultaneous existence of contradictory or con-
trasting emotions towards the same person.3 · 
positive (response or reaction): 1. agreeing in some quality 
or character with a model or an original (e.g., positive after 
image). , • • 4. a synonym for affirmative, with an emotional 
setting.~ 
1. Raimy, "The Self-Concept as a Factor in Counseling and 
Personality Organization." The use of negative, ambivalent and 
positive attitudes was prompted by this study. 
2. Howard c. Warren, Dictionary of Psychology (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), P• 176. 
3· Ibid., P• 11. 
4. ~., p. 206. 
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After reading a test form, the judges were asked to indicate 
the appearance of particular themes from the standpoint of the subject's 
basic attitudes toward them. Negative, ambivalent and positive atti-
tudes were represented on the test form rr,r three columns located to the 
right of the columns. The themes were represented by six horizontal 
lines drawn perpendicular to each column. Judges were instructed t o 
place a check mark within each attitude column. Each column was then 
to be summed and the total score placed in the score box. When judges 
classified the subjec~ responses as ambiguous, they were instructed to 
indicate the same under additional conunents. Ambiguous items were 
those which the judges could not classif.y as negative, ambivalent, or 
positive. Judges were asked to add ambiguous items within the total 
score. 
B. Summary 
It was the purpose of this chapter to describe in detail the 
overall experimental steps taken in this research project. Instruments 
were used to measure the self-reports in terms of religiosity, person-
ality factors, and certain values of the subjects. The character of 
these self-reports were determined by statistical measurement and 
idiographic analysis. 
In the next chapter, it will be the aim of the writer to report 
and interpret the results of the experimental procedures employed in 
making a phenomenological study of the self-reports of Negro college 
students in a church-related college in the deep south. 
CJWiTER VI 
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF SELF-REPORTS 
In this chapter of the dissertation, findings based on the data 
of the study will be reported. To do this, certain basic questions 
shall be raised and answered by following this procedure: (1) com-
pare groups for highest and lowest mean scores according to the rank 
order method; ( 2) compare items 1rl. thin a group indicating the way each 
group perceived or rated itself; and (3) compare the mean scores of 
the religiosity and denominational groups with mean scores of norma-
tive groups in terms of a specific item or total test score under 
investigation. 
A. Questions and Answers 
1. kcourrt; of Group Test,ing. 
a. What are the values of six irouPS of Negro college freshmen 
as measured by t.he Allport,-V ernon-Lindzey Study of Values? Tables 
1 and 2 are divided into the following sections: (1) Groups; 
(2) Number; (3) Mean Age; {4) Mean I.Q.; (5) Theoretical Value; 
(6) Economic Value; (7) Aesthetic Value; (8) Social Value; (9) Politi-
cal Value; (10) Religious Value. The value columns are divided into 
two sub-columns which represent the mean and standard deviation of 
each religiosity group. The raw scores located in the sub-columns 
under mean and staooard deviation have been multiplied by 10 in order 
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TABlE 1 
MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOO. SIX VALUES OF THE STUDY OF VALUES TEST 
ADMINISTERED TO FOUR GROUPS OF COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR 
AGE, INI'ELLIGEMJE QUOTIENI', SEX AND RELIGIOSITY 
-~~~--~ --- - --·- - -- -- - - - -- ~--
Values 
Groups N8. :r.taan Age M3an IQ Theoretical Economic (1} (2) (3} 
Male High 
Religiosity 19 18.63: 
Male Low 
Religiosity 19 18.26 
Female High 
Religiosity 55 18.76 
Female Low 
Religiosity 31 18.35 
aN = 1~er of Subjects 
bu = Mean 
csD = Standard Deviation 
(4) 
90.63 
86.84 
89.69 
89.26 
(5) (6) 
J]J SD0 M SD 
42.632 4.392 38.263 7.420 
43.132 6.291 36.895 6.807 
40.209 6.208 34.845 4.950 
40.323 5.686 34.742 6.021 
--
I-' 
I-' 
'.£) 
Aesthetic 
(7) 
M SD 
34.263 7.268 
36.526 8.966 
34.816 5.841 
35.065 6.564 
TABLE 1-Continued 
Values 
Social Political Religious (8) (9) (10) 
M SD M SD M SD 
39.342 5.943 41.658 3e994 43.842 6.856 
40.474 6.668 39.105 4.400 43.868 5.633 
44.282 5.565 38.136 4.730 47.682 5.419 
44.468 5.372 39.774 5.040 45.629 5.ll9 
'------~-1...~-~~L-~- -~-- ~ 
1-' 
1\) 
0 
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to facilitate statistical computations of the IBM machine. For 
example, reading the mean under column 5, theoretical value, the raw 
score of the mean is 42.63 instead of 426.3. 
The highest mean age score is 18.76 for the female group of high 
religiosity; the lowest mean age scare is 18.26 for the male group of 
low religiosity. The highest mean intelligence quotient, a score of 
90.36, was achieved by the male group of high religiosity. The lowest 
mean intelligence quotient, 86.84, was achieved by the male group of 
low religiosity.l 
Comparing the value mean scores of the four religiosity groups 
of subjects, one observes from Table 1 that they may be ranked from 
the highest to the lowest score. The highest mean score of 47.68 
represents the religious value made by the female group of high 
religiosity. In second place, the mean score of 44.46, made by the 
female group of law religiosity, reflects the social value. A mean 
score of 43.13, reflecting the theoretical value and reported by the 
male group of low religiosity, represents the third from the highest 
score made by aQY of the four groups. In fourth place, a mean score 
of 41.65 in the social value category was reported by the male group 
of high religiosity. A fifth place mean scare of 38.26, indicating 
the economic value, was reported by the male group of high religiosity. 
1. This score is actually the Gamma I.Q. The Gamma Intelligence 
Quotient yielded by this test is not really a quotient in the sense of 
the standard meaning of intelligence quotient; however, it has the same 
significance. Gamma I.Q.•s are less variable than the ordinary I.Q.•s; 
they tend to range closely around 100. 
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A sixth place mean score of 36.52, representing the aesthetic value, 
was reported by the male group of low religiosity. 
An analysis of religiosity groups revealing a pattern of low 
ranld.ng mean scores is cited in Table 1 in the following order. The 
male group of high religiosity scored lowest on the aesthetic value 
with a mean score of 34.26. The female group of low religiosity 
ranked second from the lowest on the economic value with a mean score 
of 34.74. The female group of high religiosity scored third lowest 
on the political value with 38.13. A fourth mean score of 39.34, 
representing the fourth score, the lowest ranking mean score, denotes 
the social valne which was reported by the male group of high reli-
giosity. A mean score of 40.20, representing the theoretical value, 
is fifth from the lowest mean. It was produced by the female group 
of high religiosity. The least lowest mean score, located in sixth 
place from the lowest mean score, was 43.84, representing the religious 
value as achieved by the nale group of high religiosity. 
A mean score of 47 .68, indicating the religious value, was made 
by the female group of high religiosity. This score seemed to 
approach a possible significance since it fell just outside the range 
of 33-47. However, this score is not high enough to indicate an 
outstanding degree of importance. Although this is true, it must be 
pointed out that it is the highest mean produced by any experimental 
group. 
A further comparison of the mean scores of the four groups adds 
to the picture. In comparing the mean scores of male college popul.a-
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tions from five white collegesl with nineteen Negro male high reli-
giosity subjects and nineteen Negro male low religiosity subjects, one 
finds that generally all of the mean scores are average. They tend 
to cluster near the midpoints of the various ranges. Only the mean 
score of 32.93 (aesthetic) made by 164 males at American International 
College, seems conspicuously law. This one value reflects the only 
occasion of significant variation from the average norm. 
Comparing white female college populations' mean scores,2 made 
on the Study of Values, with 55 Negro female high religiosity subjects 
and 31 Negro female low religiosity subjects, one may observe that the 
mean scores are quite similar. Generally they reflect, with few 
exceptions, average means. The female high religiosity group scored 
a small margin of 47.68 (religious) beyond the limit of the range. 
other variations towards the extreme may be noted. A female population 
of 258 subjects at Ohio State scored significantly low with 33.71, 
representing the theoretical value. Sixty-six Radcliffe females scored 
a conspicuously low mean score of 32.80 on the economic value, while 
they produced also an appreciable high score of 48.09 on the aesthetic 
value. Also 51 females from City College of New York produced a 
relatively low religious mean score of 31.04. Scoring 47.70, the 268 
1. Colleges represented in these college populations are 
American International (N:l64); City College, New York (I'l:ll5); George 
Peabody (N:89); Harvard (N:264); and Ohio State (N:219). See Stucy of 
Values Manual for more information. 
2. other colleges cited in this group were American Inter-
national (N:321); Barnard {N:l45) and George Peabody (N:l45). 
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females at Women's College of North Carolina indicated a tendency 
toward significance in terms of high religious values. 
It may be concluded from these comparisons ti1at the mean scores 
measured by the Study of Values are largely similar to the female 
experimental groups in this study. None of the means varied extremely 
above or below the average. 
In Table 2, one may see the comparative performances of 49 
Negro Methodists and 65 Negro Baptists. Since most of the mean scores 
of these subjects are average, falling well within the designated 
limits of value ranges, the differences in the scores are not signif-
icant. With respect to specific values, both Methodists and Baptists 
rated themselves in similar patterns, producing almost the same mean 
scores. Rank order listing shows the following pattern of self-rating, 
with the highest value, first; the lowest value, last: religious, 
social, theoretical, political, economic, and aesthetic. 
b. What are the factors of six groyps of Negro college freshmen 
as measured by Cattell's Neurotic Personality Factor Test? 
T~ble 3, containing a graphic representation of the self reports 
of the six experimental groups of this study, is organized in the 
following way: (1) Groups; (2) N~er; (3) Mean Age; (4) Mean I.Q. ; 
(S) Raw Score; (6) Neurotic Stability Rank; and (7) The Discrepancy 
Score. Experimental groups rated themselves in the light of these 
items. 
Some explanations of the foregoing items may prove helpful before 
exploring Table 3. Raw scores as presented by the designers of the 
TABLE 2 
MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIOHS FOR SIX VALUES OF THE STUDY OF VALUES TEST 
ADMINISTERED TO 49 METHODIST COLlEGE FRESHMEN AND 65 BAPI'IST COLLEGE 
FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FCR AGE, INrELLIGENCE QUCYriENI', 
SEX AND DENOMINATION 
-
Values 
Groups N8. Mean Age Mean IQ Theoretical Economic 
(1) (2) (3) 
Methodists 49 18.84 
Baptists 65 18.26 
aN = Number of Subjects 
bM =~an 
csD : Standard Deviation 
(4) 
89.55 
88.69 
(5) (6) 
JJl snc M SD 
41.337 6.241 34.969 5.933 
41.046 5.589 36.077 6.115 
~ 
Vl. 
TABLE 2-Continued. 
Values 
Aesthetic Social Political 
(7) (8) (9) 
M SD M SD M SD 
34.755 6.969 42.592 5.917 39.408 5.028 
35.185 6.772 42.885 5.969 39.246 4.828 
'----
Religious 
(10) 
M SD 
46.939 5.361 
45.562 6.069 
- -
..... 
I\) 
()"\ 
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test represent the actual scores of the subjects produced on the test. 
This score is an increment on a scale consisting of varying steps. 
The range of the interval extends from 0 to 68. Basic intervals 
included in the range are the following: 0-10, ll-18, 19-26, 27-30, 
31-35, 36-41, 42-46, 47-56, 57-68. These intervals represent indi-
caters by which the examiner is able to classify performances of the 
subject. For example, if a student made a raw s.core of 36, his score 
would fall between the limits of 36-41. In order to ascertain the 
meaning of the raw scare, the examiner referred to the Neurotic 
Stability Rank. 
The Neurotic Stability Rank is a nine point scale consisting of 
nine classifications designed to correspond with the nine intervals 
of the "N'' raw score scale. Within each rank, there is a brief 
description of behavioral tendencies of the subject's personality 
traits. For example, if a subject made a raw score falling within the 
intervals of 47-56, his corresponding rank 0n the Neurotic Stability 
Rank is 8. A general description of such a person reads as follows: 
This person can be placed in positions, high or low, in 
which there is a great need of dependability, loyality, 
stability, ability to resist emotional tensions, firmness, 
and freedom from nervousness. He has more stability than 
9 out of every 10 adults .1 
The third item, the discrepancy score, is explained in the 
following manner: 
1. Cattell, The Neurotic Personality Factor Test, "Interpreta-
tions of the N. P. F. Test," Test Bulletin, p. 1. 
The an• (Distortion) score is an index of the testee 1 s 
attempt to make himself appear in a most favorable light 
on the ~estionnaire and by so doing to falsify his 
answers. 
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Six distortion questions appear in the test. Criteria have been 
formulated in order to safeguard the validity of each item. In the 
following statement, the authors make this point clear: 
The higher the •nn score, the more falsification there has 
been, and thus the more personality score should be 
questioned--the higher the liD" score, the greater the 
chances that the N. P. F. score is higher than it should 
be. The lower the ~n: score, the more honest the testee 
has been in answering ~e questionnaire, and the more true 
his personality score. 
After the Neurotic Personality Factor Test was administered t6 
the four experimental groups, these were the results. All groups 
produced mean scores which fall within the range of 31.1-~.2-3700. 
Table 3 illustrates these results by groups. The mean score of male 
high religiosity group was 36.9.5. The mean raw score of male low 
religiosity was 37.00. The female high religiosity mean score was 
31.8.5; that of the female low religiosity score, 31.42. 
Furtb!r marginal differences in the mean scores may be noted. 
The interval of 31.42-37.00 on the Neurotic Stability Rank, corre-
sponds to certain intervals under the "N" Raw Score. These intervals 
are 31-3.5 and 36-41 and are parallel to the fifth and sixth ranks. 
This means that the four groups produced a mean score representing 
1. Ibid., P• 4. 
2. Ibid. 
Groups 
TABLE 3 
MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEUROTIC PERSONAIJTY 
FACTOR TEST ADMINISTERED TO 4 GROUPS OF COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED 
FOR AGE, INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT, SEX AND RELIGIOSITY 
~ -----~---- ----- ---- - ---- -----~-
Factors 
Na Mean Mean 
Age IQ Raw Score Neurotic Stabil ity Rank Discrepancy Score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Jll snc M SD M SD 
-Male High 
Religiosity 19 18.63 90-63 36.95 5.43 5.63 1.09 5.63 1.56 
Male Low 
Religiosi t y 19 18.26 86.84 37.00 5.04 5-74 1.12 6.05 2.35 
Female High 
Rel igiosity 55 18.76 89.69 31. 85 5.34 4.78 1.09 6.69 1.81 
Femal e Low 
Religiosity 31 18.35 89.26 31.42 3-97 4.61 .97 7.19 1.67 
- ~ 
------
-~- --~--- '---
aN ::: Number of Subj ects 
~ =Mean 
csn = Standard Deviation 
~ 
'0 
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the average image of a person who may be classified in terms of •high 
average stability. n1 Midway in the Neurotic Stability Rank, a 
description representing the fifth rank is given. This description 
also presents a profile of a person of average strength of character.2 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the average 
individual in the four groups reflects a personality of high average 
or average stability. 
The discrepancy scores as they appear in Table 3 indicate a 
similar pattern of response. For example, the arithmetic mean of the 
discrepancy scores is 6.39, indicating that on the average, "little 
distortion appeared in the group's self-rating.n According to this 
rating, "the personality score should be fairly accurate.3 
An ana~sis of Table 4 reveals that Methodists and Baptists 
rate themselves in harmony with the religiosity groups. There is a 
difference of .45 between Methodists and Baptists mean scores. A 
difference of .14 exists between Methodists and Baptists in terms of 
their mean scores on the Neurotic Stability Rank. Also a difference 
of .11 exists between the discrepanc.y scores of both Methodists and 
Baptists. 
Combining separate mean scores reveals that the arithmetic mean 
scores of Methodists and Baptists yield a simple mean of 33.28. 
1. Ibid., P• 1. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., P• 5. 
---
Groups 
(1) 
TABLE 4 
MEAN SCORES AND STA._tiDARD DEVIATIONS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY 
FACTOR TEST ADMINISTERED TO 49 METHODIST COLLEGE FRESIDIAEN AND 
Na 
65 BAPI'I ST COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED Fffi AGE, 
INTELLIGENCE QUOTI ENT , SEX AND DENOMINATION 
Factors 
Mean Mean 
Age IQ Raw Score Neurotic Stability Rank Discrepancy Score 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
~ snc M SD M SD 
Methodist 49 18.84 89.55 33.51 6.25 5.08 1.26 6.55 1.93 
Baptist 65 18.26 88.69 
aN : Number of Subjects 
bM =Mean 
csn : Standard Deviation 
33.06 5.31 4.94 1.14 6.66 1.95 
--
-----
~ 
1-' 
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According to the Neurotic Stability Rank, this score falls within the 
31-35 interval. Consequently, the average Methodist or Baptist 
subject may be characterized in terms of the fifth rank personality 
description. The mean scores of the Neurotic Stability Rank produced 
by Methodists and Baptists correspond to a mean score of 5.00, which 
is directly parallel to the interval of 31-35 on the Rank and "N" Raw 
Score Table. 
In addition to previous analyses of the four religiosity groups 
and the denominational groups, one may note further the relation of 
the groups' mean scores to the kind of personality factors by which 
the subjects of the groups are identified. Cattell and his associates 
constructed six basic factors within the N. P. F. Test. These factors 
are listed as follows: 
Factor c. Mature versus Emotional, Factor G. Conscientious 
versus Changable, Factor I. Tough-minded versus Sensitive, 
Factor N. Realistic versus Sentimental, Factor o. Confident 
versus Insecure, and Factor Q4. Steady and Relaxed versus 
Tense and OVer-anxious.l 
Cattell suggests that the six factors are to be interpreted as 
existing within the personality complex of two poles: the stable pole 
versus the neurotic pole. The stable pole indicates the high scoring 
end of the N. P. F. scale while the Neurotic pole represents the low 
scoring end of the N. P. F. scale. For example, if a person produces 
a score which is translated in terms of Factor c., Mature versus 
Emotional, a description of personalit,y factors may be interpreted on 
1. Cattell, "Descriptions of the Personality Factors in the 
N. P. F., Test Bulletin, P• 1. 
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the basis of which end of the N. P. F. scale his score falls. Further-
more, if that person .ranks 9 on theN. P. F. scale, he may then be 
considered highly mature. Cattell describes this person in the follow-
ing manner: 
The person who scores on this side of Factor c. tends to be 
emotionally mature, stable, calm, phlegmatic, realistic 
about life, placid, possessing ego strength, having an inte-
grated philosophy of life, better able to maintain high 
group morals.l 
As this system of interpretation pertains to the performances of 
the four religiosity groups and the denominational groups, we suggest 
the following summary statement. None of these groups was signifi-
cantly high or low. On the contrary, their scores terd to cl uster 
around the midpoint of the N. P. F. scale. Therefore, personality 
description of these groups yields an image of an average person who 
is neither stable nor neurotic. Rather, the average person of each 
group possesses equal dimensions of neurotic and stable traits. 
Apparent~ sex, religiosity, and denomination make no appreciable 
difference in terms of the self-report of each group. 
c. What are the variables of six grouos of Negro college 
fres1unen as measured by Bills Index of Adiustment aiXi Values? Table 
5 contains the self-ratings in terms of mean scores produced by the 
four experimental groups. Four basic variables were measured: self'-
concept, self-acceptance, ideal-self and discrepancy score. · Such 
variables were perceived ~thin two frames of references. The Self 
1. ~· 
TABLE 5 
MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF ADJlBTMENT AND VALUES TEST 
ADMINISTERED TO FOUR GROUFS OF COLLIDE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR SEX AND RELIGIOSITY 
- --_- - - - -
' Ga Nb Self-
Concept 
(1) (2) (3) 
~ sDd 
MHRe 19 194.74 16.34 
MLRf 19 192.26 23.96 
FHRg 55 198.22 22.36 
FLRh 31 191.55 24.63 
~~--
l___ _ __ 
aG = Groups 
bN = Number of Subjects 
CJvJ: = Mean 
dsD = Standard Deviation 
- ··· - - ·· -
Variables 
Self Test 
Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Acceptance Self 
(4) (5) 
M SD H SD M 
174.26 22.92 206.26 32.56 39.58 
177.74 24.49 208.47 18.69 35.00 
185.64 24.29 217.49 28.44 30.16 
179.45 19.47 212.87 20.53 32.58 
------
'------~--~ -~--- -~-- - - -- - -- - - -- --
eMHR = Male High Religiosity 
f~~R = Male Low Religiosity 
gFHR = Female High Religiosity 
hFLR = Female Low Religiosity 
(6) 
SD 
18.66 
16.73 
18.34 
19.62 
--- ---- - - -
t:: 
.r::-
TABLE 5-Continued 
Variables 
Other Test 
Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Concept Acceptance Self 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
188.74 24.31 176.32 34.04 205.16 28.69 42.53 22.86 
194.89 29.51 182.42 24.80 200.89 34.50 34.84 18.50 
197.38 19.79 185.85 22.01 212.95 24.30 32.58 17.55 
192.26 26.76 181.39 18.3.S 212.13 19.62 33.58 22.58 
~ - - - - ---- ~ - - - - - -
---------- ---- -
--- . ---- - -- --- -- - ~ . . ~-~--- -- ---
,_ 
---- --- -~ 
---- ---- -- - - -- -
e 
\J1. 
Index was the first frame of reference and the other Index was the 
second. 
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On the whole, mean scores of the other Index are very similar 
to the Self-Index mean scores. The highest possible score reported 
for the three variables--self-concept, self-acceptance, and ideal-
self--is 2L.,5. From the standpoint of the Self Index, the highest 
and lowest scores were noted. The female high religiosity group 
produced the highest self-concept mean score of 198.22. The lowest 
self-concept mean score, 191.55, was made by the female low relig-
iosity group. 
Further examination of the Self Index, indicates that a mean 
scare of 185.64, referring to the self-acceptance variable, is the 
highest self-acceptance score of any group. The lowest self-
acceptance mean score produced by the male high religiosity group is 
174.26. In relation to the highest mean score made on the ideal-self 
variable, the female high religiosity group attained a mean score of 
217.49. On the other hand, the male high religiosity group made the 
lowest ideal-self mean score of 206.26. 
The fourth column under the Self Index and the other Index 
indicates the degree of discrepancy which influences the subject's 
self-reports. It is averred that the higher the score, the greater 
the discrepancy; that the lower the discrepancy score, the less the 
degree of discrepancy. The highest discrepancy mean score made by 
any group was attained by the male high religiosity group with a mean 
score of 39.58. The lowest discrepancy mean score of 30.16 was 
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reported by the female high religiosity group. 
According to the other Index, the female high religiosity group 
scored the highest mean score of 197.38, which is represented by the 
self-concept variable. The lowest self-concept mean scare of 188.74 
was produced by the male high religiosity group. In the light of the 
self-acceptance variable, the female high religiosity group made a 
mean score of 185.85. The lowest mean score of 176.32 was made b,y the 
male high religiosity group. The female high religiosity group scored 
the highest mean score of 212.95 on the ideal-self variable, while the 
lowest mean score of 200.89 was recorded by the female high religiosity 
group. 
The discrepancy scores on the other Index, made by the male high 
religiosity group reflect the highest mean score of 42.53. The lowest 
mean score of 32.85 was reported by the female high religiosity group. 
In summar,y, we may note a uniformity of responses reflected in 
the total performances of the four religiosity groups. This was 
particular~ evidenced when these groups were classified according to 
the rank order of their mean scores. The following listing represents 
the self-rating reports of all four groups in terms of the highest, 
second to the highest and third to the highest mean score attained in 
relation to the respective optional variables. A homogeneous pattern 
emerged as these groups rated themselves. The highest variable reported 
by the four groups is the ideal self. The second highest variable, 
rated by the subjects as they viewed themselves, is the self-concept. 
Appearing in third place, the self-acceptance variable was reported. 
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This rank order previously discussed constructed the same pattern of 
uniformi. ty when applied to the variables appearing on the Other Index. 
In respect to the discrepancy score, the groups, rating them-
selves, reveal conspicuous homogeneit,y in their reports. The following 
order represents their responses. The male high religiosity group was 
first; the male low religiosity group was second; the female low 
religiosity group scored third; and the female high religiosity group 
was fourth in scoring the highest degree of discrepancy mean score. 
Comparing the performances of the denominational groups, one may 
observe that on Table 6 Baptists generally rate themselves higher than 
Methodists. The discrepancy means, on the other hand, for Baptists on 
the Self Index and Other Index is lower than that of the Methodists. 
In order to detennine the relative meaning of the experimental 
groups of this study, a comparison showing the relation of the sell-
reports in terms of mean scores will be made with normative group 
scares. The first normative group consisted in 1599 high school 
seniors distributed over eight states and included sixteen high schools. 
Of the high schools represented, 54% were females and L6% were males. 
Ten of the schools were considered city schools; two were rural and 
four were city and county consolidated schools.1 
According to the variables represented in Table 5, the four 
religiosity groups tended consistently to score means according to 
the order recorded by the high school seniors and college subjects. 
1. Bills, Index of Adiustment and Va1ues Mam,al, p. 15. 
TABLE 6 
MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF ADJUSTMENT AND VALUES 
TEST ADMINISTERED TO 49 METHODIST COLLIDE FRESHMEN AND 65 BAPI'IST COLLEGE FRESHMEN 
- --- - - - -
Ga Nb Self-
Concept 
(1) (2) (3) 
~ sDd 
Meth.e 49 191.39 24.53 
Bapt.f 65 196.28 21.37 
~ = Groups 
bN = Number of Subjects 
eM = Mean 
---- ·· - --- - - -- ---
Variables 
Self Test 
Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Acceptance Self 
(4) (5) (6) 
M SD M SD 1'1 SD 
176.67 22.18 208.24 28.26 35.27 22.21 
184.58 23.44 216.08 24.49 30.97 16.56 
dsD = Standard Deviation 
8Meth. = Methodist 
fBapt. = Baptist 
~ 
\,() 
I 
,. 
TABLE 6-Continued 
Variables 
Other Test 
Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Concept Acceptance Self 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
1'1 SD H SD H SD H SD 
-
191.14 25.48 176.84 24.80 202.89 32.65 36.27 22.57 
-
198.28 22.98 186.92 23.62 215.25 17.48 31.83 18.13 
€ 
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For example, experimental groups and normative groups showed mean 
scores in the following order ranked .from the highest variable to the 
lowest variable: self-concept, self-acceptance and ideal-self. This 
order exists for Self and other Indexes. 
Mean scores on the Self Index show similar patterns. The self-
concept mean scores of high school seniors and college subjects are 
188.01 (N:l599) and 185.79 (N:l22l) respectively. The self-concept 
mean scores of religiosity groups are as follows: male high, 194.74; 
male low, 192.26; female high, 198.22; and female low, 191.55. This 
comparison reflects little difference in mean scares. With respect 
to the other Index, normative groups produced mean scares of 181.86 
(N:705) and 185.59 (N:495). The former mean score is that of high 
school seniors. The latter mean score represents that of the college 
sampling. Mean scores of the self-concept as reported by religiosity 
groups are given in the following order: 188.74, 194.89, 197.38 and 
192.26. 
Normative groups under the Self Index self-acceptance reflects 
mean scores of 177.68 (N:l599) and 171.86 (N:l728). The former score 
is the score of the high school population while the latter score is 
the college sampling. Self-acceptance scores produced by religiosity 
groups appear in Table 5 in the following order: 174.26, 177.74, 
185.64, and 181.39 for the self-acceptance variable. 
According to the ideal-self, normative groups made under the 
Self Index mean scores of 219.49 (N:l599) and 221.31 (N:l22l). The 
former mean score refers to high school subjects while the latter 
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refers to college subjects. Table 5 shows mean scores of ideal-self 
which appear in the following order: 206.26, 208.47, 217.49, 212.87. 
The other Index ideal-self mean scores of normative samples show 
210.41 (N:705) and 216.66 (N:495). High school seniors produced the 
farmer score vmile college subjects exemplified the latter. For 
religiosity groups, however, 205.16, 200.89, 212.95, and 212.13 are 
ideal-self mean scores listed according to the order on Table 5. 
Discrepancy scores within the Self Index measure reflect 
normative mean scores of 43.85 (N:l599) and 43.79 (N:l221). The former 
mean score is that of high school seniors while the latter is that of 
college students. Religiosity groups produced discrepancy scores in 
order as found on Table 5: 39.58, 35.00, 3().16, and 32.58. Comparing 
the other Index mean scores which indicate discrepancy ratings, high 
school seniors made a score of 42.59 (N:705) and 40.49 (N:495). The 
means of the religiosity groups are recorded according to order found 
in Table 5: 42.53, 34.84, 32.58, and 33.58. 
When comparing denominational groups with normative groups, one 
may see a parallel order of reporting. Mean scares appearing on the 
Self Index and the other Index were recorded as follows with the highest 
score mentioned first; the lowest, last: ideal-self, self-concept, and 
self-acceptance. The discrepancy scores, however, reveal that the 
Methodists reported higher discrepancy means cores than the Baptists 
although Baptists scored higher on the ideal-self variable. The 
differences between the mean scores of Methodists and Baptists relative 
to the discrepancy mean scores were 5.30 (Self Index) and 4.44 (other 
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Index). 
The differences in the discrepancy scores of denominational 
groups arrl normative groups yield the fallowing results. The differ-
ence between Methodists ' discrepancy mean score and high school 
seniors' mean score is 8.58 (Self Index). The discrepancy score 
between Methodist and high school seniors is 6.32 (Other Index). 
Under the Self Index, the difference between Methodist discrepancy 
mean scores and that of the normative college population is that of 
8.52. Under the Other Index, the difference between the Methodist 
discrepancy rating and the college group is 4.22. When comparing the 
Baptist discrepancy scores under the Self Index with the normative 
high school subjects, the difference was 2.88. When comparing the 
Baptist discrepancy scores under the other Index with high school 
seniors, the difference was 10. 76. Relative to the Self Index, 
Baptist discrepancy mean scores differed from the college normative 
group to the degree of 12.82. According to the other Index, Baptist 
discrepancy mean scores differed from the college sampling to the 
degree of 8.66. 
The above comparisons indicate differences in the reporting 
which occurred between denominational groups and normative groups. 
When religiosity groups--male high, male low, female high, female 
low--were compared with the normative groups, high school seniors and 
college subjects, minor margins were found between the mean scores of 
the variables. On the other hand, when the denominational groups were 
compared with the normative groups in terms of mean score differences, 
appreciably larger margins between the mean scores were found. Higher 
discrepancy scores were found existing in Methodist rating than 
Baptist rating. For a fuller view of the way various groups reported, 
consult Table 5 and Table 6. 
d. What are the scales of six groups of Negro college freshmen 
as measured by Funk's Experimental Scales? According to Table 7, one 
may observe the performances of respective groups as they rated the~ 
selves according to seven religious scales and one manifest anxiety 
scale.l Funk's Manifest Anxiety Scale2 consists of sixteen items from 
the Taylor scale and eighteen items developed exclusively by herself 
and designed especially to apply to college students. Dr. Funk defines 
manifest anxiety as "an overt or manifest symptom of unresolved 
tensions.n3 
The maximum score produced on this scale is 49. The female high 
religiosity group made the highest mean score of 21.62. The male low 
religiosity group ranked in the lowest place with a mean score of 18.95. 
1. Mean scores indicating normative data for this test were not 
available. Statistical measures cited by the author were not amenable 
to the kind of comparison which would make uniform analysis possible. 
2. The writer is especially grateful to Dr. Funk for the oppor-
tunity of examining the first draft of her dissertation, nA Survey of 
Religious Attitudes and Manifest Anxiety in a College Population." The 
definition is taken from a chapter entitled, "Procedure: Final Survey." 
3. See Funk's 11Procedure: The Final Survey," a chapter taken 
from her dissertation, 11A Survey of Religious Attitudes and Manifest 
Anxiety in a College Population." 
Ga 
{1) 
MHRe 
MLRf 
FHRg 
FLRh 
TABLE 7 
MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR MANIFEST ANXIETY AND SEVEN RELIGIOUS 
ATTITUDES ON THE EXPERIMEN.rAL SCALES ADMINISTERED TO 4 GROUPS OF COLLEGE 
FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR SEX AND RELIGIOSITY 
------- - --- ------ --- - - - -
Experimental Scales 
Nb Manifest Religious Ort hodo:xy Philosophy 
Anxiet y Conflict of Ufe 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1f snd M SD M SD M SD 
19 20.11 5.80 13.32 3.04 8.21 2.37 1.00 .65 
19 18.95 7.00 13.05 3.86 7.47 1. 96 1.53 1.19 
55 21. 62 8.09 11.11 3.48 8.98 1.91 1.15 .88 
31 19.45 7.05 10.29 3.32 9.13 1.60 1.19 .59 
- - - --
- --- -- ---
--- --- - ---- - - ------ --- - - ----- - - -
Ba: Groups dsD • Standard Deviati on gfHR a Female High Religiosit y 
bN • Number of Subjects eMHR : Male High Religiosity ~LR = Female Low Religiosi ty 
eM : Means fMLR : Male Low Religiosi ty t: 
~ 
TABLE 7 .. continued 
Experimental Scales 
Hostility Religious Religious Religious 
to Church Tranquility Solace Attitude 
(7) (8) (9) 
Change (10) 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1.00 
-79 . 4.84 1.09 5.84 1.42 3.68 4.51 
.84 .74 4.47 1.53 5.95 1.15 5.21 4.99 
l.ll 1.15 5.16 .97 6.40 1.24 3.84 4.89 
.77 .79 5.26 1.16 6.48 .88 2.94 4.56 
--
L-.......-- --·· -
----
---- - --- - -- ~- --
g 
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The Religious Conflict Scalel comprises 22 items. The highest 
mean score of 13.32 was represented by the male high religiosity 
group. The lowest man score of 10.29 was made by the female low 
subjects. 
The Orthodoxy Scale, containing ten items, has a maximum score 
of 13. The author defines orthodoxy in the following sense: 
Orthodoxy is defined as the tendency to accept the teachings 
of religious authorities, and conform to prescribed reli-
fious practices.2 · 
Female subjects of lmv religiosity made the highest mean score 
of 9.13. on the other hand, male subjects of low religiosity produced 
the lowest mean score of 7.47. 
The Philosophy of Life Scale consists of five items. The 
maximum score is 6. This scale was primarily devised to measure 
students who view philosophy as a substitute for religion. The author 
defines philosophy of life as "an integrated system of meanings and 
purposes which relates the individual goals to the goals of humanity 
and the wider structure of the universe.n3 
The highest mean score of 1 • .53 was indicated by the male lm"f 
religiosity group. The lowest mean score of 1.00 recorded by group 
1. Religious conflict is defined by the author in the following 
manner: "Religious conflict may be defined as simultaneous tendencies 
to react in opposing and incompatible ways to the same religious atti-
tude object." See Funk, "Experimental Scales Used in a Study of 
Religious Attitudes as Related to Manifest Anxiety, 11 Psychological 
Newsletter, IX (19.58), 240. 
2. Ibid. 
3. ~., 241. 
/ 
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was made by the male high religiosity group. 
The Hostility to Church Scale is composed of seven items designed 
to measure negative attitudes and difference toward the church. Accord-
ing to Funic, "Hostility to religion is an affectively toned predispo-
sition to react with aggression or withdrawal toward religious 
attitude objects.nl The highest achievable score is 8. Seven items 
comprise its structure. A mean score of 1.11 was evidenced by female 
high religiosity subjects. This score is the highest mean score 
recorded by any group. The lowest mean score of any group is .77 made 
by the female low religiosity group. 
Religious Tranquility as defined by Funk 11is an arbitrary term, 
characterizing the attitude of those who see religion, not as compensa-
tion, but as an aid to happiness and favorable sociopsychological 
adjustment.u2 On this scale female low religiosity subjects scored 
the highest mean score of 5.26. TheiDwest mean score of 4.47 was 
recorded by the male low religiosity group. 
Another scale appearing in Table 7 is the Religious Solace Scale. 
It consists of seven items. The maxi.'llUlll score of this scale is 7. In 
art effort to define religious solace, the author states that "religious 
solace is the use of religion as a means of compensating for the 
1. Funk, "Experimental Scales," Psychological Newsletter, IX 
(1958), 242. 
2. Ibid. 
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unhappiness and disappointments of life.nl The highest mean score 
reported from this scale is 6.40. This score was made ~ female 
subjects of high religiosity. The lowest mean score made by male 
subjects of high religiosity amounted to 5.84. 
The final scale within this group is the Religious Attitude 
Change Scale, comprising ten items. As the author explains it, 
This scale attempts to measure stability or instability 
of religious beliefs since college entrance. It Ill3asures 
the subject.•·s change of attitudes toward ten traditional 
religious concepts.2 
The ten traditional religious concepts included in this scale 
are the Church, a personal God, the immortality of the soul, Hell, 
Heaven, Adam and Eve, Angels, the divine inspiration of the Bible, 
the power of prayer, the divine authority of the Church. On this 
scale, male law religiosity subjects made the highest mean score of 
5.21. The lowest mean score of 2.94 was made by the female low 
religiosity subjects. 
As Table 8 reveals, denominational groups show minor variation 
in their rating. In terms of their mean scores of the highest to the 
lowest levels, with respect to each scale, Methodists &~d Baptists 
were ranked in the following order: Manifest Anxiety, Religious 
Conflict, OrthodoY.Y, Religious Solace, Religious Tranquility, Reli-
gious Attitude Change, Philosophy of Life, Hostility to Church. 
1. ~., 242. 
2. ~·J 243. 
Ga 
(1) 
Meth.e 
Bapt.f 
TABLE 8 
MEAN SCCRES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR MANIFEST ANXIETY AND SEVEN RELIGIOUS 
ATTITUDES ON THE EXPERI MENTAL SCALES ADMINISTERED TO 49 METHODIST 
COLlEGE FRESHMEN AND 65 BAPI'IST COLLEGE FRESHMEN 
Exper imental Scales 
~ Manifest Religious Orthodoxy Philosophy 
Anxiety 
( 2) (3) 
~ snd 
49 20.45' 6.34 
65' 20.02 7.89 
aa : Groups 
bN = Number of Subjects 
CM : Means 
Conflict of Life 
(4) (5') (6) 
M SD M SD M 
ll.69 3.21 8.82 1.88 1.10 
11. 5'5' 3.81 8. 65' 1.91 1.2$ 
----- ----- -L...-. ~-- - - -~- -------- -- ---- - -
dsn = Standard Deviation 
eMeth.: Methodi st 
fBapt. : Baptist 
SD 
.79 
.89 
~ 
0 
TABLE 8-conti nued 
Experimental Scales 
Hostility Religious Religious 
to Church Tranquility Solace 
(7) (8) (9) 
M SD M SD M SD 
•92 1.01 5.08 1.16 6.24 1.27 
1.00 .99 5.00 1.18 6.35 1.01 
Religious 
Attitude 
Change 
(10) 
M SD 
5.00 5.53 
3.17 4.28 
------- -
1-' 
V1. 
1-' 
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2. Comparison of Self-Reports of Intra-Sex Religiosity Groups. 
a. How do the items of 19 Negro male college freshmen of high 
religiosity compare with 19 Negro male college freshmen of low 
religiosity as neasured by the Study; of Values and the Index of Adjust-
ment and Values? How do the items of 55 Negro female college freshmen 
of high religiosity compare with the items of 31 Negro female college 
freshmen of low religiosity as measured by the Study of Values and the 
Index of Adjustment and Values? 
Table 91 and 10 present the self-reports of intra-sex religiosity 
groups as measured by the Studz of Values ~d the Index of Adjustment 
and Values J The t-values are not significant. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
b. How do the values of 49 Negro Methodist college freshmen 
compare with the values of 65 Negro Baptist college freshmen as 
measured by the study of Values? 
Table 11 presents the self-reports of Methodist and Baptist 
groups. The t-values are not significant. The nul.l hypotheses is 
accepted. 
c. How do the variables of 19 Negro male college freshmen of 
high religiosity compare with the variables of 19 Negro male col.l.ege 
freshmen of low religiosity as measured by the Index of Adjustment and 
Values? 
1. The actual value of the mean scores and standard deviation 
scores should be interpreted as 42.63 and for the theoretical value. 
This may be attained by moving the decimal. point one place to the 
left as a result of dividing 426.3 by 10. This interpretation will be 
employed throughout this study in the case of standard deviation scares. 
T/!BLE 9 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR THE SIX VALUES OF 
THE STUDY OF VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF 
HIGH RELIGIOSITY AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF LCJH RELIGIOSITY 
---
Statistical 
Measures Theoretical 
(1) (2) 
MHRa MLRb 
~=19 N=l9 
Means 426.32 431.32 
Difference 
Between 5.00 
The Means 
T-Valued .27 
aMHR' = Male High Religiosity 
bMLR = Male Low Religiosity 
--
Values 
Economic Aesthetic 
(3) (4) 
MHR MLR MHR MLR 
N=l9 N=l9 N=l9 N=l9 
382.63 368.95 342.63 365.26 
13.68 22.63 
.62 .83 
~ 
cN = Number of Subjects 
dT•Value = Criteria for significance 
at 1% and 5% levels are 
2.72 and 2.03 respectively. s 
TABLE 9-Continued 
Values 
Social Political Religious 
(5) (6) (7) 
MHR MIR MHR MLR MHR MLR 
:r-r=l9 N=l9 :tr-19 N=19 N=19 N=l9 
393.42 404.74 416.58 391.05 438.42 438.68 
11.32 25.53 .26 
.. 53 1.82 .01 
-- ~---~ - --- --- - -- - -
¥1 
TABLE 10 
THE SIGNIFICAIDE ClF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR THE SIX VALUES OF THE 
STUDY OF VAIJJES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH 
RELIGIOOITY AND 31 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF L<lV RELIGIOSITY 
- -- ----- ----
Statistical 
Measures Theoretical 
(1) (2) 
FHRa FLRb 
~=55 N-31 
Means 402.09 403.23 
Difference 
Between 1.14 
The Means 
T-valued .085 
---- ----- --- -
aF1IR' = Female High Religiosity 
bftR = Female Law Religiosity 
- - -- - - -
Values 
Economic Aesthetic 
(3) (4) 
FHR FLR FHR FLR 
N:55 N=31 N=55 N=31 
348.45 347.42 348.45 350.65 
1.03 2.20 
.15 .15 
--- ---
eN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value • Criteria for significance 
at 1% and 5% levels are 
2.64 and 1.99 respective~. 1-' 
\.11. 
\.11. 
']ABLE 10-Continued 
Values 
Social Pblitical Religious (5) (6) (7) 
FHR FUl. FHR FIR FHR FLR 
N=55 N=31 w-55 N=31 N=55 It-:31 
442.82 444.68 381.36 397.74 476.82 456.29 
--
1.85 16.38 20.53 
.15 1.45 1.60 
t::. 
a-
TABLE 11 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETl/IEEN THE MEANS FOR THE SIX VALUES 
OF THE STUDY OF VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 49 METHODIST COLLEGE 
FRESHMEN AND 65 BAP.l'IST COLLEGE FRESHMEN 
Statistical 
Measures 
(1) 
Means 
Difference 
Between 
The Means 
T-Valued 
--
ay = ~thodist 
~ =Baptist 
Values 
Theoretical Economic Aesthetic (2) (3) (4) 
}/}- Bb M B M B 
~=49 Nm65 N=49 N=65 N=49 N=65 
413.37 410.46 349.69 360.77 347.55 351.85 
2.91 11.08 4.30 
.41 .96 • .)2 
- --- ---
- - ----- -- - - ~- - - ----- - - - -
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1%' 
and 5% levels are 2.63 and 1.98 
respectively. ~ 
-J 
TABLE 11-Continued 
Values 
Social Political Religious 
' (5) (6) (7) 
M B M B M B 
N•49 Na65 N•49 N=65 N=49 N=65 
-
425.92 428.85 394.08 392.46 469.39 455.62 
2.93 1.62 13.77 
.25 .17 1.26 
~ 
co 
TABLE J2 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH 
RELIGIOOITY AND 19 MALE COLlEGE FRESHMEN OF LON RELIGIOOI'l'Y 
----~·- - ----- ---- - -- - -
Variables 
Self Test 
Statistical Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Measures Cbncept Acceptance Self 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MHRa MLRb MHR MLR MHR MLR MHR MLR 
W•l9 N:-19 N-19 N=-19 N-19 Na19 N-19 N-19 
Means 194.74 192.26 174.26 177.74 206.26 208.47 39.58 -35.00 
Difference 
Between 2.48 3.48 2.21 4.58 
The Means 
. 
T-Valued .. 36 .43 .25 .77 
-- --- - -- - --~-- - - ---- ------ --- '---------- ~--- - ---- --- ---
aMHR = Male High Religiosity 
bMLR = Male Low Religiosity 
eN = Number of Subjects 
dT~Va1ue = Criteria far significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.72 and 2.03 
respectively. 
~ 
'0 
TABLE !a-continued 
Variables 
other Test 
Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Concept Acceptance Self (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MHR MLR MHR MLR MHR MLR MHR MLR 
N=19 N=l9 N=l9 N=19 N=19 N=19 N=l9 N=19 
--
188.74 194.89 176.,32 182.42 205.16 200.89 42.53 34.84 
6.15 6.10 4.27 7.69 
.68 .61 .40 1.ll 
·-
'----------- -~- - - -- -
~ 
0 
TABLE 13 
THE SIGNJFIC~~E OF THE DJFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FCR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN ClF 
HIGH RELIGIOOITY AND 31 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESID.JEN OF LON RELIGIOSITY 
----
Variables 
Self 
-
Statistical Self- Self-
Measures Concept Acceptance 
(1) (2) (3) 
FHRa FIRb FHR FLR 
w=ss N=31 N=55 N=31 
Means 198.22 191.55 185.64 179.45 
--
Difference 
Between 6.67 6.19 
The Means 
T-Valued 1.22 1.26 
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
bfLR = Female Low Religiosity 
Test 
Ideal Discrepancy 
Self 
(4) (5) 
FHR FIR FHR FIR 
N=55 N=31 N•55 N=31 
217.49 212.87 30.16 32.58 
4.62 2.42 
.85 .55 
eN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria far significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.64 and 1.99 
respectively. 
~ 
1-' 
TABLE 13-Gontinued 
Variables 
other Test 
Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
c-oncept Acceptance Self 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
FHR FLR FHR FLR FHR FLR FHR FLR 
N=55 N=31 N=55 N=31 Ni::55 W-31 W-55 N=31 
197.38 192.26 185.85 181.39 212.95 212.13 32.58 33.58 
5.12 4.46 .82 1.00 
.91 .99 .16 .21 
- ----- - - - - - -
~ 
1\) 
TABLE J.4 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE M&ANS FOR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 49 METH®IST COLLEGE FRESHMEN 
AND 65 BAPI'IST COLlEGE FRESHMEN 
Statistical Self-
Measures Concept (1) (2) 
r 
~·49 
Means 191.39 
Difference 
Between 4.89 
The Means 
T-Valued 1.10 
ay = Methodist 
~ = Baptist 
Bb 
N=65 
196.28 
Variables 
Self Test 
Self~ Ideal Discrepancy 
.A:cceptance Self 
(3) 
M 
N=49 
176.67 
7.91 
1.86 
(4) (5) 
B M B M B 
N=65 N=49 N=65 N=49 ~65 
184.58 208.24 216.08 35.27 30.97 
7.84 4.30 
1.53 2.07 
~- ------
eN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.63 and 1.98 
respectively. 
~ 
\..U 
TABLE ~-continued 
Variables 
other Test 
self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Concept Acceptance Self (6) (7) (8) (9) 
M B M B M B M B 
N•49 N=-65 N-49 N=65 N=49 ~65 N=-49 N=65 
191.~ 198.28 176.84 186.92 202.29 215.25 36.27 31.83 
7.14 10.08 12.96 4.44 
1 • .53 2.17 2.50 1.12 
- ---· ---~. -- - ·~-- - ~ -
~ 
.&:::-
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Table 12 and 13 present the self-reports of intra-sex religiosity 
groups as measured by the Index of Adjustment and Values. The t-values 
are not significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
d. How do the variables of 49 Negro Methodist college freshmen 
compare with the variables of 65 Baptist college freshmen as measured 
by the Index of AdjustmEnt and Values? 
Table 14 presents the self-reports of Methodist and Baptist 
groups. The t-values, yielded from the difference of the self-concept, 
self-acceptance, and ideal-self mean scores (Self Index), are not 
significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. However, the means of 
the discrepancy variables of these two groups are respective~ 35.27 
and 30.97. The difference between the means is 4.JO. The t-value is 
2.07, and is significant at the 5% (1.98) level of confidence. The 
null hypothesis is rejected. 
According to the other Index, the t-values, yielded from the 
difference of the self-concept and discrepancy variables, are not 
significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. However, the means of 
the self-acceptance variables of the Methodist and Baptist groups are 
respectively 176.84 and 186.92. The difference between the means is 
10.08. The t-value is 2.17, and is significant at the 5% (1.98) level 
of confidence. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
The means of the self-ideal variables of the Methodist and 
Baptist groups are respectively 202.29 and 215.25. The difference 
between the means is 12.96. The t-value is 2.50, and is significant 
at the 5% (1.98) level of confidence. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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e. How do the scores of 19 Negro male college freshmen of high 
religiosity compare with the scores of 19 Negro male college freshmen 
of low religiosity as measured by the Neurotic Personality Factor 
Test? 
-
Table 1.5 presents the self-reports of male high and low 
religiosity groups. The t-values, yielded from the difference o:t the 
means of the raw scores, Neurotic Stability Rank and the discrepancy 
scores, are not significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
f. How do the scores of .5.5 Negro female college freshmen of 
high religiosity compare with the scores of .31 Negro female college 
freshmen of low religiosity as measured by the Neurotic Personality 
Factor Test? 
Table 16 presents the self-reports of female high and low 
religiosity groups. The t-values, yielded from the difference of the 
means of the raw scores, Neurotic Stability Rank, and the discrepancy 
scores, are not significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
g. How do the scores of 49 l-Tegro Methodist college freshmen 
compare Wi. th the scores of 6.5 Negro Baptist college freshmen as 
measured by the Neurotic Personality Factor Test? 
Table 17 presents the self-reports of Methodist and Baptist 
groups. The t-values, yielded from the difference of the means of 
the raw scores, Neurotic Stability Rank, and the discrepancy scores, 
are not significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
h. How do the scores of 19 Negro male college freshmen of high 
religiosity compare with the scores of 19 Negro male college freshmen 
of low religiosity as measured by the Experimental Scales? 
TABLE 15 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY 
FACTOR TEST AD:HINISTERED TO 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH RELIGIOSITY AND 
19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF LO"w RELIGIOSITY 
- - -
Statistical Measures Raw Score (1) (2) 
MHRa 
Nc=l9 
Means 36 .95 
Difference 
Between .05 
The Means 
T-Valued .003 
a.MHR = Male High Religiosity. 
'bm.R = Male Low Religiosity 
MLRb 
N=l9 
37.00 
--~- -
Factors 
Neurotic Stability Rank Discrepancy Score 
(3) (4) 
MHR MLR MHR MLR 
Nc:l9 N=l9 N=l9 N=l9 
5.63 5.74 5.63 6.05 
.11 .42 
.31 .64 
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.72 and 2.03 
respectively. ~ 
...... 
TABLE 16 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BEI'WEEN THE MEANS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEURGriC PERSONALITY 
FACTOR TEST ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH RELIGIOSITY AND 
31 FEMALE COLLIDE FRESHMEN OF LOW RELIGIOSITY 
---
Stat istical Measures Raw Score 
(1) ( 2) 
FHRa FLRb 
Nc=55 N=31 
Means 31.85 31.42 
Difference 
Between .43 
The Means 
T-Valued .42 
--- · - -------~.--~---·-- ----- ·---~-
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
bFLR = Female Low Religiosity 
- - - -
Factors 
Neurotic Stability Rank Discrepancy Score 
(3) (4) 
FHR FLR FHR FLR 
N=55 N=31 N=55 N=31 
4.78 4.61 6.69 7.19 
.17 .so 
.77 1.28 
-
eN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.64 and 1.99 
respectively. 
~ 
co 
TABLE 17 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEUROTIC 
PERSONALITY FACTOR TEST ADMINISTERED TO 49 MEI'HODIST COLLIDE FRESHMEN 
AND 65 BAPI'IST COLLIDE FRESHMEN 
----~ - ----- - ---- - - - --------- - ---· -- - ---- - - - - - --- -- -------- -- ---~- ---
Factors 
Statistical Measure Raw Score Neurotic Stability Rank Discrepancy Score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Methodists Baptists Methodists Baptists Methodists Baptists 
Na=49 N=65 N=49 N=65 N=49 N=65 
Means 33 .51 33.06 5.08 4.94 6.55 6. 66 
Difference 
Betlveen .45 .14 .11 
The Means 
T-Valueb .04 .64 .31 
~-- ·-- - --- - --- - -- - -- - ----- - -
---------- - - - - - -
aN = Number of Subjects 
bT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% and 5% levels are 2.63 and 1.98 respecti vely. ~ 
~ 
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Table 18 and 19 present the self-reports of the female high 
and low religiosity groups. The t-values yielded from the difference 
of the means of the Manifest Anxiety Scale, Religious Conflict Scale, 
Orthodoxy Scale, PhilosopQy of Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, 
Religious Tranquility Scale, Religious Solace Scale, Religious 
Attitude Change Scale, are not significant. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
j. How do the scales of 49 Negro Methodist college freshmen 
compare with the Beales of 65 Negro Baptist college freshmen as 
measured by the Exoerimental. Scales? 
Table 20 presents the self-reports of the Methodist and Baptist 
groups. The t-values yielded from the difference of the means of the 
Manifest Anxiety Scale, Religious Conflict Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, 
Philosophy of Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scal.e, Religious Tran-
quili ty Scale, Religious Solace Scale, and the Religious Attitude 
Change Scale, are not significant. The null Pypothesis is accepted. 
3. Comparison of the Self-Reports of Inter-Sex Religiosi tx 
Groups. 
a. How do the scores of 55 Negro female college freshmen of 
high religiosity compare with the scores of 19 Negro male college 
freshmen of high religiosity? 
Table 21 presents the self-reports of female and male high 
religiosity groups. The t-va lues yielded from the difference of the 
means of the theoretical., economic and aesthetic values, are not 
significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
TABLE 18 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETYvEEN THE MEANS FOR MANIFEST ANXIETY AND SEVEN RELIGIOUS 
ATTITUDES ON THE EXPERIMENTAL SCAlES ADMINISTERED TO 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF 
HIGH RELIGIOOTI'Y AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF LON RELIGIOOTI'Y 
- ---
Experimental scales 
statistical Manifest Religious Qrthod.OJcy Philosophy 
Measures Anxiety Conflict of Life 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MHRa Mrnb MHR MLR MEffi MLR MHR MLR 
w•19 N=19 ND19 N=19 N•19 N•19 N•19 N:a19 
Means 20.11 18.95 13.32 13.05 8.21 7.47 1.00 1.53 
Difference 
Between 1.16 .27 .74 .53 
The Means 
T-Valued .54 .23 1.04 1.82 
-- ~ - -~- -- -~- -
------- -- L__ -- - ------ -~--- ---------
aMHR : Male High Religiosity 
bMLR - Male Low Religiosity 
eN = Number of Subjects 
~-Value • Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2 •. 72 and 2.03 
respective:cy. 
1-' 
-.J 
...... 
TABLE 18-continued 
Experimental Scales 
Hostility Religious Religious Religious 
to Church Tranquility Solace Attitude 
Change 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mim. MLR MHR MLR MHR MI.R MHR MLR 
N1119 Nal9 N1119 N•l9 N=l9 N=l9 N•l9 N•l9 
1.00 .84 4.84 4.87 5.84 5.95 3.68 5.2). 
.J.6 
·37 .n. 1.53 
·-
.67 .86 .26 .91 
---
---- -~- - -- - --- -- --
~ 
1\:) 
TABLE 19 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR MANIFEST ANXmY A-TID SEVEN RELIGIOUS 
ATT.ITUDES ON THE EXPERIMENTAL SCALES ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE C OLI.EGE FRESHMEN OF 
HIGH RELIGIOOITY AND 31 FEMALE COLlEGE FRESHMEN OF LON RELIGIOOITY 
--- - - -~·- ---- --- ----- --- - · - · - ·· - -----
Experimental Scales 
Statistical Manifest Religious 
Jleasures Anxiety Conflict 
(1) (2) (3) 
FHR.a FI.Rb FHR FLR 
lf•55 N=31 N=55 N=31 
Means 21.62 19.45 11.11 10.29 
Difference 
Between 2.17 .82 
The Means 
T-Valued 1.28 1.06 
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
hr'IR = Female Low Religiosity 
Orthodoxy Philosophy 
of Life 
(4) (5) 
FHR FIR FHR FLR 
N=55 N=31 N=55 N'=31 
8.98 9.1.3 1.15 1.19 
.15 .04 
.39 .26 
eN = Number of Subjects 
dr-value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.64 and 1.99 
respectively. 
1-' 
-..] 
'vJ 
Hostility 
to Church 
.. 
(6) 
F!ffi FIR 
Na55 N•31 
l.ll .77 
.34 
1.61 
TABLE 19-Gontinued 
Experimental Scales 
ReligiouS Religious 
Tranquility Solace 
(7) (8) 
FER FIR FHR FIR 
N•)5 N=31 N=.55 N=31 
5.16 5.26 6.40 6.48 
.10 .oB 
.41 .36 
Religious 
Attitude 
Change 
(9) 
F!ffi FLR 
N=55 N=31 
3.34 2.94 
.90 
.8.5 
--- ------ - -
f-1 
-.J f:_-
TABLE 20 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFEREN}E BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR MANIFEST ANXIETY AND SEVEN 
RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES ON THE EXPERIMENTAL SCALES ADMINISTERED TO 49 METHODIST 
COLLEGE FRESHMEN AND 6.5 BAPI'IST COLlEGE FRESHMEN 
-
Statistical Ma..Tlifest 
Measures ,Anxiety 
(1) (2) 
:f.!8. Bb 
~·49 N=6.5 
Means 20.4.5 20.02 
Difference 
Between .l.~-3 
The Means 
T-Valued .32 
aM • Methodist 
~ =Baptist 
Experimental Scales 
Religious 
Conflict 
(3) 
:M B 
~49 N-6.5 
11.69 11 • .55 
.14 
.21 
Orthodoxy Philosophy 
of Life 
(4) (.5) 
M B: M B 
N=49 ~6.5 N=49 N=6.5 
8.82 8.6.5 1.10 1.2.5 
.17 .1.5 
.48 1.00 
- -
cN • Number of Subjects 
dr-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and .5% levels are 2.63 and 1.98 
respectively. 
1-' 
-.J 
Vl 
TABLE 20-Gontinued 
Experimental Sbales 
Hostility Religious Religious 
to Church Tranquility Solace 
(6) (7) (8) 
M B M B M B 
N=49 N=6.5 N=49 N=6.5 N=49 N=6.5 
.92 1.00 .5.08 .5.00 6.24 6.3.5 
.68 .oB .11 
.44 .38 .52 
- -- - -~- - - -- - - ------- - - -~ --
- - - ·---- -- -- - -- - ------ - - -- ------ ---- -
Religious 
Attitude 
Change 
(9) 
M B 
N:a1.~9 N=6.5 
.5.00 3.17 
1.83 
1.92 
1-' 
-.J 
"' 
TABLE 21 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BET\VEEN THE MEANS FOR THE SIX VALUES OF THE 
STUDY OF VALUES ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH 
RELIGICSITY AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH RELIGIOOITY 
-
~--- -~ - ---~ - ---- -- -- --- -- -- -- - - - - - --~~ 
Statistical 
Measures Theoretical 
(1) (2) 
FHRa MHRb 
~=55 N=l9 
Means 402.09 426.32 
Difference 
Between 24.23 
The Means 
T-Valued 1.81 
- - -- - - - - - - -- --- c__ _ _ --- --- ----- - - --
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
bMHR = Male High Religiosity 
Values 
Economic Aesthetic 
(3) (4) 
FHR MHR FHR MHR 
N=55 N•l9 N=55 N=l9 
348.45 382.63 348.45 342.63 
34.18 5.82 
1.82 .31 
- -- - - - - - - --
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value • Criteria for significance 
at 1% and 5% levels are 
2.65 and 2.00 respective~. 
..... 
-..1 
-..1 
TABLE 21-Continued 
Values 
Social Political Religious 
(5) (6) (7) 
FHR MHR FHR MHR FHR MHR 
N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=19 
442.82 393.42 381.36 416.58 476.82 438.42 
49.40 35.22 38.40 
3.10 2.97 2.16 
-- ~ ---- - - ~ --- - ---- - - - ---~~ ~ - - --- - - - - ~--- - --~---- - .~--- ---~-- - -
~ 
co 
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The means of the social value scores of the female high and male 
high religiosity groups are respectively 442.82 and 393.42. The 
difference between the means is 49.40. The t-value is 3.10, and is 
significant at the 1% (2.65) level of confidence. The null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
The means of the political value scores of the female high and 
male high religiosity groups are respectively 381.36 and 416.58. The 
difference between the means is 35.22. The t-va1ue is 2.97, and is 
significant at the 1% (2.65) level of confidence. The null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
The means of the religious value scores of the female high and 
male high religiosity groups are respectively 476.82 and 438.42. The 
difference between the means is 38.40. The t-value is 2.16, and is 
significant at the 5% {2.00) level of confidence. The null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
b. How do the values of 31 female Negro college freshmen of 
low religiosity compare with the values of 19 Negro male college 
freshmen of low religiosity as measured by the Study of Values? 
Table 22 presents the self-reports of female low and male low 
religiosity groups. The t-values yielded from the difference of the 
means of the theoretical, economic, aesthetic, political, and the 
religious values, are not significant. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. However, the means of the social values scores are respec-
tively 444.68 and 404.74. The difference between the means is 39.94. 
The t-value is 2.20, and is significant at the 5% (2.20) level of 
confidence. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
TABLE 22 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FCR THE SIX VALUES OF THE 
STUDY OF VALUES ADMINISTERED TO 31 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF LON 
RELIGICBITY AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF LO.'f RELIGIOSITY 
-----~ ---- -
Statistical 
Measures Theoretical 
(1) (2) 
FIR a MI.Rb 
rf•31 N=l9 
Means 403.23 431.32 
Difference 
Between 28.09 
The Means 
T-Valued 1.55 
aFIR : Female Low Religiosity 
bMLR = Male Low Religiosity 
Values 
Economic Aesthetic 
(3) (4) 
FLR MLR FLR MLR 
N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 
347.42 368.95 350.65 365.26 
21.53 14.61 
1.11 .59 
---- - - - -- - - -- -
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance 
at 1% and 5% leveJB are 
2.69 and 2.02 respectively. b:', 0 
TABLE 22-Continued 
Values 
social Political 
(5) (6) 
FLR MLR FLR MI.R 
N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=19 
444.68 404.74 391.74 391.05 
- . 
39.94 6.69 
2.20 .48 
---~~-~- '----~--
Religious 
(7) 
FIR 
N=31 
456.29 
17.61 
1.04 
- '--------
MLR 
N=l9 
438.68 
-
1--' 
co 
1--' 
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c. How do the factors of 55 Negro female college freshmen of 
high religiosity compare with the factors of 19 Negro male college 
freshmen of high religiosity as measured by the Neurotic Personality 
Factor Test? 
Table 23 presents the means of female high and male high 
religiosity groups. The means of the raw scores of the female and 
male high religiosity subjects are respectively 31.85 and 36.95. 
The difference between the means is 5.10. The t-value is 3.49, and 
is significant at the 1% (2.65) level of confidence. The null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
The means of the Neurotic Stability Rank of the female and male 
high religiosity groups are respectively 4. 78 and 5.63. The 
difference between the means is .85. The t-value is 3.04, and is 
significant at the 1% (2.65) level of confidence. The null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
The means of the discrepancy score of the female and male high 
religiosity groups are respectively 6.69 and 5.63. The difference 
between the mans is 1.03. The t-value is 2.39, and is significant 
at the 5% (2.00) level of confidence. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
d. How do the factors of the 31 Negro female college freshmen 
of law religiosity compare with the factors of 19 Negro male college 
freshmen of law religiosity as measured by the Neurotic Personality 
Factor Test? 
Table 24 presents the self-reports of female and male low 
religiosity groups. The t-values yielded from the difference of the 
TABLE 23 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BErWEEN THE MEANS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY 
FACTOR TEST ADHINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLLIDE FRESIDviEN OF HIGH RELIGIOSITY AND 
19 MALE COLLIDE FRESID1EN OF HIGH RELIGIOSITY 
Statistical Heasures RavT Score (1) (2) 
FHRa MHRb 
Nc=55 N=l9 
Heans 31.85 36.95 
Difference 
Between 5.10 
The Means 
T-Valued 3.L.9 
--~---~-- --~-
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
bHHR = Male High Religiosity 
- - --
Factors 
Neurotic Stability Rank Discrepancy Score 
(3) (4) 
FHR MHR FHR MHR 
N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 
4. 78 5.63 6 .69 5.63 
. 85 1.03 
3.04 2.39 
-- --- - - - --- - - ---~ - - - - -- - · -- - -- -- - -------- - - ---- --- ----
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.65 and 2.00 
respectively. 
-
~ 
""' 
TABLE 24 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR FACTORS OF THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY 
F.ACTOR TEST ADMINISTERED TO 31 FWJALE COLLIDE FRESHMEN OF LOW RELIGIOSITY AND 
19 MALE COLLIDE FRESHMm OF LOW RELIGIOSITY 
Statistical Measures Raw Score 
(1) (2) 
FLRa 
Nc=31 
Means 31.42 
Difference 
Between 5.58 
The Means 
T-Valued .Lo 
aFLR = Female Low Religiosity 
hMLR = Male Low Religiosity 
MLRb 
N=l9 
37.00 
Factors 
Neurotic Stability Rank Discrepancy Score 
(3) (4) 
FLR MLR FLR MLR 
N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 
4.61 5.74 7.19 6.05 
1.13 1.14 
3.64 1.81 
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.69 and 2.02 
respectively. 
~ 
.j:::"'" 
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means of the raw scores and discrepancy scores are not significant. 
The null hypothesis is accepted. However, the means of the Neurotic 
Stability Rank of the female and male low religiosity groups are 
4.61 and 5.74. The difference between the means is 1.13. The 
t-value is 3.64, and is significant at the 1% (2.69) level of 
confidence. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
e. How do the variables of 55 Negro female college freshmen of 
high religiosity compared with the variables of 19 Negro maJ.e college 
freshmen of high religiosity as measured by the Index of Adjustment 
and Values? 
Table 25 and 26 present the self-reports (Self and other Indexes) 
of the inter-sex religiosity groups. The t-values yielded from the 
difference of the means of the self-concept, self-acceptance, ideal-
self and discrepancy score are not significant. The null hypothesis 
is accepted. 
f. How do the scales of 55 Negro female college freshmen of 
high religiosity compare with the scales of 19 Negro male college 
freshmen of high religiosity as measured by the Experimental Scales? 
Table 27 presents the self-reports of female and male high 
religiosity groups. The t-values yielded from the differences of the 
means of the Manifest Anxiety Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, Philosophy of 
Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, Religious Tranquility Seale, 
Religious Solace Scale, Religious Attitude Change Scale. However, 
the means of the Religious Conflict Scale are respectively 11.11 and 
13.32. The difference between the means is 2.11. The t-value is 2.48, 
TABLE 25 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FCR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLlEGE FRESHMEN OF 
HIGH RELIDICSITY AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH RELIGIOSITY 
--- - - -- -- - -- ---- --- --
Variables 
Self Test 
Statistical Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Measures Concept Acceotance Self 
(1) (2) - (3) (4) (5) 
FHRa MHRb FHR MHR FHR MHR FHR MHR 
~=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 W-55 N=l9 
Means 198.22 194.74 185.64 174.26 217.49 206.26 30.16 39.58 
Difference 
Between 3.48 11.38 D .• 23 9.42 
The Means 
T-Valued .71 1.79 1.31 1.86 
---
--
- --- -- - --- - --- -
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
bMHR = Male High Religiosity 
eN = Number of SUbjects 
~-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.65 and 2.00 
respectively. 
~ 
0'-
Self-
Concept 
(6) 
Flffi MHR 
N=55 N=l9 
-
197.38 188.74 
8.64 
e30 
TABLE 25-Continued 
Variables 
other Test 
Self- Ideal 
Acceptance Self 
(7) (8) 
FHR MHR Flffi MHR 
N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 
185.85 176.32 212.95 205.16 
9.00 7.79 
1.05 1.03 
Discrepancy 
(9) 
Fiffi MHR 
N=55 N=l9 
32.58 42.53 
9.95 
1.70 
...... 
co 
--J 
TABIE 26 
THE SIGNJFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR VARIABLES OF THE INDEX OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND VALUES TEST ADMINISTERED TO 31 FEMALE COLlEGE FRESHMEN OF LO'f 
RELIGIOOrrY AND 19 MAIE COLLEGE FRESHMEN CF LCX'f RELIGIOOrrY 
--
-
Variables 
Self Test 
Statistical Self- Self- Ideal Discrepancy 
Measures concept Accept;mce Self 
(1) (2') 
F]RFi MIRb FLR 
~=31 N=l9 N=31 
Means 191 • .55 192.26 179.45 
Difference 
Between 1.10 
The Means 
T-Valued .13 
aFLR = Female Low Religiosity 
b~!LR = Male Low Religiosity 
(3) (4) (5) 
MLR FLR MLR FLR MI.R 
N=l9 N=31 N=ll9 N=31 N=l9 
177.74 212.87 208.47 32.58 35.00 
1.71 
.25 
4.!~0 2.42 
.76 .45 
CN = Number of Subjects 
dT-Value • Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5%' levels are 2.69 and 2.02 
respectivelY. 
1-' 
co 
co 
TABLE 26-Continued 
Variables 
other Test 
Self- Self..:. Ideal 
Concept Acceptance Self 
(6) (7) (8) 
FIR MIR FIR MIR FLR 
N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 N=31 
192.26 194.89 181.39 182.42 212.13 
2.63 1.03 11.24 
.31 .15 1.26 
MIR 
N=l9 
200.89 
Discrepancy 
(9) 
FIR MIR. 
N=31 N=l9 
33.58 34.84 
1.26 
.21 
- - --
1-' 
co 
'0 
TABLE 27 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS FOR MANIFEST ANXIETY AND SEVEN RELIGIOUS 
ATTITUDES ON THE EXPERIMENTAL SCALES ADMINISTERED TO 55 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN 
OF HIGH RELIGICSITY AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF HIGH RELIGIOSITY 
Experimental Scales 
Statistical Manifest Religious Orthodoxy Philosophy 
Measures Anxiety Conflict of Life 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FHRa MHRb FHR MHR FHR MHR FHR MHR 
~·55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 
Means 21.62 20.11 11.11 13.32 8.98 8.21 1.15 1.00 
Difference 
Between 1.51 2.11 .77 .15 
The Means 
T-Valued .07 2.48 1.26 .75 
- - --
----
L___ __ _ _______ 
'----- ~---
aFHR = Female High Religiosity 
bMHR • Male High Religiosity 
eN = Number of Subjects 
~-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.65 and 2.00 
respectively. 
..... 
'0 
0 
TABLE 27-Continued 
Experimental Scales 
Hostility Religious Religious Religi.ous 
to Church Tranquility Solace Attitude 
Change 
(6) (7) (8) (9) 
FHR MHR FHR MHR FHR MHR FHR MHR 
N=55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 N•55 N=l9 N=55 N=l9 
1.11 1.00 5.16 4.84 6.40 5.84 3.84 3.68 
.11 .32 .56 .16 
.55 1.06 1.55 .02 
~ 
~ 
TABLE 28 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BEI'WE.EN THE NEANS FOR MANIFEST ANXIEI'Y AND SEVEN RELIGIOUS 
ATTITUDES ON THE EXIERIMENTAL SCALES ADMINISTERED TO 31 FEMALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN 
OF LOW RELIGIOSITY AND 19 MALE COLLEGE FRESHMEN OF LOW RELIGIOSITY 
--
-- ----- - - -~ -- - - --- ------- ----- -- - - ------- --
Experimental Scales 
J 
Statistical Manifest Religious 
Measures Anxiety Conflict 
(1) (2) (3) 
FLRa MLRb FLR NLR 
Nc=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 
Means 19.45 18.95 10.29 13.05 
Difference 
Bet1-teen .5o 2.76 
The Means 
T-Valued • 21.~ 2.53 
aFLR = Female Low Religiosity 
bMLR =Hale Low Religiosity 
Orthodoxy Fhilosophy 
of Life 
(4) (5) 
FLR M1R I FLR M1R 
N=Jl N=l9 N=31 N=l9 
9.13 7.47 1.19 1.53 
1.66 .34 
3.07 1.13 
CN = Nur~ber of Subjects 
dT-Value = Criteria for significance at 1% 
and 5% levels are 2.69 and 2.02 
respectively. 
I-' 
'0 
1\) 
TABLE 28-Continued 
Experimental Scales 
Hostility Religious Religious Religious 
to Church Tranquility Solace Attitude 
Change 
(6) (7) (8) (9) · 
F1R MLR FLR MLR FLR MLR FLR MLR 
N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 N=31 N=l9 
.77 .84 5.26 4.47 6.48 5.95 2.94 5.21 
I 
.07 • 79 .53 2.27 
.06 .192 1.76 1.58 
~ 
w 
and is significant at the 5% (2.00) level of confidence. The null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
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g. How do the scales of 31 Negro female college freshmen of 
low religiosity compare with the scales of 19 Negro male college 
freshmen of low religiosity as measured by the Experimental Scales? 
Table 28 presents the self-reports of the female and male low 
religiosity groups. The t-values yielded from the difference of the 
means of the Manifest Anxiety Scale, ~thodoxy Scale, Philosophy of 
Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, Religious Tranquility Scale, 
Religious Solace Scale, and Religious Attitude Change Scale, are not 
significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. However, the means 
of the female and male low religiosity groups made on the Religious 
Conflict Scale are respectively 10.29 and 13.05. The difference 
between the means is 2. 76. The t-value is 2.53, and is significant 
at the 1% (2.09) level of confidence. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
The means of the female and male low religiosity groups made on 
the Orthodoxy Scale are respectively 9.13 and 7.47. The difference 
between the means is 1.66. The t-value is 3.07, and is significant at 
the 1% (2.09) level of confidence. 
4. Comparison for internal stability of the self-reports. 
Stability essentially means consistency. Two levels of stability 
were sought and appraised: (1) internal consistence, which means the 
homogeneity of the scores of a given test as compared with the scores 
obtained from other tests and produced by the same religiosity group. 
This definition of stability denotes the inner reliability of the self-
195 
reports; and (2) external stability, which means the homogeneity of 
the scores as compared with the scores obtained from different tests 
and produced by different religiosity groups. 
Religiosity groups were compared for stability by comparing 
their respective performances on the Wesleyan Religiosity Index and 
the Study of Values. The "religiosity variable" of the Wesleza!l; 
Religiosity Index and the 11religious values" was the point of 
comparison for each group. This approach was made because (1) the 
focus of this study is on the religious attitudes and behavior of 
students, and (2) religious variables statistically provide a common 
standard for all four religiosity groups. 
When comparing for the internal stability of the self-reports 
of the four religiosity groups, the results were as follows: 
(1) The religiosity mean and the religious values mean of the 
male high religiosity group are respective~ 43.84 and 45.62. The 
difference between the means is 1.78. The t-value is 12.92, and is 
significant. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
(2) The religiosity mean and the religious values mean of the 
male low religiosity group are respectively 43.86 and 45.62. The 
difference between the mean is 1.76. The t-value is 2.38 and is on~ 
significant at the 5% level of confidence. The null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
(3) The religiosity mean and the religious values mean of the 
female high religiosity group are respectively 102.69 and 47.68. 
The difference between the means is 75.01. The t-value is 33.13, and 
196 
is significant. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
(4} The religiosity mean and the religious values mean of the 
female low religiosity group are respective~ 43.42 and 38.16. The 
difference between the means is 5.36. The t-value is .727, and is 
not significant. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
In summary, the comparison of the religiosity variables of the 
Wesleyan Religiosity Index and the religious values of the Study of 
Values, showed that the self-reports of the male high, male low, and 
female high religiosity groups were stable. However, the self-reports 
of the female lOW' religiosity group when measured likewise, were not 
stable. 
5. Comparative ana:Iysis of idiographic groups. It is the aim 
of this study to examine the self-reports of subjects from an 
idiographic or a subjective point of view. This approach, denoting 
an intensive analysis, is an inclusive observation of a smaller degree 
of data. Its focus is therefore, qualitative, not quantitative. Its 
dimensions are idiographic instead of nomothetic. 
Judges participating in this aspect of the study were as follows: 
Judge 1 was a Pastoral Counselor; Judge 2 was a social worker; and 
Judge 3 was a Professor of Psychology. These judges were given the 
same test forms previously administered to four subjects. Each judge 
was asked to analyze the test performance of one female of highest 
religiosity, one female of lowest religiosity, one male of highest 
religiosity, and one male of lowest religiosity as defined by the 
Wesleyan Index of Religiosity. Judges were not only asked to analyze 
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40 items of the Gilmore Sentence Completion Test, which reflects the 
religiou~family relations, sex, aspiration, self-views, and prejudice 
themes but to classify each item according to three basic attitudes: 
positive, negative, and ambivalent. An evaluation of each judge will 
follow. 
Table 29 presents the ratings of four subjects by three judges 
under the religious theme. Each subject participating in this aspect 
of the experiment was Baptist. The average age of the subjects was 
17.25; the average age intelligence of the subjects was 86.25. The 
ratings of the female of highest religiosity were represented in the 
following way. Judge 1 rated 1 item: this item was positive. Judge 
2 rated 2 items: both were ambivalent. Judge 3 rated none of the 
items under the religious theme. 
The ratings of the female of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judges 1 and 2 rated none of the items under 
the religious theme. Judge 3 rated 2 items: one negative and one 
positive. 
The ratings of the male of highest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated one item; this item was 
ambivalent. Judges 2 and 3 rated none of the items under the religious 
theme. 
The ratings of the male of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judges 1 and 2 rated none of the :items under the 
religious theme. Judge 3 rated 2 items: one negative and one positive. 
Table 30 presents the ratings of four subjects by three judges 
under the family relations theme. The ratings of the female of highest 
TABLE 29 
RATINGS BY THREE JEDGES OF THE RELIGIOUS THEME ON THE GILMORE SENTENCE COMPLETION TEST 
ADMINISTERED TO 4 COI.Ll!nE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR SEX, RELIGIOSITY, 
Subjects 
(1) 
FHRa 
FIRb 
MHRC 
MLR.d 
AGE, INTELLIGEMJE QUOTIENT AND DENOMINATION 
- ·----- ---
Religious Theme 
Denomination Age I. Q. Judges 
(2) (3) (4) 
Baptist 18 81 
Baptist 17 90 
Baptist 18 83 
Baptist 18 91 
aFHR : Female of Highest Religiosity 
brLR = Female of Lowest Religiosity 
(5) 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
J 
1 
2 
3 
Negative Ambivalent 
(6) (7) 
2 
1 
1 
1 
cMHR = Male of Highest Religiosity 
dMLR = Male of Lowest Religiosity 
Positive 
(8) 
1 
-~ 
1 
~ (X) 
-TABLE .30 
RATOOS BY THREE JUDGES OF THE FAMILY RELATIONS THEME ON THE GILMORE SENrEMJE COMPLETION 
TEST ADMINISTERED TO 4 COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR SEX, 
RELIGIOOITY, AGE, INTELLIGENCE QUOTIEN.l' AND DENOMINATION 
-~ - --- --------- -~~--~~ 
Family Relations Theme 
Subjects Denomination Age I. Q. Judges 
Negative .Ambivalent Positive 
(1} (2) (.3) {4} {5) {6) {7) (8) 
1 2 5 1 
FHRa Baptist 18 81 _2_ 7 2 
3 l. 
1 .3 1 . ' -- -" 
FLRb Baptist 17 90 2 1. _5 ]. 
_.3 
- . 
1 2 -.- -:r ·~- - __ , .. 
MHRc Baptist 18 8.3 
MLRd Baptist 18 91 
--- --~ -------~- ~-------
aFHR = Female of Highest Religiosity 
bfLR = Female of Lowest Religiosity 
2 
_3 
1 
_2_ 
.3 
2 '( 
3 
1 5 2 
2 ]. 
--~-~-- -----
cMHR = Male of Highest Religiosit,y 
dMLR = Kale of Lowest Religiosit,y 
~ 
"' 
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religiosity were represented in the following way. Judge 1 rated 8 
items: 2 negative, 5 ambivalent, and 1 positive. Judge 2 rated 9 
items: 7 ambivalent and 2 positive. Judge 3 rated 1 item: this item 
was positive. 
The ratings of the female of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 4 items: 3 negative and 1 
ambivalent. Judge 2 rated 7 items: 1 negative, 5 ambivalent and 1 
positive. Judge 3 rated none of the items under the family relations 
theme. 
The ratings of the male of highest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge ·1 rated 3 items: 2 negative and 1 
positive. Judge 2 rated 9 items: 2 ambivalent and 7 positive. Judge 
3 rated 3 items: these three items were positive. 
The ratings of the male of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 8 items: 1 negative, 5 ambivalent, 
and 2 positive. Judge 2 rated 10 items: 9 ambivalent and 1 positive. 
Judge 3 rated none of the items under the family relations theme. 
Table 31 presents the ratings of four subjects by three judges 
under the sex theme. The ratings of the female of highest religiosity 
were represented in the following way. Judge 1 r, ated 7 items: 1 
negative, 4 ambivalent, and 2 positive. Judge 2 rated 2 items; both 
were ambivalent. Judge 3 rated none of the items under the sex theme. 
The ratings of the female of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Juige l rated 8 items: 6 ambivalent and 2 
positive. Judge 2 rated 2 items: 1 negative and 1 ambivalent. Judge 
3 rated 1 item: this itemwas ambivalent. 
Subjects 
TABLE 31 
RATINGS BY THREE JUDGES OF THE SEX THEME ON THE GILMORE SENrE~E COMPLETION 
TEST ADMINISTERED TO 4 COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR SEX, 
RELIGIOOITY, AGE, INI'ELLIGE~E QUariE:m' AND DENOMINATION 
- - ~ ~~ ----~- - --~~ 
Sex Theme 
Denomination Age I. Q. Judges 
Negative Ambivalent Positive 
(1) 
FHRa 
FIBb 
MHRC 
MIRd 
(2) (3) (4) 
Baptist 18 81 
Baptist 17 90 
Baptist 18 83 
Baptist 18 91 
aFHR : Female of Highest Religiosity 
hrLR : Female of Lowest Religiosity 
(5) 
1 
2 
3 
1 
_ 2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
(6) (7) 
1 4 
-~ 
6 
l _ 1 
l 
3 5 
3 
10 
]._ 
0 MHR : Male of Highest Religiosity 
dMLR : Male of Lowest Religiosity 
(8) 
2 
2 
1 
l 
_2 
2 
1\.) 
0 
I-' 
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The ratings of the male of highest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judges 1 rated 9 items: 3 negative, 5 
ambivalent, and 1 positive. Judge 2 rated 3 items: these items were 
ambivalent. Judge 3 rated 1 item: this item was positive. 
The ratings of the male of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 10 i terns: these items were 
ambivalent. Judge 2 rated 3 items: 1 ambivalent and 2 positive. 
Judge 3 rated 2 items: these items were positive. 
Table 32 presents the ratings of four subjects by three judges 
under the aspiration theme. The ratings of the female of highest 
religiosity were represented in the following way. Judge 1 rated 8 
items: 2 negative, 1 ambivalent, and 5 positive. Judge 2 rated 20 
items: 5 negative, 7 ambivalent, and 8 positive. Judge 3 rated 3 
i tams: 1 negative and 2 positive. 
The ratings of the female of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 2 items: 1 ambivalent and 1 
positive. Judge 2 rated 15 items: 6 negative, 7 ambivalent, a.rrl 2 
positive. Judge 3 rated 2 items: 1 ambivalent and 1 positive. 
The ratings of the male of highest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 9 items: 3 ambivalent and 6 
positive. Judge 2 rated 20 items: 13 ambivalent and 7 positive. 
Judge 3 rated 4 items: these items were positive. 
The ratings of the male of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 5 items: 2 ambivalent and 3 
positive. Judge 2 rated 19 items: 4 negative, 10 ambivalent, and 5 
TABLE 32 
RATINGS BY THREE JUDGES OF THE ASPIRATION THEME ON THE GILMORE SENTENCE COMPLETION 
TEST ADMINISTERED TO 4 COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FCR SEX, 
RELIGIOSITY, AGE, INI'ELLIGENCE QUOTIENI' AND DENOMINATION 
Aspiration Theme 
Subjects Denomination Age I. Q. Judges 
(1) 
FHR.a 
FIRb 
MHRC 
YLRd 
(2) (3) (4) 
Baptist 18 81 
Baptist 17 90 
Baptist 18 83 
Baptist 18 91 
aFHR : Female of Highest Religiosity 
hFLR • Female of Lowest Religiosity 
(5) 
l 
2 
3 
1 
~~ 
3 
1 
-z 
3 
1 
~ 
3 
Negative Ambivalent 
(6) (7) 
2 1 
5 7 
1 
1 
0 7 
1 
3 
).)~ 
2 
If 10 
cMHR : Male of Highest Religiosity 
dMLR : Male of Lowest Religiosity 
Positive 
(8) 
5 
B 
2 
1 
2 
1 
6 
7 
4 
3 
5 
2 
1\) 
8 
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positive. Judge 3 rated 2 items: both were positive. 
Table 33 presents the ratings of four subjects by three judges 
under the self-views theme. The ratings of the female of highest 
religiosity were represented in the following way. Judge 1 rated 10 
items: 4 negative, 2 ambivalent, and 4 positive. Judge 2 rated 5 
items: 4 negative and 1 positive. Judge 3 rated none of the items 
under the self-views theme. 
The ratings of the female of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following wa:y. Judge 1 rated 22 items: 8 negative, 10 
ambivalent, and 4 positive. Judge 2 rated 7 items: 1 negative, 6 
' ambivalent, and 1 positive. Judge 3 rated 5 items: 4 negative and 
1 ambivalent. 
The ratings of the male of highest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 15 items: 3 negative, 8 
ambivalent, and 4 positive. Judge 2 rated 7 items: 1 negative, 3 
ambivalent, and 3 positive. Judge 3 rated 5 items: 3 negative, 1 
ambivalent, and 1 positive. 
The ratings of the male of lowest religiosity were represented 
in the following way. Judge 1 rated 15 items: 7 negative, 4 
ambivalent, and 4 positive. Judge 2 rated 2 items: 1 negative and 
1 ambivalent. Judge 3 rated none of the items under the self-views 
themes. 
Table 34 presents the ratings of four subjects by three judges 
under the prejudice theme. The ratings of the female of highest 
religiosity were represented in the following way. Judge 1 rated 1 
Subjects 
(1) 
Flma 
FI.Rb 
MHRC 
MIRd 
TABLE 33 
RATINGS BY THREE JUDGES OF THE SElF-VIEWS THEME ON THE GILMORE SENTENCE 
COMPLETION TEST ADMINISTERED TO 4 COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED 
FOR SEX, RELIGIOSITY, AGE, INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT AND DENOMINATION 
Self-Views Theme 
Denomination Age I. Q. Judges 
(2) (3) (4) 
Baptist 18 81 
Baptist 17 90 
Baptist 18 83 
Baptist 18 91 
aFHR = Female of Highest Religiosity 
bfLR = Female of Lowest Religiosity 
(5) 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Negative Ambivalent 
(6) (7) 
4 2 
4 
8 10 
1 _6 
4 _! 
3 8 
T .3_ 
3 ~ 
7 4 
T ! 
cMHR = Male of Highest Religiosity 
dMLR = Male of Lowest Religiosity 
Positive 
(8) 
4 
1 
4 
1 
4 
3 1-
I\) 
0 
\J1. 
TABlE 34 
RATINGS BY THREE JUDGES OF THE PREJUDICE THEME ON THE GILMORE SENrENCE C OMPIETION 
TEST ADMINISTERED TO 4 COLLEGE FRESHMEN WHO ARE COMPARED FOR SEX, 
REUGIOOITY, AGE, INrELLIGE~E QUCYI'IENI' AND DENOMINATION 
Prejudice Theme 
Subjects Denomination Age r. Q. Judges 
(1) 
FHRa 
FI.Rb 
MHRc 
:umd 
(2) (3) (4) 
Baptist 18 81 
Baptist 17 90 
Baptist 18 8.3 
Baptist 18 91 
aFHR • Female of Highest Religiosit,y 
~LR = Female of Lowest Religiosity 
(5) 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
.3 
1 
2 
3 
Negative Ambivalent Positive (6) (7) (8) 
1 
__l~ 
1 
--~- -- ~- --
CMHR = Male of Highest Religiosity 
dMLR = Male of Lowest Religiosity 1\) 0 
a-
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item: this item was positive. Judge 2 rated 1 item: this item was 
negative. Judge 3 rated 1 item: this item was negative. 
The ratings of female of lowest religiosity, male of highest 
religiosity, and the male of lowest religlosit.y were rated by the 
three judges showing non~ of the items appearing on the respective 
test forms of each of the subjects to be prejudice. 
A complex of attitudinal traits were considered by the three 
judges in relation to each theme. A rank order showing how the four 
subjects were classified in relation to negative attitudes was seen 
as follows: female low, 1 female high, male low, male high. This 
order means tl:at tm female low subject was ranked first in the 
highest degree of negative attitude. The female high ranked second 
in the highest degree of negative attitude. The male low ranked third 
in the highest degree of negative attitude. The male high ranked 
fourth as having the highest degree of negative attitude. 
Judges rated 8 out of 21 female high negative attitudes under 
self-views; 13 out of 26 negative items of the female low subject 
were classified under self-views. Furthermore, 7 out of 12 negative 
items of the male high subject were under self-views. Eight out of 
14 negative items of the male low subject were self-view items. 
Ambivalent attitudes of the four subjects were rated by the 
panel of judges showing the following rank order: male low, female 
low, male high, and female high. With reference to the female high 
1. "F'emale low" is an abbreviated form of the expression, 
"F'emale of lowest religiosity." For the sake of brevity, "Female low," 
"Female high," ".Male low,": and 11Male high," will be used as equivalents 
denoting subjects of highest religiosity, etc. 
208 
subject, 2 out of 30 items were ambivalent self-views. Seventeen out 
of 40 items were attributed to ambivalent self-views of the female 
low subjects. In analyzing the male high subject's responses, 12 out 
of 39 were classified as ambivalent self-views. On the other hand, 
5 out of 42 items of the male low subject's responses were considered 
ambivalent self-views. 
Judges ranked the positive attitudes of the four subjects• self-
views accordingly: male high, female high, male low, female low. 
Eight of the 38 items of the male high subject's self-views were rated 
positively. Four of the 22 items of the male low subject's self-views 
were rated positively. Five of the 28 items of the female high 
subject's self-views were rated positively. Five of the 13 items of' 
the female of low subject•s self-views were rated positively. Five 
of the 13 items of the female low subject•s self-views were rated 
positively. 
Judges rated the negative religious attitudes of the four subjects 
in the following way. The male low subject was the only subject 
classified as having a negative religious attitude. One of the 14 
items of the male low subjectls religious attitude was rated negatively. 
Two religious items of the 10 items of' the female high subject's were 
rated ambivalently. 
rated ambivalently. 
The female low subject 1 s religious items were not 
cne of the 39 items of the male high subject Is 
religious attitudes were rated ambivalently. None of the items of the 
male low subjectls religious attitudes were rated ambivalently. With 
respect to the positive attitudes of the four subjects and their 
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relation to religious themes, the .female high subject am .female low 
subject's items were not rated positively. Only 1 o.f the 22 items 
o.f the male low subject.•s religious theme was rated ,positively. 
A general description of the collective ratings of each theme 
of the four subjects by the panel of judges will now be presented. 
The aspiration theme ranked first, representing 109 of the 324 items 
which constituted 33.64% of the total items. Judge 1 rated it 24 
times; Judge 2 rated it 74 times; and Judge 3 rated it 8 times. 
The self-view theme ranked second, representing 90 of the 324 
items which constituted 27.77% of the total items. Judge 1 rated it 
58 times; Judge 2 rated it 22 times; and Judge 3 rated it 10 times. 
The family relations theme ranked third, representing 66 of the 
324 items which eonsti tuted 19.75% of the total items. Judge 1 rated 
it 27 times; Judge 2 rated it 35 times; and Judge 3 rated it 4 times. 
The sex theme ranked fourth, representing 48 of the 324 items 
which constituted 14.81% of the total i terns. Judge 1 rated it 34 
times; Judge 2 rated it 10 times; and Judge 3 rated it 8 times. 
The religious theme ranked in fifth place, representing 8 of the 
324 items which constituted 2.46% of the total items. Judge 1 rated 
it 2 times; Judge 2 rated it 2 times; and Judge 3 rated it 4 times. 
The prejudice theme ranked in sixth place, representing 3 of the 
324 items which constituted .925% of the total items. Judge 1 rated 
it 1 time; Judge 2 rated it 1 time; and Judge 3 rated it 1 time. 
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B. SlllJIIIl817 
Several tests were administered to 124 Negro college freshmen 
who were divided on the basis of religiosity, denomination, and sex. 
The self-reports of each group were ranked according to the highest 
and lowest mean score. Certain analyses and comparisons were made of 
each group's self-report. Self-reports consisted of the self-ratings 
made by each group. The following summary will state general and 
comparative findings of this chapter. 
1. General Findings 
a. The highest value, the religious value, on the study of 
Values, was produced by the female high religiosity group. This 
value was high according to the standard of the test. The lowest 
value, the aesthetic value, was produced by the male high religiosity 
group. 
b. The comparison of the values of five male white college 
populations with nineteen Negro male high and male low religiosity 
groups showed that primarily all the values were favorable. The 
only occasion of important variation from the average score was when 
the aesthetic value of one hundred and sixty-four males of American 
International College were compared with Negro male high and male law 
religiosity groups. This value was exceptionally law. 
c. The order of importance of the six Allport-Vernon-Lindzey 
values for 49 Methodists and 65 Baptists is from highest to lowest: 
religious, social, theoretical, political, economic, and aesthetic. 
2ll 
d. None of the factors on the Neurotic Personality Factor Test, 
of the religiosity groups was significantly low. A personality 
description of the average person of these groups, showed an image of 
a person who possesses equal dimension of neurotic and stable traits. 
Apparently, religiosity, denomination, and sex, made no appreciab~e 
difference in the way each religiosity group viewed itself. 
e. The order of importance of the three variables on the Index 
of Adjustment and Values (Self and other Indexes) for religiosity 
groups is from the highest to the lowest: ideal self, self-concept, 
and self-acceptance. 
f. The order of importance of the discrepancy variable on the 
Index of Adjustment and Values (Self md other Indexes) is from the 
highest to the lowest: male high, male low, female low, and female 
high religiosity groups. 
g. Baptist subjects generally rated themselves higher than 
Methodist subjects on the Index of Adjustment and Values (Self and 
other Indexes). Furthermore, the discrepancy variables (Self and other 
Indexes) for Baptists were lower than Methodists. 
h. The self-reports of religiosity groups, compared with nor-
mative groups showed minor variations in their variables. On the 
other hand, the self-reports of denominational groups, compared With 
the same normative groups, showed larger margins of variation. 
Methodist discrepancy ratings compared with these normative groups 
were higher than Baptist ratings. 
i. The following data were observed in accordance with the 
performance of the religiosity and denominational groups on Funk's 
Experimental Scales: 
(1) The female high religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Manifest Anxiety Scale; the male low religiosity group 
produced the lowest mean score. 
(2) The male high re~igiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Religious Conflict Scale; the female low group produced 
the lowest mean score. 
(3) The female low religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Orthodoxy Scale; the male low religiosity group produced 
the lowest mean score. 
(4) The male low religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Philosophy of Life Scale; the male high religiosity group 
produced the lowest mean score. 
(5) The female high religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Hostility to Church Scale; the female low religiosity 
group produced the lowest mean score. 
(6) The female low religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Re l igious Tranquility Scale; the male low religiosity 
group produced the lowest mean score. 
(7) The female low religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Religious Solace Scale; the male high religiosity group 
produced the lowest mean score. 
(8) The male low religiosity group produced the highest mean 
score on the Religious Attitude Change Scale; the female low religiosity 
group produced the lowest mean score. 
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(9) The order of importance of the eight Funk Scales for 49 
Methodists and 65 Baptists is from the highest to the lowest: Manifest 
Anxiety Scale, Religious Conflict Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, Religious 
Solace Scale, Religious Tranquility Scale, Religious Attitude Change 
Scale, Philosophy of Life Scale, and Hostility to Church Scale. 
2. Comparative Findings 
a. The comparison of intra-sex religiosity groups and 
denominational groups, as measured by the study of Values, showed that 
the difference between the means was not significant. 
b. The comparison of the self-reports of intra-sex religiosity 
groups and denominational groups, as measured by the Index of Adjust-
ment and Values (Self and other Indexes), indicated that with the 
exception of three instances, the difference between the means was not 
s i.gnificant. The t-values of the discrepancy score on the Self Index 
were significant. The t-values of the discrepancy score and the self-
concept score, yielded from the mean scores of Methodist and Baptist 
groups on the Other Index were not significant. Yet, the t-values of 
the self-acceptance, and ideal self variables were significant. 
c. The comparison of the self-reports of intra- sex religiosity 
and denominational groups, as measured by the Neurotic Personality 
Factor Test, showed that the difference between the means of the raw 
scores, Neurotic Stability Rank, and discrepancy variables, was not 
significant. 
d. The comparison of the self-reports of the intra-sex 
religiosity and denominational groups, as meas~~ed bythe Experimenta! 
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Scales, showed that the difference between the means of the Manifest 
Anxiety Scale, Religious Conflict Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, Philosopny 
of Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, Religious Tranquility Scal e, 
Religious Solace Scale, and Religious Attitude Change Scale, was not 
significant. 
e. The comparison of the self-reports of the inter-sex 
religiosity groups, as measured by the Study of Values, showed that 
with the exception of three instances, the difference between the 
means was not significant. These exceptions were found when the 
female high religiosity group was compared with the male high 
religiosity group. The difference between the social, political, and 
religious values of these groups was significant. However, the 
difference between the means of the female low and male low on the 
six values was not significant. The difference between the means of 
the social value was significant. 
f. In the idiographic phase of this study, the Gilmore Sentence 
Completion Test was administered to four subjects: one female of 
highest religiosity, one female of lowest religiosity, one male of 
highest religiosity, and one male of lowest religiosity, as defined 
by the Wesleyan Index of Religiosity. Three judges did an item analysis 
of each test. They classified 40 items of the Gilmore Sentence 
Completion Test according to 6 themes: religious, family relations, 
sex, aspiration, self-views, and prejudice. Furthermore, they 
classified each item in the light of 3 basic attitudes: negative, 
ambivalent, and positive. 
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The following data were observed: 
(1) The order of importance of the negative attitudes for each 
religiosity subject, as measured by the panel of judges is from the 
highest to the lowest: female low, female high, male low, and male 
high. 
(2) The order of importance of the ambivalent attitudes for 
each religiosity subject, as measured by the panel of judges is from 
the highest to the lowest: male low, female low' male high, am 
female high. 
(3) The order of importance of the positive attitudes for each 
religiosity subject, as measured by the panel of judges is from the 
highest to the lowest: male high, female high, male low, and female 
low. 
(4) Fina~, the total ratings of the subjects by the judges 
presented the following percentage rank order of the six themes: 
aspiration (33.64%), self-view (27.77%), family relations (19.75%), 
sex (14.81%), religious (2.46%) and prejudice theme (.925%). 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the empirical phase of the study by 
re-stating the problem and the hypotheses and by describing the 
methodology and findings of the investigation. In addition, this 
chapter states conclusions and discusses implications for further 
research. 
A. Re-statement of the Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to determine if there is 
any significant difference between the way students of high and of 
low religiosity view thanselves. 
B. Re-statement of the Null Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: (1) there is no 
significant difference in the self-evaluation of students of high 
and of low religiosity; (2) there is no significant difference in 
the stability of the self-reports of students of high and of low 
religiosity; and (3) there is no significant difference in certain 
personality factors of students of high and of low religiosity. 
c. Re-statement of the Methodology of the Dissertation 
One hundred and eighty-six Negro college freshmen were given 
the Wesleyan Religiosity Index• Only the subjects whose scores fell 
one half the standard deviation above the mean and one half the 
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standard deviation below the mean were included in the sample. These 
students were divided into six groups, comprj.sing a total of 124 
subjects. These groups consisted of male high religiosity 3 male low 
religiosity, female high religiosity, and female low religiosity sub-
jects. The denominational groups, composed of Methodist and Baptist 
subjects, were formed by extracting subjects from the same population 
that formed the initial religiosity groups. 
After administering the Wesleyan Religiosity Index, the subjects 
were given the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey's, Study of Values, Bills' Index 
of Adiustment apd Values, Cattell's Neurotic Personality Factor Test, 
Funk's Experimental Scales, and Gilmore's Sentence Completion Test. 
The scores from the first five instruments were computed into t-values 
in order to determine whether the null hypotheses of the dissertation 
were to be accepted or rejected. Criteria of 1%. and .5% were employed 
as levels of confidence. Analyses were made in the light of such 
criteria. 
A final group of four subjects was formed for the purpose of 
comparing idiographic findings of this small group with quantitative 
findings of the larger groups of the 124 subjects. In this small 
group, subjects were classified in the following manner: one male of 
highest religiosity, one male of lowest religiosity, one female of 
highest religiosity, and one female of lowest religiosity. On the 
basis of the experimental data drawn, certain analyses were made and 
various conclusions were reached regarding each null hypothesis. 
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D. Summary of the Findings 
The findings regarding each hypothesis are organized in the 
following manner. After a statement of the hypothesis, comparative 
data are presented followed by those which are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis. 
1. Findings regarding null hYPothesis number one. Hypothesis 
One: There is no significant difference in the self-evaluation of 
students of high ani of low religiosity. When the intra-sex religi-
oai ty groups and denominational groups were compared, the results 
were as follows: 
a. Data which support this hypothesis. The Stuciv of Values 
and the Index of Adjustment and Values measured the self-evaluati on 
of intra-sex and denominational groups. 
(1) When the values on the Study of Va1ues of male high ani 
male low religiosity groups were compared, the difference was not 
significant; (2) when the values on tre Study of Values of female high 
and female low religiosity groups were compared, the difference was not 
significant; (3) when the values on the Stud,y of Values of Methodist 
and Baptis:t groups were compared, the difference was not significant; 
(4) when the variables on the Index of Aq.1ustm,ent and Values of male 
h.i.gh and mal' low religiosity groups were compared, the difference 
was not significant; (5) when the variables on the Index of Adjustment 
and Values of female high am female low religiosity groups were 
compared, the difference was not significant; am (6) when the self-
concept, self-acceptance, and ideal-self (Self-Index), the self-concept 
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and discrepancy variables ( Otl~r Index) on the Index of Adjustment 
and Values of Methodist and Baptist groups were compared, the differ-
ence was not significant. 
b. Data which are inconsistent with the hypothesis. When the 
discrepancy (Self Index), self-acceptance, and ideal-self variables 
(other Index) on the Index of Adjustment and Values of Methodist and 
Baptist groups were compared, the difference was significant. 
When the inter-sex religiosity groups were compared, the results 
were as follows: 
a. Data which support this hypOthesis. (1) When the theoretical, 
economic, and aesthetic values on the Study of Values of female high 
and male high religiosity groups were compared, the difference was not 
significant; (2) when the values on the Study of Values of female low 
and male low religiosity groups were compared, the difference was not 
significant; (3) when the variables on the Index of Adjustment and 
Values of female high and male high religiosity groups were compared, 
the difference was not significant; (4) when the variables on the Index 
of Adjustment and Values of female low and male low religiosity groups 
were compared, the difference was not significant. 
b. Data which are inconsistent with' this hypOthesis. (1) When 
the social, political, and religious values on the Study of Values of 
female high and female low religiosity groups were compared, the 
difference was significant; (2) when the social values on the Study of 
Values of female low and male low religiosity groups were compared, the 
difference was significant. 
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2. Findings regarding hypothesis number two. HYPothesis TWo: 
There is no significant difference in the stability of the self-
reports of students of high and of low religiosity. This hypothesis 
was measured in terms of the religiosity variables on the Wesleyan 
Religiosity Index, the religious values variables on the Study of 
Values, the religious variables on the ~rimental Scales, and the 
self-variables on the Index of Adjustment ani Values. When the 
religiosity and denominational groups were compared in order to 
determine the external stability of the religious variables of their 
self-reports, the results were as follows: 
a. Data which support this hypothesis. (1) When the religious 
values on the Stll;dy of Values of male high and male low were compared, 
the difference was not significant; (2) when the religious values on 
the Study of Values of female high and female low were compared, the 
difference was not significant; (3) when the religious values on the 
Study of Values of Methodist and Baptist groups were compared, the 
difference was not significant; (4) when the religious variables on 
the Religious Conflict Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, Philosopny of Life 
Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, Religious Tranquility Scale, Religious 
Solace Scale, Religious Attitude Change Scale, of male high and male 
low religiosity groups were compared, the difference was not significant; 
(.5) when the religious values on the Study of Values of female low and 
male low were compared, the difference was not significant. 
(6) When the religious variables on the Religious Conflict 
Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, Philosopny of Life Scale, Religious Tranquility 
221 
Scale, Religious Solace Scale, Religious Attitude Change Scale, of 
female high and female low religiosit,y groups, the difference was not 
significant. (7) When the religious variables on the Orthodoxy Scale, 
Philosop~ of Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, Religious 
Tranquility Scale, •Religious Solace Scale of female high and male high 
religiosi t,y groups were compared, the difference was not significant. 
(8) When the religious variables on the Religious Conflict Scale, 
Orthodoxy Scale, Philosop~ of Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, 
Religious Tranquility Scale, Religious Solace Scale, Religious Atti-
tude Change Scale of Methodist am Baptist were compared, the differ-
ence was not significant. 
b. Data which are inconsistent Jdth this hypothesis. (1) When 
the religious values on the Study of Values of female high and male 
high religiosity groups were compared, the difference was significant; 
(2) when the religious variables on the Religious Conflict Scale, and 
Orthodoxy Scale of female high and male high religiosity groups were 
compared, the difference was significant; (3) when the religious 
variables on the Religious Conflict Scale, and Orthodoxy Scale of 
female low and male low were compared, the difference was significant. 
When the religiosity and denominational groups were compared in 
order to determine the external stability of the self-variables of 
their self-reports, the results were as follows: 
a. Data which support this hYpothesis. When the self-variables 
2 2~ 
of the self-concept, self-acceptance, ideal-self, and discrepancy 
(Self and other Indexes) on the Index of Adjustment and Values of 
female high and female low religiosity groups were compared, the 
difference was not significant; (2) when the self-variables of the 
self-concept, self-acceptance, ideal-self, and discrepancy variables 
(Self and other Indexes) on the Index of Adjustment and Values of male 
high and male low religiosity groups were compared, the difference was 
not significant; (3) wban the self-variables of the self-concept, sell-
acceptance, ideal-self (Self Index), and the self-concept and discrep-
ancy variables (Other Index) on the Index of Adjustment and Values of 
Methodist and Baptist groups, the difference was not significant in 
part; (4) when the self-variables of the self-concept, self-acceptance, 
ideal-self and discrepancy variables (Self and other Indexes) on the 
Index of Adjustment and Values of female high and male high, the 
difference was not significant; (5) when the self-variables of the self-
concept, self-acceptance, ideal-self and discrepancy variables (Self 
and other Indexes) on the Index of Adjustment a.rx:l Values of female low 
and male low groups were compared, the difference was not significant. 
b. Data which are inconsistent with this IvPothesis. (1) When 
the self-variables of discrepancy (Self Index), self-acceptance, and 
ideal-self (other Index), on the Index of Adjustment ard Values of 
Methodist and Baptist groups were compared, the difference was 
significant. 
When the religiosity groups were compared in order to determine 
the internal stability of their self-reports, the results were as 
follows: 
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a. Data which support this hypothesis. When the religious 
variables on the Wesleyan Religiosity Index of the female low religi-
osity group was compared, the difference was not significant. 
b. Data which are inconsistent witb this hypothesis. (1) When 
the religiosity variables on the Wesleyan Religiosity Index of the 
male high religiosity group were compared, the difference was 
significant; (2) when the religiosity variables on the Wesleyan 
Religiosity Indelk of the male low were compared, the difference was 
significant; and (3) when the religiosity variables on the Wesleyan 
Religiosity Index of female high were compared, the difference was 
significant. 
3. Findings regarding nu11 hYPothesis number three. Hypothesis 
three: There is no significant difference in certain personality 
factors of students of high and of low religiosity. When the religi-
osity and denominational groups were compared, the results were as 
follows: 
a. Data which support this hypothesis. This hypothesis was 
measured in terms of the Neurotic Personality Factor Test and the 
Manifest Anxiety Seale of the Experimental Seales. ( 1) When the 
factors of the raw score, Neurotic Stability Rank, and discrepancy on 
the Neurotic Personality Factor Test of female high and female low 
were compared, the difference was not significant; (2) when the factors 
of the raw score, Neurotic Stability Rank, and discrepancy on the 
Neurotic Personality Factor Test of male high and male low were 
compared, the difference was not significant; (3) when the factors of 
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the raw score, Neurotic Stability Rank, and discrepancy on the 
Neurotic Personali~~ctor Test of Methodist and Baptist groups were 
compared, the difference was not significant. 
(4) When the variables of the Manifest Anxiety Scale on the 
Experimental Scales of female high and female low religiosity groups 
were compared, the difference was not significant; (5) when the 
variables of the Manifest Anxiety Scale on the Experimental Scales of 
male high and male low were compared, the difference was not significant; 
( 6) when the variables of the Manifest Anxiety Scale on the E;xperimental 
Scales of Methodist and Baptist groups were compared, the difference was 
not significant; (7) when the factors of the raw score and discrepancy 
on the Neurotic Personality Factor Test of female low and male low were 
compared, the difference was not significant; (8) when the variables of 
the Manifest Anxiety Scale on the Experimental Seal~~ of female high 
and male high groups were compared, the difference was not significant; 
(9) when the variables of the Manifest Anxiety Scale on the Experimental 
Scales of female low and male low were compared, the difference was not 
significant. 
b. Data which are inconsistent with this hypothesis. (1) When 
the factors of the raw score, Neurotic Stability Rank, and discrepancy 
on the Neurotic Perso~lity Factor Test of female high and male high 
religiosity groups were compared, the difference was significant; 
(2) when the factors of the Neurotic Stability Rank on the Neurotic 
Personality Factor Test of female low and male low religiosity groups 
were compared, the difference was significant. 
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E. Conclusions 
1. Validity and ReliabilitY: of Research Methods and Tools. 
The significance of the experimental aspect of this study is 
dependent upon the validity, reliability, instruments, and other 
factors which emerged naturally in the experiment. Furthermore, it 
depends upon the efficiency with which it measures what it attempts 
to measure. Since a basic aim of the experiment was to measure the 
self-reports of students of high and of low religiosity, a statistical 
calculation was considered important. The data of the self-reports 
under investigation were not only the product of the variables being 
investigated, but also of other uncontrolled and unknown factors 
producing further variation among the self-reports of the subjects. 
Therefore, the validity of this experiment was based on the theor,r 
that if the difference between the means was sufficiently large, 
yielding a t-value at the 1% and .5% level of confidence, then the finding 
may be considered significant and therefore reliable. 
Tests, null hypotheses, 1t 1 test~ among other methods, were basic 
means of research in this experiment. Although they were statistical 
determinants, producing certain findings, additional factors emerged 
to affect the validity and reliability of the experiment. They are as 
follows: 
(1) It was noted at the outset (Chapter I) that many perceptive 
or phenomenological factors may affect the accuracy of the self-reports; 
(2) the testing conditions tended also to affect the outcome of 
experimentation. The fact that the tests were given primarily within 
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the regular philosophy and religion survey class (Freshman Course), 
by the author, although aided by the Director of the Testing 
Bureau of Clark College, may have reinforced the students' religious 
bias against the religious implications of the study; (J) because 
the intelligence quotient of the average subject did not exceed 
90.63, which may be an indication of intellectual immaturity, an 
argument questioning the accuracy of their responses to test ques-
tions may have merit; (4) the randomness of the sample tended to be 
narrow. This may have been caused by the attempt of the examiner to 
correlate the subjects with respect to age, sex, denomination, in-
telligence quotient, and scores obtained from the respective in-
struments. 
(5) The number of subjects participating in the experiment 
may have also affected the variability of the scores. Larger samples 
tend to make for wider spread or dispersion of the subjects scares 
and moreover facilitate reliability; (6) because the study was 
restricted to Negro college freshmen of Clark College, a small Church-
related college located in the deep south, racial, sectional, and 
cultural factors may have conditioned its results; and finally (7) 
while the means is considered an approved statistical tool for 
measuring large groups, its validity remains questionable when it 
is used with the •t• test to interpret tt~ significance of an 
individual's self-report. 
2. Conclusions relating to tbe ID1Jl Hypothesis. 
The principal conclusions with respect to the three major 
hypotheses set up for evaluation in this study are as follows: 
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a. The first lzy'pothesis was supported. and rejected in part. 
(1) The compari son of the self-reports of the intra-sex 
religiosity groups, as measured by the Study of Values, was not 
significant, 
(2) The comparison of the self-reports of Methodist and 
Baptist groups, as measured by the Stu4y of Values. was not significant. 
(3) The comparison of the self-reports of the intra-sex 
religiosity groups, as measured by the In4ex of Adjustment and Va1ues, 
was not significant. 
(4) The comparison of the self-reports (self-concept, self-
acceptance, and ideal-self on the Self Index and the self-concept and 
discrepancy variables on the Other Index) of Methodist and Baptist 
groups, as measured by the Index of Adjustment and Va1ues, was not 
significant. 
(5) The comparison of the self-reports (theoretical, economic, 
and aesthetic values) of the female high with the male hieh religiosity 
group, as measured by the Study of Values, was not significant. 
(6) The comparison of the self-reports of the female low with 
the male low religiosity groups, as measured by the Stwiy of V§lues, 
was not significant. 
(7) The comparison of the self-reports of the inter-sex 
religiosity groups, as measured by the Index of Adjustment and Values, 
was not significant. 
(8} The comparison of the self-reports (discrepancy variable on 
the Self Index) of the Methodist and Baptist groups, as measured by 
the Index of Adjustment and Va1ues, was significant. 
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(9) The comparison of the self-reports (social, political, and 
religious values) of the female high with the male high religiosity 
groups, as measured by the Study o:t Values, was significant. 
(10) The comparison of the self-reports (social values) of the 
female low with the male low religiosity groups, as 112asured by the 
Study of Values, was significant. 
b. The second hypOthesis was supported and rejected in part. 
The results pertaining to external stability were as follows: 
(1) The comparison of the self-reports of the intra-sex 
religiosity groups, as measured by the Study" of Values, was not 
significant. 
(2) The comparison of the self-reports of the Methodist and 
Baptist groups, as measured by the study of Values, was not significant. 
(3) The comparison of the self-reports (Religious Conflict 
Scale, Orthodoxy Scale, Philosophy of Life Seale, Hostility to Church 
Scale, Religious Tranquility Seale, Religious Solace Scale, and 
Religious Attitude Change Scale) of the intr«Psex religiosity groups, 
as measured by the ~rimental Scales,was not significant. 
(4) The comparison of the self-reports . (religious values) of 
the female low with the male low religiosity groups, as measured by 
the Study of Values, was not significant. 
(5) The comparison of the self-reports (Orthodoxy Scale, 
Philosophy of Life Scale, Hostility to Church Scale, Religious Tran-
quility Scale, Religious Solace Scale, and Religious Attitude Change 
Scale) of the female high with the male high religiosity groups, as 
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measured by the Experimental Scales, was not significant. 
(6) The comparison of the self-reports (religious values) of 
the Methodist with Baptist groups, as measured by the Stugy of Values, 
was not significant. 
(7) The comparison of the self-reports (Religious Conflict 
Scale, Orthodoxy Scale , Philosophy of Life Scale, Religious Tran-
quility Scale, Hostilit y to Church Scale, Religious Solace Scale, and 
Religious Attitude Change Scale) of Methodist and Baptist groups as 
measured by the Experimental Scales, was not significant. 
(8) The comparison of the self-reports (religious values) of 
the female high with the male high religiosity groups, as measured 
by the Stu& of Values, was significant. 
(9) The comparison of the self-reports (Religious Conflict 
Scale, and Orthod~ Scale) of the female high with the male high 
religiosity group, as measured by the Experimental Scale, was 
significant. 
The results pertaining to internal stability were as follows: 
(1) The comparison of the self-reports of the religiosity 
variables on the Wesleyan Religiosity Index with the religious values 
on the Study of Values of the female high religiosity subject was not 
significant. 
(2) The comparison of the self-reports of the religiosity 
variables on the Wesleyan Religiosity Index with the religious values 
of the Study of Values of the male high religiosity group, was 
significant. 
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(3) The comparison of the self-reports of the religiosity 
variables on the Wesleyan Religiosity Index with the religious values 
on the Study; of Values of the male low religiosity group, was 
significant. 
(4) The comparison of the self-reports or the religiosity 
variables on the Wesleyan Religiosity; Index with the religious values 
on the Study of Values of the female high religiosity group, was 
significant. 
c. The third hy"pothesis was supported and rejected in part. 
(1) The comparison of the self-reports (raw score, Neurotic 
Stability Rank, and discrepancy factors) or the intra-sex religiosity 
groups, as measured by the Neurotic Personality; Factor Test, was not 
significant. 
(2) The comparison of the self-reports (raw score, Neurotic 
Stability Rank, and discrepancy factor) of the Methodist and Baptist 
groups, as measured by the Neurotic Personality Factor Test, was not 
significant. 
(3) The comparison of the self-reports (Manif'est Anxiety Scale) 
of t he intra-sex religiosity groups, as measured by the Experimental 
Scales, was not significant. 
(4) The comparison of the self-reports (Manifest Anxiety Scale) 
of Methodist and Baptist groups, as measl.D:"ed by the Experimental 
Scales, was not significant. 
(5) The comparison of the self-reports (raw scores, and 
discrepancy factors) of the female low with the male low religiosity 
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groups, as measured by the Neurotic Personality Factor Test, was not 
significant. 
(6) The comparison of the self-reports (Manifest Anxiety 
Scale) of the inter-sex religiosity groups, as measured by the 
Exoeri.mental Sca1es, was not significant. 
(7) The comparison of the self-reports (raw scores, Neurotic 
Stability Rank, and the discrepancy factor) of the female high and 
male high, as measured by the Neur.otic Personality Factor Test, was 
significant. 
(8) The comparison of the self-reports (Neurotic Stability 
Rank) of the female low with male low religiosity groups, as 
measured by the Neurotic Persona1ity Factor Test, was significant. 
3. Comparison of idiographic and Q.uantitatiye data. 
Four students were individual]Jr tested to compare their separate 
self-reports with the mean self-reports of their respective religiosity 
groups. This was done to ascertain whether these subjects showed any 
difference in the way they viewed themselves. 
Three judges evaluated the need responses of the subjects as 
measured by the Gilmpre Sentence Completion Test. Judges rated these 
responses according to six themes: (1) religious, (2) family relations, 
(3) sex, (4) aspiration, (5) self-views, and (6) prejudice. Themes 
consisted of the major responses of the subjects as interpreted by the 
author in terms of extreme attitudes. These attitudes were rated 
according to (1) negative, (2) ambivalent, and (3) positive feeling. 
A brief comparative analysis of the self-report of each religiosity 
subject with the mean self-report of each religiosity group will now be 
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discussed. 
a. Findings of m1ll h,.v:pothesis number one and its relation to 
some idiographic data. Hypothesis number one states: there is no 
significant difference in the self-evaluation of students of high and 
of low religiosity. 
Among the four intra-sex religiosity group findings, no 
significant difference was found. However, in four instances among 
the inter-sex religiosity group findings, significant differences 
were found in the self-evaluation of female high versus male high, and 
female low versus male low religiosity groups. In all instances of 
these comparisons, the weight of the self-reports was significantly 
reflected in the responses of the female group with the female high 
religiosity group showing the higher mean scores on the social, 
political, and religious values. Furthermore, in the idiographic 
findings, the female of highest religiosity was rated by the judges, 
showing only 15 self-views items in contrast with 77 items of the same 
subject classified under other themes. On the other hand, when the 
self-views of the total four religiosity subjects were rated by judges, 
it ranked in second place to the aspiration theme. Apparent differ-
ences appeared with respect to the way four religiosity subjects 
evaluated themselves and four religiosity groups evaluated themselves. 
Generally, the idiographic findings showed little similarity in 
the way students evaluated themselves as a religiosity group. 
b. Findings of nu11 hypothesis number two and its relation to 
some idiogrg.phic data. Hypothesis number two states: there is no 
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significant difference in the stability of the self-reports of 
students of high and of low religiosity. When the intra-sex religi-
osity groups were compared for significant difference in terms of 
their religious variables, no significant difference was found in the 
external stability of their self-reports. However, when the inter-
sex religiosity groups were measured for the same objective, the 
di~ference was significant in the case of (1) the religious values on 
the Study of Values and (2) the Religious Conflict Scale and orthodo:xy 
Scale. 
en the other hand, when the data for internal stability of the 
religious variables of the self-reports were observed, no significant 
difference was found when the religiosity and religious values 
variables of the female low group were compared. Yet, the data showed 
that the self-reports of the male high, male low, and female high 
religiosity groups were stable. 
Relative performances of the 4 religiosity subjects with that 
of the 4 religiosity groups showed a tendency toward a paralleled 
pattern with respect to external stability but a non-paralleled pattern 
with respect to internal stability. In the area of religion, the 
idiographic subjects showed least importance as rated bythe judges. 
Religion for aD. subjects ranked in fifth place from the highest 
position on the rank order. The female of highest religiosity was 
ranked in first place with 3 religious items; the female of lowest 
religiosity was ranked in a tie for second place with the male of 
lowest religiosity; and the male of highest religiosity was ranked 
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in last place. 
In summary, the self-reports of four religiosity subjects on 
religj.ous variables in contrast to four religiosity groups showed a 
sharp difference in the manner that the,y evaluated their religious 
experiences. However, both groups showed a uniform tendency toward 
internal stability of their self-reports in terms of their religious 
attitudes. 
c. Findings of n\lll hypothesis number t:hree and its relation 
to sgme idiggraphic ciata. Null hypothesis number three states: 
there is no significant difference in certain personality factors of 
students of high and of low religiosity. Intra-sex and inter-sex 
religiosity groups showed significant differences in relation to the 
Neurotic Persona1ity Factor Test. When the raw scores, Neurotic 
Stability Rank, and discrepancy factors were compared, the difference 
was significant with the weight of the difference reflected in favor 
of the male high group and male low religiosity group. Furthermore, 
the male low religiosity subject showed the highest degree of ambivalence 
and next to the lowest degree of positive traits. Likewise, the male 
high religiosity subject was rated to have the second highest rank for 
ambivalence. Therefore, the above data tended to confirm the rejection 
of hypothesis number three. 
4. Conclusions beyond the null cypothesis. Many additional state-
ments emerge as by-products of the theory and experimental findings of 
the dissertation. The following discussion is an attempt to relate such 
observations to the central problem of the study. Questions arising 
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from the universe of the study will be raised and answers given. 
(1) Do students scoring high on religiosity tend to be more or 
less theoreticallY, aesthetically, economica~, socially, politically 
and religiously oriented? Stuients,- scoring high on religiosity tended 
to be less theoretically, aesthetically, and economically, arxi mare 
socially, politically, and religiously oriented in their values. This 
was particularly true of inter-sex religiosity groups. Possibly, sex 
differences tended to influence the outcome of this question. The 
significant difference between the mean scores of the social, political, 
and religious values of female high and male high groups indicate 
that . the means of the female high are higher than the males. One 
may question whether this difference may be attributed to religious traits 
of the growing female adolescent or tbe social, poll tical, and religious 
factors potentially present in the adolescent1 s striving for social, 
political and religious acceptance. 
(2) Do students scoring high on religiosity tend to hold more or 
less positive attitudes toward themselves? Students taking part in 
this study did not reveal marked significant tendencies relative to 
this question. When intra-sex and inter-sex religiosity groups were 
compared no significant difference resulted. However, Methodist and 
Baptist students showed significant differences in the manner that trey 
viewed themselves, Baptist students scored significantly higher on the 
self-concept, self-acceptance, and ideal-self than Methodist students. 
On the other hand, Methodist students scored higher discrepancy scores 
than &p tist students. The tendency for Baptist students to hold more 
236 
positive attitudes toward themselves seems probable in contrast to 
Methodist students. However, since these denominational groups 
were mixed, it was difficult to calculate the import of high and 
low religiosity factors. 
(3) Do students scoring high on religiosity tend to show 
more or less anxiety tendencies, religious conflict, and neurotic 
tendencies? 
In this study there was a tendency for students of high 
religiosity to show signs of religious conflict and neurotic tenden-
cies. This was especially true in the case of female high and male 
high students. The emotional problems created by undue aspiration, 
insecurity, relating to authority figures, and the pressure of 
academic achievement may be the outcome of an inner religious con-
flict in the life of the adolescent freshmen. 
(4) Do students scoring high on religiosity tend to be more or 
less orthodox in their attitudes toward the conventional symbols of 
religion? 
In the case of female high and male high religiosity groups, 
students who scored high on religiosity also scored high on the 
Orthodoxy Scale. This meant that the students scoring in this mamer 
tended to define religion as a tendency to accept the teachings of 
religious authoritarianism, and conform to prescribed religious practices. 
It is interesting to note that the same inter-sex religiosity groups 
scoring high .on neurotic and religious conflict also showed strong 
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signs toward orthodoxy. It may well be that at the crucial point 
between the dynamic interplay of orthodox patterns of religion, which 
are closely interwoven in the culture of these students and the 
critical environment of the college campus, a genuine search for mean-
ing in their lives is being sought. 
(5) Do students scoring high on religiosity tend to be more or 
less consistent in their self-reports? 
The answer to this question provides a profile of the student's 
image of high religiosity. It was found that the student who scored 
high on religiosity tended to score high in neurotic tendencies, 
religious conflict, orthodoxy, social, political, and religious values. 
Significant t-distributions were found in relation to the six scores. 
The above pattern seems reasonable except for the appearance of orthodoxy. 
A deeper manifestation of orthodoxy may denote, in the students' cases, 
a tendency toward neurotic guilt. It does follow that there are possi-
ble grounds for establishing a logical relationship between the ortho-
dox student an:l his being laden with guilt feeling. This tendency may 
also be explained in the light of the fact tba t from the same sampling 
of high religiosity students, it was found that no significant trends 
were revealed in their self-reports of self-acceptance or ideal-self. 
S. Implications for turther research. The findings of this 
dissertation provide only tentative conclusions. These conclusions 
were reached in relation to many perplexing proBlems and challenging 
areas for new understanding. 
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Psychological investigation of the meaning of the self in 
relation to religion and personal adjustment is still an intellectual 
frontier. While recent findings of Rogers, Allport, Combs and Snygg 
tend to provide channels for further study of the self, the college 
student, , in confronting his religion while attempting to understand 
himself, has become the focal point for further empirical studies. 
Paralleled with this need are the deeper and more significant questions 
which the student raises: "Is religion really a matter of serious 
import?" "Does it really have meaning for me on the college campus?" 
In the light of the previous research, the author suggests 
certain implications for further study. 
The religious orientation of the college student needs to be 
couched in a new phenomenological framework. Briefly, a perceptual 
theory will provide the source which likewise will tem to aid the 
student in his quest for self-realization. 
Assuming that behavior is consistent with a behaver's perceptions 
about the world in which he lives, this orientation would provide the 
foundation for creative and wholesome growth. Although this belief is 
opposed to the metaphysical stress of fundamentalistic religious 
dogmas, nevertheless, it will provide a positive setting for the 
"emotional" and "religious" learning of the student. 
Realizing tta t t he student is conditioned by guilt-potential, 
anxiety provoking situations, and hostile pressures, one sees him 
dramatizing his frus t rations. However, what he perceives concerning 
himself and his world is vital to what he may become. His perceptions 
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are constantly influenced by his needs and values, the presence or 
absence of threat, opportunities for experience with new stimuli, the 
perceiver's physiological state, and his beliefs about himself and 
other people. 
Religion off ers the self-enhancement of the individual. And 
only recently, the studies of Strunk, Funk, et al have tended to 
indicate the need for a new. religious and psychological orientation 
which emphasizes self-affirmation rather than self-negation. Further-
more, sin according to fundamentalistic religion, may well be persona-
lity maladjustment caused by its own abortive dogmas. Instead, a 
theory which counsels the student into believing that he is adequate, 
worthwhile, possessing dignity, am integrity ani also believing 
that other people have similar perceptions of themselves is essential 
for the well-adjusted religiously oriented student. 
Phillip E. Jacobs' study, Changing Va1ues in College, reveals 
that students 11want to see a world of peace and justice but are not as 
a whole participating in crusades in order to transform their ideals 
into realities." Although insightful, this statement needs to be 
brought up to date so far as the American Negro college student is 
concerned. The Student Si t-In Movement in Southern Negro college 
communities is one of the most significant events in the second half 
of the twentieth centur,y. Negro students in contrast to the overtones 
of Jacobs' study are parti cipating in a social crusade as they struggle 
to regain self-identity, new dignity, and a new image of the ideal-self. 
It is within the context of such movemmt that religion on the 
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Negro college campus, facilitated by a phenomenological orientation, 
may become the crucial molding center for new life. Further research 
in the area of ascertaining the changing Negro student image, 
vocational guidance and counseling, experiments with group dynamic 
sessions and classroom instruction, employment of phenomenological 
theor,y and method in pastoral counseling are but a few suggested areas 
where empirical studies are needed to help the Negro student accept 
the challenge of his ideal image. 
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ABSTRACT 
1. The Problem 
The problem of this dissertation is to determine if there is 
any significant difference between the ways tudents of high and of 
low religiosity vievl themselves. "Religiosity" refers to religious 
behavior in church at tendance and contributions, in reading religious 
literature, and in affirming religious belief. 
2. The Method 
This study tested religiosity by using Strunk's Wesleyan 
Religiosity Index, which was administered to 186 students, enrolled 
in a required first year course. Of these, 74 students were 
classified as "high re l igiosity, 11 and SO as "low religiosity •11 The 
scores in religiosity were then correlated statistica1ly with the 
self-reports of these students. To evaluate the self-reports and 
personality characteristi cs of the students involved, five other 
standard tests were administered. 
3. Conclusions 
(1) For the most part, Methodist and Baptist groups did not 
vary significantly in self-evaluation. 
1 
2 
(2) On the other hand, the self-evaluation of the Methodist 
and Baptist groups differed significantly with respect to the dis-
crepancy between self-rating and other rating on the Index of 
Adjustment and Values. 
(3) The female high and male high religiosity groups dif fered 
significantly with respect to the religious values. Likewise, the 
female high and the male high, and the female low and male low, 
differed significantly in terms of the religious conflict and 
orthodoxy. 
(4) The personality factors were measured by the Neurotic 
Personality Factor Test. These factors were defined in terms of the 
raw score, neurotic stability rank, and the discrepancy score. The 
female high religiosity group showed greater emotional stability 
than the male high. The female low religiosity group showed greater 
emotional stability than the male low. 
(5) Students scoring high on religiosity tended to be less 
theoretically, aesthetically, and economically oriented, but more 
socially, politically and religiously oriented. 
(6) Students scoring high on religiosity showed no consistent 
positive or negative self-images. Baptist students scored signifi-
cantly higher on the self-concept, self-acceptance, and the ideal-
self than the Hethodist students. 
(7) Signs of religious conflict are more evident in the case 
of high religiosity groups than low. 
Students who scored high on religiosity also scored high on 
the orthodoxy variables of the Funk Experimental Scales. This shows 
3 
religion for these students to be a tendency to accept religious 
authorities and conform to prescribed religious practices. We may 
infer a restless submission here, for these same students also scored 
high on religious conflict. 
(8) Male students tended to score higher in neurotic ten-
dencies than the female students. The female high religiosity group 
reported more orthodoxy and appreciation for social, political, and 
religious values. We may infer that the le s s orthodox males are 
atvare of more religious and neurotic conflict. 
In summary, the hypothesis of this study was generally sup-
ported; na.mely, that self-reports show no significant difference 
in the self -evaluation, consistency, and certain personality factors 
of students of high and of low religiosity. It indicated that 
religiosity is not the decisive concern for these students. It 
appears that the entire culture and interpersonal relationships are 
more important to them than the single factor of religiosity. 
However, in the crucial struggle with orthodox patterns of religion, 
students undergo anxiety, religious conflict, and ambiguous self-
images. A genuine search for an understanding of themselves in 
relation to the demands of the church-related college may impel them 
to reconsider traditional religious forms. In such a time of 
searching there is strategic opportunity for religious teaching in 
a supportive college community. 
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